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Introduction
This is a story about a man, a treaty; and a nation. The man is John
Quincy Adams: son of a president, congressman, president and the
greatest secretary of state in American history: The treaty is the
Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, which acquired Florida, secured a
western boundary extending to the Pacific Ocean, and, I argue, repre-
sented the first determined step in the creation of an American global
empire. The nation is the United States, the most powerful nation-
state in world history and a country in whose growth and develop-
ment Adams perceived himself destined to playa crucial role.
Samuel Flagg Bemis writes that "the historical figure of John
Quincy Adams stands betlind that of Abraham Lincoln in the history
of this Union." 1 Given Adams's lifetime of service and achievement,
Bemis's judgment is sound. Yet Adams's historical significance is not
limited to a recitation of his remarkable public accomplishments. Of
equal and perhaps greater significance are the peculiar circumstances
of his life, which unfolded in parallel to that of the nation. A child of
the nation's preeminent revolutionary couple, Adams watched the
.Battle of Bunker Hill from his mother's knee,2 suffered a personal
crisis during the "critical period". of the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution, found :himself in the middle of the controversy
surrounding the Louisiana Purchase, and wrestled throughout his life
·with the moral and practical dilemmas presented by black slavery:
IThese and other aspects of Adams's life resonate strongly with the
history of the nation. When he died at the climax of the Mexican War,
the nation knew that an era had passed with him. This is "great man"
Jhistory; although not in the traditional sense in which the term is
lused. Adams's historical significance may be seen less in his public
achievements than in the ironies that characterized his life. Perhaps
lffiore than anyone of his time, John Quincy Adams lived at the
intersection of the personal and the public; in a very real sense, the
story of his life is the story of a nation.
I examine in detail Adams's greatest contribution to the American
llation: the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. A major event in a year
that saw the beginning of the Missouri debates and the Panic of 1819,
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its significance has been underestimated by historians. The acquisi-
tion of Florida with which it is most often associated was in fact
secondarily important to the transcontinental claim it secured and
the global vision that informed its negotiation. The Transcontinental
Treaty (along with the policies pursued during its negotiation) was the
foundation of Monroe's "doctrine" of American hemispheric domi-
nance. Moreover, the acquisition of a claim to the Oregon territory in
exchange for a claim to Texas established a dynamic that would
determine the course of American expansionism until the Civil War.
Adams's brilliant diplomatic achievement deserves renewed explica-
tiotl: his conduct of foreign affairs in the perilous circumstances of
1817 improved the nation's position so as to allow Monroe to declare
the Western Hemisphere off limits to further European colonization
by I)ecember 1823. It is the skill with which Adams transformed the
nation's international position from one of relative weakness to one
of relative strength which merits for him the title of "America's
greatest secretary of state." His vision of empire persisted in the
policies of William Seward and John Hay:
I)uring the conduct of the negotiations with Spain, Adams con-
fronted the dilemmas that divided the nation and ultimately broke it
apart. The interrelated problems of slaver~ sectionalism, and im-
pending financial crisis which influenced the outcome of the treaty
forced Adams to compromise his personal integrity in ways that his
personal myth forbade. In so doing, he gradually realized that the
Founders' dream of a virtuous republic in wpich the common good
took precedence over individual self-interest was itself compromised
and that the nation faced inevitable civil war.
This study is informed primarily by three areas of American histor-
ical scholarship. First, as a contribution to the history of American
foreign relations, it seeks to occupy a place between Alexander De-
Conde's This Affair of Louisiana and Norman Graebner's Empire on
the Pacific. DeConde's keen insights regarding the imperialist im-
pulse behind the Louisiana Purchase have been a point of departure
for my understanding of the treaty: Graebner's thesis that the expan-
sionism of the 1840s can be understood as motivated by a desire for
Pacific ports has been extended backward in time. In this regard the
Transcontinental Treaty can be understood as a prelude to "Polk's
aggressive diplomacy:" In addition, William Appleman Williams's
landmark article "The Age of Mercantilism" has suggested a frame-
work within which to explain the foreign policy of the Monroe
administration.
Second, during the last quarter-century the influence of a classical
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republican tradition on the revolutionary generation has been docu-
mented by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, J.G.A. Pocock, Joyce
Appleb~ and others. Their work emphasizes that generation's percep-
tion that the survival of the American republican experiment de-
pended on the virtue of its citizens. A republican people had to resist
the temptations of personal ambition, self-interest, and faction if the
republic was to withstand the disintegrative effects of time. The
Adams family can be considered "classical republicans ll : for three
generations, public service was the axis around which the family
oriented its existence. John Quincy Adams was groomed from early
childhood to occupy what was assumed to be his destined role of
leadership. His moral, religious, and educational training were all
intended to create the ideal republican leader, one whose personal
integrity matches the purity of his public vision. Adams acted out the
myth of the classical republican, so much so that late in life he
identified with the Roman statesman Cicero. Adams steadfastly as-
serted an ethic holding that process is as important as result, that
public service must not be tainted by private ambition. Yet he lived in
an era in which ambition and self-interest were becoming the motive
forces in American societ~This basic tension in his life forced him to
choose between adhering to his ideals and realizing his appointed
destin~ In the end, Adams opted for diplomatic and electoral success
at the cost of his sense of virtue. By so doing, he demonstrated the ir-
relevance of classical republican notions of public service in the nine-
teenth centur~ In this sense, Adams's life bore witness to the truths
contained in the predictions of republican disintegration and col-
lapse.
Third, although the sheer size of the Adams Family Papers (605
reels of microfilm, more than ,150 for John Quincy Adams alone)
prohibits a comprehensive reexamination of his life, I have closely
examined the record of the period from late 1817 to early 1819, during
which Adams negotiated the treaty with Spain. I attempt to chronicle
this moment, so crucial to both the life of Adams and the history of
the nation. Then, using the work of his numerous biographers, I seek
to contextualize my understanding of this critical time in Adams's
life within the broader perspective of both his career and the nation's
history. Brooks and Henry Adams's perception of their grandfather is
the starting point for this analysis; of near-equal importance is the
two-volume biography of Adams by Samuel Flagg Bemis.
, My research has confirmed Brooks and Henry Adams's perception
of the tragic nature of their grandfather's life. Raised to believe that a
loving God exercised His will in rationally ascertainable ways and
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that the United States was an agent of divine will, Adams discovered
during the course of his life the inscrutable nature of divine provi-
dence and the unlikelihood that the nation he had served so faithfully
could be an agent of that providence. He realized that his destiny (and
that of the Adams family) was not to lead the nation but to serve as a
symbol for all that Jacksonian America rejected. In an attempt to be
the "man of the whole nation," Adams had (as Brooks put it) "minis-
tered to the demon" of Jacksonianism and slavery: His "second ca-
reer" as a member of the House of Representatives can, in large part,
be understood as a repudiation of the achievements of his first career
as a national leader. Like John C. Calhoun, Adams evolved from
staunch nationalist to fiery sectionalist, one who anticipated and
encouraged the breakup of the Union.
I have quoted extensively from Adams's diary (both published and
unp'ublished), letters, and public writings in order to reveal the
pungent eloquence of his expression. This is not to suggest that
Adams's words are coterminous with the "truth." His famous diar~
kept almost daily for more than half a centur~ is better understood as
epic American literature than as an "objective" view of the world. His
rich and voluminous expression suggests multiple meanings; Henry
Adams's dictum that "no one means all he says, and yet very few say
all they mean, for words are slippery and thought is viscous" holds
true for his grandfather.3 The interpretation advanced here is by no
means the only plausible one. Yet I hope the reader will perceive the
tormented soul that emerges from the profusion of words that de-
fined John Quincy Adam.s's life. For Adams, words ultimately proved
a trap that obscured as much as they illuminated the reality he
inhabited. It is a lesson. to be heeded by scholars of the Western
tradition.
ONE
Destiny
Oh! God, my only trust went there
Through all life's scenes before
Lo! At the throne again I bo~
New mercies to implore.
Grant active power, grant fervent zeal;
and guide by thy controul;
and ever be my country's weal
the purpose of my soul.
Extend, all seeing God, thy hand
In memory still decree
And make, to bless thy native land
An instrument of me.
From John Quincy Adams's diary,
21 September 1817
Fifty years old in 1817, John Quincy Adams stood at the crossroads of
an already remarkable life. Returning from his post as United States
minister to Great Britain, he prepared to assume the office of secre-
tary of state in the new administration of James Monroe. The appoint-
ment represented both an opportunity and a risk for Adams; all his
previous accomplishments would count for little if he failed in his
new job.
No American had been better prepared to be secretary of state.
Adams's entire life had led to this end; if he failed, it would not be for
lack of experience. His diplomatic career had begun at age twelve,
when he accompanied his father to Paris to serve as his secretary in
the negotiations to end the War of Independence. George Washington,
acting as a patron to the young Adams, appointed him to his first
diplomatic post in 1794 as United States minister to the Netherlands.
At The Hague, Adams received his mature introduction to European
diplomac~ It proved a strategic spot from which to watch the balance
of the French Revolution unfold. Adams's reports home told of the
extensive influence of Jacobinism in the nominally independent
Netherlands. His experiences there reinforced what became a life-
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long hostility to the French Revolution and a suspicion of revolutions
generally: 1
From The Hague, in 1795 Adams went to London, where he as-
sisted in the final exchange of ratifications of Jay's Treaty: Though not
entirely successful in his mission, he had the opportunity to deal face
to face with some of the most skilled diplomats in Europe. It proved
an educational if chastening experience.
Adams's first important diplomatic assignment came in 1797
when his father, now president, appointed his son to be the first
United States minister to Prussia. In Berlin he negotiated his first
treat~ an agreement outlining commercial relations between the
United States and Prussia. The most important issue concerned the
lnaritime rights of neutrals, a cause Adams championed the rest of his
life. The negotiations gave him his first opportunity to bargain by
diplomatic note; he later became a master of this technique. A keen
and tireless observer of people and events, Adams found his four years
in Prussia an invaluable part of his education as a diplomat.2
After a brief and uninspiring interlude practicing law in his native
Massachusetts, Adams returned to public life in 1803 as a United
States senator. Nominally a Federalist, he pursued an independent
political course that resulted in his siding frequently with the Repub-
licans. He was the only Federalist from New England in either house
to support the Louisiana Purchase; moreover, he strongly supported
Jefferson's embargo, a policy that was anathema to most New Eng-
landers.3 Adams paid a price for his principled stands, being recalled
from office prior to the end of his term. Yet he had established a
reputation as a powerful spokesman for expansion and nationalism.
Rebuked by his own part~Adams formally switched allegiance to
the Republicans in 1808. Not long after, President James Madison
rewarded his support by appointing him minister to Russia. Adams
stayed in St. Petersburg from 1809 to 1814 and developed a cordial
relationship Tsar Alexander I. The two men went on long walks
together, during which Adams gained further insight into the intri-
cacies of European balance-of-power politics.4 The dazzling court life
of St. Petersburg enlightened but did not beguile him; the soirees
permitted him to observe and study the European diplomatic corps.
.Adams's most important achievement in Russia concerned a conflict
over the northwest coast of North America: he instinctively refused a
.Russian offer that would in effect have recognized the Russian right
to fur trading posts in the region. This turned out to be the first step in
,a long strategy that eventually resulted in the formal statement
prohibiting further European colonization in the Western Hemi-
sphere-the Monroe Doctrine.
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From St. Petersburg, Adams went directly to the city of Ghent in
Belgium, where he chaired the American peace comission negotiat-
ing an end to the War of 1812. Here he had the opportunity to
duplicate the peacemaking achievements of his father. Many of the
issues in dispute were the same as those in 1782: boundaries, fishing
rights, and the status of the native peoples of North America. At first,
a favorable settlement seemed unlikely; however, a shift in bat-
tlefield fortunes and the determined work of the American commis-
sioners salvaged an agreement based on the status quo ante bellum. In
light of the circumstances, it was a formidable diplomatic accom-
plishment.
For Adams, the triumph at Ghent opened the door to the preemi-
nent position in the American foreign service-minister to Great
Britain. The rising diplomat made the most of his opportunity: He
participated in the negotiation of the Anglo-American Commercial
Convention of July 1815, having been at his post less than a month.
He laid the foundation for the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, a pact
limiting Anglo-American naval forces on the Great Lakes. Most
important, he worked diligently to cultivate good relations between
the United States and Great Britain.
British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh joined Adams in the
quest for closer Anglo-American ties. Though of very different per-
sonalities, the two men were like-minded when it came to the neces-
sity of ending hostilities between the two nations. The dawn of the
post-Napoleonic era made clear the interest each nation had in peace,
trade, and expansion. The alignment of forces making possible the
Monroe Doctrine began to evolve at this time; Castlereagh and
Adams played a central role in that evolution.5
In sum, John Quincy Adams had led a life of distinguished achieve-
ment. His career to a remarkable degree mirrored that of his father,
yet he had not reached the presidenc~ the post for which all previous
accomplishments had been mere preparation. Adams had spent sev-
enteen of the previous twenty-three years abroad, establishing an
enviable reputation in European courts from St. Petersburg to Lon-
don. Now it was time to assume a position of leadership at home and
perhaps a place in history on a par with the near-mythical figures of
the previous generation. To Adams it must have seemed that in some
ways his career was only beginning.
It is therefore not surprising that Adams suffered from anxiety and
self-doubt in the weeks and months before his return to America.
Plagued with sleeplessness and physical ailments, he toyed with the
idea of turning down the offer to head the Department of State. Even
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before Monroe offered the position, Adams wrote to William Eustis, a
family friend, that he had "several strong, personal motives" for not
accepting and that "the pros and cons [are] so nearly balanced that I
'willingly postpone the decision until there shall be a certainty that it
will be called for." 6 Formal nomination to the post did not end his
indecision; he wrote to his mother on 23 April 1817 of his "very
serious doubts" as to his competency for the job. He feared that he
could not "conciliate" his self-respect and "spirit of personal inde-
pendence" with the subordination the job would require. Ultimately;
as he did so often in times of crisis, Adams relied on his faith in God to
assuage his uncertainties; he wrote his mother that "the disposer of
every gift can alone enable me faithfully and acceptably to perform my
duties." 7 In retrospect, Adams's doubts as to his competency seem
more coquettish than sincere. No American had more reason for con-
fidence about his ability to discharge the duties of secretary of state.
'Yet no American bore a greater burden of history and destiny than
John Quincy Adams. Success for him was measured in terms far
grander than for other men. The Founding Fathers had taken an active
interest in him from the time he assisted his father in Europe. George
Washington (after whom Adams named his firstborn) had launched
his diplomatic career. Thomas Jefferson played a large role in his
personal development: John Adams once wrote to the Sage of Mon-
ticello that John Quincy"appeared to be as much your boy as mine." 8
Finally; there was the example of his father-peace negotiator, vice-
president, president-a giant among giants, constantly held up to the
young boy as the personification of virtue and wisdom. Against this
backdrop of immortality; John Quincy Adams hesitantly approached
his term as secretary of state, unsure of his ability to measure up to
his father's generation yet compelled by his family to tr~
IIldeed, he has the distinction of being, as Samuel Flagg Bemis
observed, the only nation.alleader whose parents planned his life for
him that wa~9 John Quincy Adams bore the responsibility of extend-
ing the fame of a family convinced of its role as an agent of national
destiny-a responsibility made greater by the alcoholism and dis-
sipation of his two brothers. For Adams, success required extending
the achievements of his father's generation. Anything less would be
failure. Abigail Adams continually reminded her eldest son of his
special destiny as "a guardian of the laws, libert)', and religion of your
country; as your father ... had already been." 10 She stressed the
heritage of previous generations and the need for their work to be
continued: "Glory my son in a country which has given birth to
characters, both in the civil and military departments, which may vie
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with the wisdom and valor of antiquit~ As an immediate descendant
of one of these characters, may you be led to an imitation of that
disinterested patriotism and that noble love of countr)', which will
teach you to despise wealth, titles, pomp, and equipage, as mere
external advantages, which cannot add to the internal excellence of
your mind, or compensate for the want of integrity or virtue." 11 The
emphasis was on service, integrit)', and, most important, a con-
formity between one's personal values and public actions.
John Adams, despite his long absences from home (he was away for
all but six months of the years between 1774 and 1781), took an active
interest in the upbringing of his children. His letters to Abigail
continually stress that she must be attentive to the moral, religious,
and educational training of their brood. He urged her to "mould the
minds and manners of our children.... teach them not only to do
virtuously but to excell." Abigail was to "train them to virtue,
habituate them to industr)', activit)', and spirit. Make them consider
every vice, as shameful and unmanly." He feared his absence would
hinder the educational and moral development of his children.
"Truth, sobriet)', and industry" were to be "perpetually inculcated
upon them." 12 The lessons were of the utmost importance, for John
Adams believed that the survival of the republic depended on "a small
number of the ablest men" serving their nation virtuously and un-
selfishly. 13 John Quincy Adams was from birth groomed to be one of
these men.
While both his parents envisioned John Quincy as a future leader,
it was Abigail who did the most to mold his mind. During her hus-
band's long absences she formed an especially close attachment to
John Quinc~ One historian writes that"she attended to every aspect,
from his appearance to his soul." 14 Her precocious son provided
sorely needed conversation and companionship during John's ab-
sences. 1S From his early teens she treated John Quincy as an adult,
referring to him from time to time as "young Hercules." 16 Ardently
interested in the success of her husband, Abigail deemed John Quincy
the heir to greatness. She groomed him for future responsibilities,
admonishing him at age twelve that "nothing is wanting from you
but attention, diligence, and steady application. Nature has not been
deficient." 1 7
Abigail and John knew that destin)', in order to be fulfilled, had to
be prepared for. The success of the United States as the redeemer
nation required that it be led by virtuous and learned men. Con-
sequentl)', religion and education became the cornerstones of John
DESTINY 11
Quincy Adams's world. Abigail wrote to him in 1780: "The only sure
and permanent foundation of virtue is religion. Let this important
truth be engraven upon your heart." 18 She cultivated in her son a
belief in an infinitely wise, just, and good God who held out the
promise of etemallife to those who lived on earth the principle of the
Golden Rule, thus reinforcing the relationship between right conduct
and earthly reward. Moreove~ she stressed to him that "you are
accountable to your Maker for all your words and actions." 19 John
Quincy took to heart his mother's religious instruction. Christian
belief guided his life more than that of any other American political
leader of his age. Adams read the Bible daily upon arising, believing it
to be divine revelation. As an adult he read it in French and German
translations.20
John Quincy Adams came to rely heavily on his faith in God to
surmount the frequent crises he faced. His belief in the power of
human reason did not prevent him from appreciating the essentially
unknowable nature of the universe. In this vein he wrote: "That same
God who in one person exacts the punishment, in another person
sustains it [and] thus makes his own mercy pay the satisfaction to his
own injustice-this is not reason-it is mystery:" 21 Religious faith
provided Adams with a justification for life's sufferings that his
rationalist philosophy could not. .
Education served as the other cornerstone of John Quincy Adams's
life, the second means by which one prepared to serve destiny: Bemis
writes that his parents "prescribed his education to a degree that
would stagger a modern psychologist. " 22 As a toddler, the first book
he read was Giles Gingerbread: A Little Boy Who Lived upon Learning,
which taught that "merit and industry may entitle a man to any
thing." The stories in the book stressed the importance of familial
duty; rigid adherence to moral precepts, piety; hard work, and a love
for learning. In later years Abigail fondly recalled John Quincy's
learning the lessons of Giles Gingerbread by heart.23 By age ten he
had read most of the works of Shakespeare and Pope. His travels with
his father gave his education a strongly European flavor. After attend-
ing prep schools in Paris and Amsterdam (and gaining the benefits of
his father's tutoring), he enrolled for a while at the University of
Leyden. By his teenage years he had mastered French, Latin, German,
and Dutch; he would later acquire Greek and a rudimentary knowl-
edge of Spanish. His fluent French allowed him to serve at age four-
teen as interpreter on Francis Dana's mission to Russia.
Reading "the great books" proved a major source of enlightenment
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and enjoyment for John Quincy Adams throughout his life. At age
seven he began to read excerpts from Charles Rollin's Ancient History
to his mother.24 He had a thorough knowledge of both English and
French literature and history. He was an expert on the literature of
classical Greece and Rome, reading as a teenager the works of, among
others, Cicero, Suetonius, Liv~ Herodotus, Aristotle, and Plutarch in
their original Latin and Greek. He translated Virgil's Aeneid and the
works of Tacitus.25 Such was his love for the writings of Tacitus and
Cicero that later in life he declared that to be deprived of their
wisdom would be akin to the loss of a limb.
John Quincy Adams's intense study of the ancient world was not
solely for academic purposes. The works particularly of the classical
historians, representing the accumulated experience of the ages,
served as invaluable guides to the present. Abigail wrote to sixteen-
year-old John Quincy: "It is instructive to trace the various causes,
which produced the strength of one nation, and the decline and
weakness of another; to learn by what arts one man has been able to
subjugate millions of his fellow creatures ... sometimes driven by
ambition and a lust of power; at other times, swallowed up by relig-
ious enthusiasm, blind bigotr~ and ignorant zeal; sometimes en-
ervated with luxury and debauched by pleasure, until the most
powerful nations have become a prey and been subdued by these
sirens, when neither the number of their enemies, nor the prowess of
their arms, could conquer them." 26 Hence the modern lessons of the
evils of luxury and the necessity of virtue received ancient con-
firmation. Throughout his life John Quincy Adams relied on the
experience of the past to serve as a lens through which to evaluate the
issues and events of his own da~27
While it was Abigail who did the most to shape John Quincy during
his formative years, the influence of John Adams cannot be underesti-
mated. Abigail's political philosophy mirrored that of her husband.
The necessity of mixed government, the limits of egalitarianism, and
the use of history as a tool for learning were all axiomatic to John and
were faithfully passed on via Abigail to John Quinc~28 This sim-
ilarity in political philosophy between father and son later prompted
Joseph Addison of the London Spectator to remark, "Curse on the
stripling, how he apes his sire."
In addition to his impressive knowledge of languages, literature,
and histor~ John Quincy Adams became, during the course of his life,
well-schooled in the sciences. In the tradition of Franklin and Jeffer-
son he was a meticulous observer of the natural world. He kept a daily
record of the temperature and became an amateur horticulturalist.
DESTINY 13
His investigation of weights and measures proved a classic in the
field. 29 His work on behalf of the Smithson bequest was essential to
the establishment of the Smithsonian Institution. Awestruck by the
heavens, Adams developed a thorough knowledge of celestial objects.
His advocacy of the development of observatories in the United
States earned him a place as one of the fathers of American astron-
omy.3D Bemis writes: "No one save Franklin had done so much to
advance the cause of science in America. 11 31
John Quincy Adams envisioned education as the natural comple-
ment to religion. He believed that God's laws could be discerned by
scientific investigation and that, once learned, these laws could be
used for the improvement of humanity.32 Therefore, he pushed for
federal suport of education and science, including the establishment
of a national university; long before it became acceptable to do 80.33
Adams's belief in the power of learning and of the potential for human
improvement through education is an interesting counterpoint in the
life of a man often described (with some justice) as puritanical.
While stressing the importance of education for cultivating the
mind and of religion for ministering to the soul, Abigail and John did
not overlook the physical aspect of existence. John' urged Abigail to
augment the mental and moral training of their children with exer-
cise: "Without strength and activity and vigor of body; the brightest
mental excellencies will be eclipsed and obscured./ 34 Abigail was
more direct. She informed John Quincy that"our bodies are framed of
such materials as to require constant exercise to keep them in repair,
to brace the nerves and give vigor to the animal functions. 11 35 Again,
their son took the advice of his parents to heart. Physical exercise
became almost as much a part of his daily life as did reading the Bible.
Historians have long noted his habit of swimming in the Potomac, a
practice he continued into his late seventies. In Washington he rou-
tinely walked to his office and also took long solitary strolls as a
means of relaxation from the stresses of official duties. John Quincy
Adams's exercise regimen and naturally resilient constitution gave
him an awesome capacity for work: for years he was known as the
hardest-working, most indefatigable person in Washington.36
Although Abigail and John worked endlessly to make their prized
son appreciate the importance of piety and learning, all the encour-
agement, prodding, and lessons in the world would have been fruit-
less had not he been so receptive to their admonitions. From his
earliest days he sought to seek his parents' approval by fulfilling their
hopes for him. Undoubtedly; John Quincy Adams's love for his
mother and his desire to show his devotion to her fueled his intense
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efforts to please. He loved his mother more than he loved anyone else
during his long life. Brooks Adams later wrote that Adams/s "love and
veneration for his mother ... even passed the adoration of Catho-
lics for the Virgin. 1I3? To fulfill her hopesl to live up to her expecta-
tionsl became paramount to him at an early age. Thus when Abigail
wrote to ten-year-old John Quincy that "I would rather you should
have found your grave in the ocean you have crossedl or that any
untimely death crop you in your infant yearsl then see you an im-
morall profligatel or graceless childl ll it profoundly effected the future
statesman.38 Abigail pleaded with her eldest son to "preserve your
innocence and pure conscience. Your morals are of more importancel
both to yourself and the worldl than all languages and sciences. The
least stain upon your character will do more harm to your happiness
than all accomplishments will do it good. II 39 In shortl John Quincy
Adams/s lifelong determination to lead a principledl moral life can be
understood as the natural result of an upbringing that conditioned his
happinessl his success l and even his salvation on doing SO.40
While religion and education were meant to prepare John Quincy
Adams for leadershipl destiny was to be fulfilled by selfless service to
the nation and devotion to the ideals on which the republic had been
founded. Abigail and John believed that the fate of the nation de-
pended on the willingness of its wise and virtuous members to take
an active role in civic affairs. They saw the United States as the
manifestation of divine will; to serve the republic was to serve both
God and the cause of humanity: Abigail continually held up to John
Quincy the image of his father as the embodiment of patriotic virtue.
Indeedl she stressed that the greatness of the nation (like the salvation
of its citizens) depended on the virtue and morality of its leaders. No
family in American history has more personified the ideal of service
to the nation than the Adamses; and no members of that family
devoted more of themselves to the country than did John Quincy:41
Adams bore the burden of extending the fame of his family as well
as that of the nation. He knew that to be anything less than extraordi-
nary in his achievements meant a betrayal of the family. One his-
torian terms this ethic the "Adams family myth. II 42 Inculcated
unconsciously as well as consciousl~ it taught that political power
could be attained only by moral and educational superiority; more-
overl it stressed that the reward for such superiority must be freely
bestowed rather than sought. To grasp for powerl to actively seek the
approbation and support of one/s fellow citizensl was as serious an
offense as to ignore one/s public duties entirely: In shortl personal
ambition was an egregious moral failing.
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The"Adams family myth" created severe tension in the mind of
John Quincy Adams. It demanded personal striving for success yet
denied that it might be done for personal satisfaction. The myth
stressed achievement but condemned personal aggrandizement.
Adams was to emulate the accomplishments of his father but was
prohibited from doing so in any way that smacked of selfishness or
personal ambition. At times it must have seemed an unbearable
burden for him. It is little wonder that his brothers Charles and
Thomas, raised under similar injunctions, found comfort in alco-
ho1.43
Indeed, the myth the Adams family created for itself was a burden
for all its members. Deeply distressed by her husband's long absences,
Abigail rationalized them as necessary sacrifices for the common
good and the progress of the nation. She found the strength to go on in
the belief that "the honour of my dearest friend, the welfare and
happiness of this wide extended country; ages yet unborn, depend for
their happiness and security; upon the able and skillful, the honest
and upright discharge of the important trust committed to him." 44
Although these lines seem exaggerated, time has demonstrated that
Abigail's personal sacrifices were indeed necessary for the good of the
country.45 She wrote to her husband: "All domestick pleasures and
injoyments are absorbed in the great and important duty you owe
your country 'for our country is as it were a secondary God, and the
first and greatest parent'.... Thus do I suppress every wish, and
silence every murmuI:, acquiescing in a painful separation. 11 46 For
three generations the Adamses served their country at the cost of long
familial separations.
During his late teens and early twenties, John Quincy Adams
balked at the role that had been prescribed for him. He did not choose
to be a man of destiny; destiny (through the agency of his parents) had
chosen him. He suffered from frequent depressions as he tried to
reconcile in his own mind what was important in life. One biographer
has noted that his personal "critical years" coincided with the
"critical period" of American history during which the Constitution
was drafted and ratified.47 While it might be too much to suggest, in
the words of Hawthorne, that "jollity and gloom contended for an
empire" in the heart of the young native of Mount Wollaston (later
Quincy; and Hawthorne's Merrymount), it is clear that the years
1785-94-spent first at Harvard and then as a lawyer-were a time of
anguish and indecision for John Quincy Adams. The prescription of a
life of public service conflicted with his deepest yearnings to be a man
of letters and a poet, the latter inclination undoubtedly derived from
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his mother.48 Destiny meant the unrelenting sacrifice of personal
desires without any expectation of personal reward. By late adoles-
cence he had not yet resigned himself to such a life.
Adams struggled during this time to overcome his physical desires.
At fourteen he suffered a passionate and unrequited love for a young
French actress whom he never met in person. The experience engen-
dered in him a lifelong suspicion of ladies of the stage.49 His flir-
tatious encounters with the opposite sex were countered by brutal
after-the-fact assessments of the objects of his fancy. At twenty-three
he broke off an engagement, at the insistence of his mother, with
Mary Frazier of Newburyport. Abigail feared that choosing a mate at
such a young age would hinder her son's career as a statesman.
Obedient to his mother's wishes, John Quincy Adams nonetheless
never forgot Mary Frazier or loved another woman (with the excep-
tion of his mother) as much.50
The cultivation of Adams's mental powers and moral faculties
came at the expense of the growth of a well-rounded personalit~His
childhood was anything but "normal. lI In his first letter (written at
age six) he admonished himself, attributing his lack of progress in
reading to spending "too much of my time in play.1I He added that
"there is a great deal of room for me to grow better. II 51 In his first
letter to his father, the young Adams wrote: "I hope I grow a better boy
and that you will have no occasion to be ashamed of me when you
retum. 1I 52 He preached to his younger brothers: "We are sent into this
world for some end. It is our duty to discover by close study what that
end is and when we discover it to pursue it with unconquerable
perseverance. II 53 His long travels, disjointed education, and experi-
ences in adult circles deprived Adams of the benefits of a peer group to
grow up with. He always occupied the role of the outsider. At Harvard
his long absence from the United Sates and what he perceived as the
foolishness of his classmates combined to make him a solitary fig-
ure.54
Adams never mastered the art of social conversation. When his
reticence did not render him uncommunicative, his pugnaciousness
tended to make him argumentative in discussions. He recognized his
shortcomings in this regard: "I went out this evening in search of
conversation, an art of which I never had an adequate idea.... I am by
nature a silent animal, and my dear mother's constant lesson in
childhood, that children in company should be seen and not heard,
confirmed me irrevocably in what I now deem a bad habit. II 55 A man
of many acquaintances, John Quincy Adams had few friends. The
surface most people dealt with was austere, dour. His son Charles
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Francis thought his father "the only man I ever saw whose feelings I
could not penetrate.... I can study hi~ countenance forever and very
seldom find any sure guide by which to move." S6
Washington's appointment of John Quincy Adams as minister to
the Netherlands ended all doubts regarding his future. The beginning
of his public career marked the triumph of destiny over introspection,
of public service over private happiness. His yearnings for a life of
philosophic repose and agricultural pursuits (such as his father had
enjoyed for nearly sixty years) were thenceforth subordinated to the
demands of public service, to be conjured up in moments of exhaus-
tion in the fonn of self-pit~S7 Adams, for better or worse, had em-
braced the destiny laid out for him and the personal sacrifices that
fulfilling such a destiny required. His being, like that of his mother,
came to rest on the twin pillars of religious faith and patriotism.
John Quincy Adams had no doubts that the United States was the
agent of God's work on earth, the vehicle by which human progress
could be achieved. Unless one appreciates how deeply and how
sincerely this belief motivated him, much of his life is difficult to
understand. His sense of purpose as an individual hinged on his
perception that America had been designated by God as the redeemer
nation and that he had an essential role to play in the national mission
of global redemption. The founding fathers had begun this process,
and the Declaration of Independence was their holy writ. Now the
torch had been passed to a new generation-and Adams saw himself
as the natural leader of that generation. Given his parentage and
trailling, it was not an unreasonable assumption.
A.s a leader of the nation chosen by God to redeem the world,
Adams saw himself as literally an instrument of divine providence.
Throughout his life he attributed his accomplishments to the inspira-
tion and aid of providence. He struggled to subordinate his own
desires, ambition, and pride to the humility and tireless sense of duty
that he felt were appropriate to his role as divine servant. He viewed
his destiny as a trust, a special responsibility-indeed, a heavy bur-
den-from which he expected neither profit nor enjoyment..AI-
though it is easy to discount Adams's pious conception of his
"destiny" as a mere cover for the pursuit of personal ambition, his
financial records and his diary unarguably demonstrate that he re-
ceived little profit and even less joy from his long years of public
service.58 A profound sense of his own sinfulness and inadequacy for
the task of leadership more than balanced any personal rewards SllCh
,3. destiny might have provided.
As he matured, John Quincy Adams evolved a vision of society that
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drew upon the ideals of Washington, Jefferson, and John Adams. It was
an article of faith to him that effective leadership depended on the
president's having a moral vision of the nation's future. At the center
of his own vision of America's future lay an extensive system of
federally built internal improvements, to be financed by the sale of
public lands. Inspired by Washington's efforts to construct a system
of canals and highways in Virginia, Adams's plan of internal improve-
ments became central to his political philosoph~s9 Federally fi-
nanced canals and highways would facilitate commerce, stimulate
manufactures, and aid travel, thus reinforcing the bonds of union. He
wrote to James Lloyd in 1822 that "the first duty of a nation ... [is
that of] bettering its own condition by internal improvements." 60 As
president, he called in his inaugural address for a system of internal
improvements rivaling those of ancient Rome, a gift to the future that
would prompt "the most fervent gratitude ... [of] the unborn mil-
lions of our posterity/' 61 Yet this commitment did not begin with his
presidency. When on 23 February 1807 he introduced in ~he Senate a
resolution calling for a national plan of roads and canals, he became
the first member of Congress to go on record in support of such
improvements.62
Adams's vision of the role of government in the betterment of
society was not confined to transport and travel facilities, however.
He believed that government, as the instrument of the people (and of
God), had a moral obligation to assist desirable enterprises that profit-
minded entrepreneurs would not undertake; that it had a literal
obligation to "establish justice," "provide for the common defense,"
"promote the general welfare," and otherwise ensure that the prom-
ises of the preamble of the Constitution were kept. The subsidization
of education, the promotion of a favorable business climate, and even
the planning of cities were to Adams all legitimate activities of
government.63 His perception that mutual obligation bound the·
members of society to one another and his advocacy of an activist
central government reveal him to have been simultaneously behind
and ahead of his time. His belief in a broad interpretation of the
constitutipnal powers of government existed in parallel to his ada-
mant opposition to the usurpation of individual rights by govern-
ment.64 Edward Everett noted: "It is characteristic of most men to
lean decidedly either to the conservative or progressive tendenc~ .
In Mr. Adams's political system there was a singular mixture of both
principles." 6S
Adams grafted a vision of human equality to a conception of
societ)T, at once hierarchical and organic, in which the members had
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mutual bonds of obligation and responsibilit~A staunch defender
of the rights of propert~ he equally asserted the obligation of the
stronger and wealthier citizens to take care of the needs of the poor.
.Like John Winthrop's"city on a hill," Adams envisioned a society in
'which all members were linked and in which the interest of the
individual was, to a certain extent, both defined and limited by the
common good.66
Adams ridiculed the notion that the pursuit of the unbridled self-
interest of each individual would promote the best interests of the
societ~ Individual self-interest untempered by a concern for the
common good would be disastrous to the social cohesion of the na-
tion and the moral advance of both society and the individual. Such a
system would lead to the rise of a capitalistic or speculative class
presiding over a discontented and degraded mass owing no sense of
loyalty or obligation to the societ~67 In the tradition of his Puritan
forebears, he believed that liberty meant the right to do what was just
and moral, not what suited individual profit or fancy. Insofar as the
marketplace did not address social imperatives of either a material or
a moral nature, it was the function of the government, acting in the
interest of the citizenr~ to step in. Adams's first message to Congress,
in December 1825, captures this aspect of his thought: "The great
object of the institution of government is the improvement of the
condition of those who are parties to the social compact.... Roads
a.nd canals, by multiplying and facilitating the communications and
intercourse between distant regions and multitudes of men, are
among the most important means of improvement. But moral, politi-
cal, intellectual improvement are duties assigned by the Author of
Our Existence to social no less than to individual man. For the
fulfillment of those duties governments are invested with power, and
to the attainment of the end-the progressive improvement of the
condition of the governed-the exercise of delegated powers is a duty
cIS sacred and indispensable as the usurpation of powers not granted is
criminal and odious." 68
The conviction that the United States had been designated by God
to be the redeemer nation prompted Adams to become one of the
most ardent proponents of continental expansionism. He conceived
of th.e North American continent as the proper laboratory for the
great experiment in human freedom, and early on he determined to
devote his energies to the expansion of the nation's limits. His sup-
port of the Louisiana Purchase confirmed that if he had not fully
embraced the ideology of the Jeffersonians, he had gone beyond what
~~ere by 1803 the sectioIlal (and thereby limited) concerns of the
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Federalists. Adams later decreed continental expansion to be a man-
ifestation of natural law: "The world shall be familiarized with the
idea of considering our proper dominion to be the continent of North
America. From the time that we became an independent people it was
as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension as
that the Mississippi should flow to the sea." 69
Adams just as strongly believed in the economic and moral neces-
sity of expanding the nation's overseas commerce. Trade would be the
means of uniting the diverse cultures of the world in a common
interest. A thriving international trade would be the basis of a new
global communit~with the United States as its leader. Adams looked
to a day when interstate warfare would be made obsolete by the eco-
nomic interests that tied nations together. Following in the footsteps
of his father, John Quincy fought throughout his professional life for
the destruction of the European mercantile system and the establish-
ment of an international trading order based on the principles of
equality of commercial access, reciprocit~ and freedom of the seas.70
The creation of global sea lanes open to all nations and dedicated to
the protection of neutral shipping was the international counterpart
to Adams's plan for domestic internal improvements and advocated
for much the same reason: to reinforce the ties of communit~
Adams elevated trade to the status of moral dut~ When the Chi-
nese refused to trade with the Western powers because of their
merchants' continued importations of opium into China, Adams
responded iratel~Describing commerce as "among the natural rights
and duties of men," he argued that China's refusal to trade with the
West on terms of equality and reciprocity represented a selfish, un-
Christian, and "unsocial" system that hindered international prog-
ress. Adams believed it to be the "duty" of nations to trade-"not
from exclusive or paramount consideration of [the one's] own inter-
est; but from a joint and equal moral consideration of the interests of
both." He denied that the cause of the opium war was the opium
trade: "The cause of the war is the kowtow! the arrogant and insup-
portable pretension of China, that she will hold commercial inter-
course ... not upon terms of equal reciprocit~but upon the insulting
and degrading forms of the relation between lord and vassal." 71
Hence John Quincy Adams was a champion of the "open door" long
before the term was used to describe that basic aspect of American
foreign polic~
Although Adams championed the establishment of greater com-
mercial ties as a means of establishing international communit~he
just as resolutely resisted attempts to involve the United States in the
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affairs of other nations. While he advocated the unlimited expansion
of American overseas trade, unilateralism and isolationism charac-
terized his approach to political and military matters. Here again the
influence of George Washington is clear. The role of the United States
as moral leader of the world and the great example of republican
government implied no obligation to assist other nations struggling
for independence. Adams's steadfast opposition to the extension of
material or diplomatic aid to the South American and Greek revolu-
tions provides vivid evidence of his refusal to jeopardize American
national interest for the sake of other nations. In a famous speech on 4
July 1821 he stated that the United States "goes not abroad, in search
of monsters to destroy: She is the well-wisher to the freedom and
independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her
own." 72
When John Quincy Adams returned to the United States in 1817,
he carried with him an image of himself as the "man of the whole
nation," a man above party and section. For twenty-five years he had
crafted a career that emphasized the interests of the nation as a
unified whole. His vision of leadership was built upon the ideals of
both Washington and Jefferson, Federalist and Republican. It looked
back~ with pride on the legacy of the Founders and forward to the
.realization of their dreams. The office of secretary of state, traditional
stepping-stone to the White House, now belonged to a man who
considered the presidency to be his birthright. Destiny seemed on the
verge of fulfillment.
'The United States, like John Quincy Adams, had reached a critical
stage of development by 1817. The bitterly divisive war with Great
:Britain had ended on terms far more favorable than anyone could have
dared to hope for, and the full flush of peace brought a brief period of
leconomic prosperity in 1816 and 1817. Yet the disputes that had
lcaused the war remained unsettled, as did a festering disagreement
"with Spain over the nation's boundaries. In addition to these interna-
tional disputes, an impending crisis of confidence in the dollar
loomed, caused in part by export of U.S. silver reserves to finance a
lucrative trade with the Orient. Moreover, an ever widening sectional
schism was emerging between the Northeast, the South, and the
trans-Appalachian West. Each region had specific economic needs
and aspirations that found expression in conflicting programs to deal
'with the problems the nation faced. Underneath all these issues lay
the question of slavery: Despite constitutional compromise, the con-
tinuation of human bondage in the presumed land of freedom drove a
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wedge through the middle of American society: With the end of the
Napoleonic wars and the controversies they had engendered, the
nation's attention focused on internal development and the settle-
ment of the West. The manner of solving the problems with Great
Britain, Spain, the dollar, sectionalism, and slavery established a
dynamic that would influence the course of American history until
the Civil War.
The dispute with Spain was the most pressing problem in 1817.
Having its immediate origins in a disagreement over the boundaries
and indeed the legitimacy of the Louisiana Purchase, the dispute
actually formed but one part of a long-term struggle between the
United States and Spain for dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
Beginning with the formal independence of the United States in 1783,
the ceaseless expansion of the new republic created friction with a
Spanish government too weak to defend its far-flung possessions, yet
too proud and too stubborn meekly to surrender them. Pinckney's
Treaty of 1795 marked the close of the first phase of this struggle; it
secured for the United States the right to navigate the Mississippi
River and defined a southern border with Spanish Florida. The con-
flict between the two nations ended in 1898 with the complete
expulsion of Spanish influence from the hemisphere in the aftermath
of the Spanish-Cuban-American War. The Transcontinental Treaty of
1819 can therefore be understood as a part of an ongoing American
drive to acquire or control Spain's dominions in the Western Hemi-
sphere.
But in 1817 the debate concerned Louisiana. From the beginning,
Spain had claimed the purchase of the territory from France to be
illegal, for two reasons. First, the terms under which Louisiana had
been retroceded to France in 1800 stipulated that the territory could
not be transferred to a third party without prior Spanish consent-
which Napoleon had not obtained when he instructed his ministers
to sell Louisiana to the United States for $15 million. Second, Spain
claimed that nonfulfillment of another of the terms of the retroces-
sion had invalidated the transfer of Louisiana to France. The retroces-
sion stipulated that Napoleon would place the Duke of Parma, Carlos
IV's brother-in-Ia~ on the throne of the kingdom of Tuscany: Napo-
leon did not do this. France, therefore, could not sell what it did not
own, or so Spain's ministers argued.73
The United States rejected the Spanish protest. Although Presi-
dent Jefferson did not deny the validity of the Spanish argument, he
knew that without the support of a major European power Spain
could not assert its claim militarily:74 France certainly would not
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come to Spain's rescue; Talleyrand argued that Spain had made the
sale of the territory necessary when the Spanish intendant at New
Orleans temporarily closed the port to American shipping. Even the
momentary suspension of the right of deposit had created a furor in
the United States, whose western states relied on New Orleans as an
outlet for the produce of the Mississippi Valley region. The uncer-
tainty regarding New Orleans had engendered talk of a war with
France to settle the matter, an ominous prospect for a nation soon to
be at war with most of Europe. These circumstances, said Talleyrand,
necessitated the sale as a means of fostering American good will.
Thus, Spain was abandoned by a nation presumed to be a close ally-
an occurrence that was to be repeated.
Spain's impotence soon forced a retreat from its claim regarding
the illegality of the sale of Louisiana. Then began the arduous task of
defiJling its uncertain boundaries through negotiations with the
United States. In selling Louisiana to the United States, the French
had purposely left unclear the extent of the territory: When Robert
Livingston, the chief American negotiator of the deal, inquired of
Talleyrand as to the boundaries of the immense tract he had bought,
lle received a cryptic reply: "I can give you no direction. You have
made a noble bargain for yourselves and I suppose you will make the
most of it." 75 Make the most of it the United States did, ultimately
extending the boundaries of "Louisiana" to the shores of the Pacific
()cean.
In 1803, however, discussion focused on the uncertainty surround-
ing the boundaries and the ownership of West Florida, or the part of
West Florida west of the Perdido River. Spanish foreign minister Don
Pedro de Cevallos claimed that West Florida formed no part of the
territory of Louisiana, basing his assertion on the fact that Great
.Britain had seized West Florida from France in 1763, thereby splitting
it off from Louisiana. Spain subsequently had obtained East and West
Florida from Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris of 1783 as compensa-
tion for its part in the recent war. From this, Cevallos reasoned that
since the terms of the Louisiana Purchase held that its boundaries
'were the same as when Spain had retroceded the territory to France in
1800, then West Florida could not be considered part of the pur-
ehase.76
In fact, French negotiator Fran~ois Barbe-Marbois had informed
the Americans that West Florida was not part of Louisiana. Living-
ston, however, chose to ignore this advice and instead referred to
:French maps of the early eighteenth century showing the Louisiana
boundary extending to the Perdido River. 77 Although these maps
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predated the seizure of West Florida by Great Britain in 1763 and its
subsequent transfer to Spain, they became the basis of the American
claim to the region.
In response to mounting Spanish opposition to the sale of Loui-
siana, the Jefferson administration vigorously asserted its claim to
West Florida. In February 1804 the House of Representatives passed a
remarkable 'bill known as the "Mobile Act." Sponsored by John
Randolph and encouraged by Jefferson, the legislation called for the
president to establish a customs district in the Mobile Bay area and
extended the legal jurisdiction of the United States to the Perdido
River. In effect, the bill assumed American ownership of West Flor-
ida; implementing its provisions would invite war with Spain.78 Jef-
ferson increased the pressure on Spain by gaining Senate approval of a
convention settling the claims of American shippers who had suf-
fered losses in Spanish waters at the hands of the French during the
"Quasi-War" of 1798-1800. Although the Spanish government had
had no control over the actions of the French fleet in its waters, the
convention held Spain accountable for several million dollars' worth
of ship seizures. The value of these claims as a diplomatic bargaining
chip overshadowed their doubtful validity:
These actions, particularly the Mobile Act, outraged the Spanish
minister to the United States, Casa Yrujo. Yrujo rebutted the spolia-
tion claims against Spain with the aid of expert American legal
opinion. He described the Mobile Act as "an atrocious libel" against
the king of Spain and demanded that it be annulled. He published a
pseudonymous series of articles in a Philadelphia newspaper attack-
ing Jefferson's Florida policy: He eventually proved such an embar-
rassment that in early 1805 the administration requested his recall to
Spain.79
Yrujo's strong protests, as well as uncertainty over the French
policy regarding West Florida, prevented Jefferson from establishing
the customs district that the Mobile Act called for. Instead, he sug-
gested in his annual message, November 1804, that Spain had misun-
derstood the act. This seems unlikelYi every member of the House
knew that Spain claimed the territory with which the legislation
dealt. A more reasonable explanation is that the Mobile Act was an
attempt to bully Spain into ceding West Florida by an implied threat
to use military force. When Spain called his bluff, Jefferson proved
unwilling to take steps that likely would have led to war.
Meanwhile, in Madrid, Charles Pinckney attempted to secure by
negotiation what the House could not achieve by legislation. The
opposition of France and the coarseness of Pinckney's diplomacy
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doomed these efforts from the start. Perhaps assuming that the Jeffer-
son administration intended to pursue the strong course dictated by
the Mobile Act, Pinckney opened the talks in May 1804 by demand-
ing ratification of the Commercial Convention of 1802 between
Spain and the United States. The Senate had taken over a year to
ratify the convention, and now the steadily worsening relations of the
two nations led Spain to reconsider. Foreign Minister Cevallos replied
coldly to Pinckney's demands, laying down the repeal of the Mobile
Act and the dropping of the spoliation claims as conditions for
ratification. Pinckney then implied that refusal to ratify the conven-
tion would lead to war and threatened to ask for his passport-a
threat made without authorization from Washington and one that
caused embarrassment when Cevallos called Pinckney's bluff.
James Monroe arrived in Madrid in January 1805 to assist the
hapless Pinckney: Monroe knew the futility of his mission, for his
recent stay in Paris had revealed the strong French support for Spain's
clailDs to West Florida. But by this time the American claim had
expanded to include the entire Florida peninsula. The claim to West
Florida from the first had been intended as a starting point to gain
control of both Floridas. In May 1805, Monroe offered to draw the
western boundary of Louisiana at the Colorado River of Texas and
drop the spoliation claims against Spain in exchange for the cession of
East as well as West Florida. Cevallos, by now assured of French
support, rejected this offer.
The Jefferson administration's willingness to draw the western
boundary of Louisiana at the Colorado River of Texas foreshadowed
the eventual retreat to the Sabine River in the Treaty of 1819. During
the course of the tortuous negotiations, the Texas frontier proved the
one area where the United States stood ready to make concessions,
first in exchange for the Floridas and finally for a transcontinental
boundary: How did the boundaries of "Louisiana" come to encom-
pass Oregon as well as Texas?
At the time of the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson thought the "un-
questioned" bounds of the territory to be roughly the lands drained by
the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, bounded on the west by the
Sabine River and on the east by the Iberville River. These are the
limits depicted on schoolroom maps today: But beyond these "un-
questioned" claims Jefferson thought the United States held reason-
able "pretensions" to lands westward to the Rio Bravo (Rio Grande)
clnd eastward to the Perdido River-in other words, Texas and West
Florida. He carefully researched a scholarly treatise that he thought
provided historical documentation for this enlarged claim. The no-
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tion of a French Louisiana extending from the Rio Bravo to the
Perdido was based on the explorations of the Frenchmen LaSalle and
Iberville, as well as a land grant made by Louis XIV early in the
eighteenth century to a nobleman named Crozat. The argument
advanced in Jefferson's treatise is significant because it formed the
basis of John Quincy Adams's negotiating position in 1818.80
While Jefferson developed his argument regarding the eastern lim-
its of Louisiana, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark prepared to
explore the territory to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, ostensibly for
scientific purposes. The true motive of their expedition, however, was
to develop the fur trade of the West for American interests. Jefferson
admitted as much in his personal correspondence as well as in the
secret message to Congress of 1803 in which he first proposed the
expedition.81 By 1808 he was convinced that Oregon formed a part of
the Louisiana territor~ Thus, the vision of Thomas Jefferson con-
tains the origins of the transcontinental claim of 1819.82
The Lewis and Clark expedition was but one of a series of Amer-
ican military-commercial incursions into the Louisiana territory
under the guise of scientific exploration. In two expeditions in
1805-6, Zebulon Pike explored the Missouri, Arkansas, and Red
Rivers, discovering the Colorado peak that bears his name. In addi-
tion, the Dunbar-Hunter, Sibley; and Freeman expeditions explored
"Louisiana" as far west as Santa Fe, alarming Spanish authorities
throughout the region. The United States appeared to be moving
toward asserting control over an expanse of territory bound only by
the limits of the American imagination.83
Yet in the end, Jeffersonian diplomacy failed to resolve the dispute
with Spain over the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase, in part
because of French opposition but primarily because of Jefferson's
reluctance to use force to assert the American claim. Though he
pushed the Mobile Act through Congress, he proved unwilling to risk
war by implementing it. The numerous westward expeditions had
the effect of provoking Spain but by themselves did little to extend
American control of the region. That Spain's ministers knew Jeffer-
son would not resort to force made it easy for them to ignore the
bluster of Pinckney.84 Jefferson's unwillingness to use military power
as an instrument of policy stands in sharp contrast to the course that
James Monroe and John Quincy Adams would follow in eventually
bringing Spain to terms.
Monroe's departure from Madrid in July 1805 marked the end of
the first phase of negotiations over the disputed lands. Direct negotia-
tions did not resume until after the fall of Napoleon. The United
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States refused to negotiate with either the puppet government of the
Napoleonic era or the Spanish government in exile known as the
regency: Diplomatic relations with Spain, broken off in 1809, were
not reestablished until 1816.
Yet suspension of direct talks did not still American yearnings for
the Floridas. On the contrar~ as time passed, the region gained in
strategic and economic importance. Few Americans doubted that the
Floridas in the hands of another power posed a serious security risk
for the United States along its southern frontier. The geographical
eontours of Florida led some to compare it to a pistol whose barrel
pointed directly at New Orleans. In time of war it would be an
impregnable base from which to invade the United States. Moreover,
south Florida controlled the sea lanes leading into the Gulf of Mex-
ico. Ownership of Louisiana required that body of water to be an
American "lake." Finall~ Americans alleged that the Floridas in
Spanish hands functioned as a refuge for "marauding Indians" and
runaway slaves, who periodically launched cross-border raids on local
{l.S. settlements. Although of lesser substance than the first two
concerns, this last reason worried Americans, especially southerners,
the most.
Beyond posing a threat to American securit~ Spanish control of
the Floridas acted to stunt the economic growth of the lower South by
limiting access to the Gulf of Mexico. Livingston's original instruc-
tions called for the purchase not of Louisiana but of New Orleans and
'West Florida, for an effective regional transportation system de-
pended on access not just to the Mississippi but also to the rivers
flowing through West Florida to the Gulf, such as the Mobile and the
.Apalachicola. Having failed as Livingston's assistant to gain uncon-
tested control of West Florida in the Louisiana Purchase, James
~Monroe-first as secretary of state and then as president-labored
hard to appease the South. by acquiring all of Florida. As secretary of
state under James Madison, he adopted a bold policy aimed at doing
so. He had believed during the talks in Madrid in 1804-5 that a more
resolute military stance was necessary and now pushed for the adop-
tion of such a position. In the end, however, Monroe and Madison,
Jlike Jefferson before them, could not accept the consequences of
taking by force what could not be obtained by negotiation.85
The "No Transfer Resolution" marked the first phase of this bolder
policy: Passed by Congress in January 1811, the resolution stated that
in view of its overriding interest in the territories along its southern
border, the United States could not, "without serious inquietude, see
Clny part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign
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power." It authorized the president to seize East Florida (West Florida
being already considered part of the United States) in the event that
"any foreign power" attempted to occupy it or any "existing local
authority" proved ready to cede it. The No Transfer Resolution came
to be of lasting importance, not only in the case of the Floridas but in
the development of a hemispheric U.S. foreign policy. Its injunction
against the transfer of territory to "any foreign power" prefigured the
Monroe Doctrine's noncolonization clause.86
In 1811, however, the purpose of the No Transfer Resolution was to
prevent Great Britain from seizing the Floridas from Spain. Gaining
control of West Florida was made easier by the presence of a large
number of American settlers in the province. In September 1810 a
contingent of these settlers, aided by Americans from across the
border, had successfully declared their independence from Spain and
petitioned the United States government for annexation. The Madi-
son administration, fearing potentially troublesome claims of the
insurgents, in October 1810 ordered troops to take control of West
Florida to the Perdido River. By mid-1811 the province was in the
control of the United States except for the city and fortifications at
Mobile.87 Spain's tenuous grasp on the Florida peninsula appeared to
be slipping as well, and fears arose that Great Britain would move to
fill the vacuum created by the collapse of Spanish authority. The No
Transfer Resolution demonstrated congressional resolve that the
United States would not stand idly by and let this happen.
Having warned Great Britain to keep hands off, the Madison ad-
ministration began efforts to acquire East Florida from the "existing
local authorit~"But the East Florida officials were unwilling to hand
over the province; unlike those in West Florida, most of East Florida's
inhabitants were satisfied to remain under Spanish rule, if for no
other reason than the laxness of that nation's authorit~88
Thus rebuffed, American negotiator General George Mathews in-
trigued to foment a rebellion in East Florida by promises of rewards
for those taking part. In effect, he attempted by bribery to stir up a
revolution where no discontent existed. American naval forces
moved to support this effort. On 18 March 1812 Mathews landed at
Amelia Island, off the Georgia-Florida border, to accept the cession of
East Florida from the "patriot" forces (comprising primarily Amer-
ican citizens) who had declared the territory independent the day
before. Mathews then led American ground and naval forces in the
capture of St. Augustine, the capital of East Florida. The whole sordid
affair had been orchestrated to comply with the requirements of the
No Transfer Resolution; Mathews thought he had won a great victory
for his countr~89
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The Madison administration was not prepared for the lengths to
which Mathews had gone or for the domestic and international out-
cry that followed. Though Mathews had departed with implied orders
to take East Florida by force if necessar~ and though the fact that his
communications to Washington during his months of preparation
llad gone unanswered indicated tacit approval, when word arrived as
to the full extent of his actions, Monroe promptly disavowed them
and relieved the general of his command. Strong public protest appar-
ently forced this about-face. A well-publicized case of a British
agent's attempts to intrigue with American citizens had surfaced
only a short time earlier; now the administration faced the embar-
rassment of being caught in a similar act. Its solution was to repudiate
Mathews while retaining the fruits of his exploits.9o Accordingl~
Monroe, through an intermediar~ disavowed Mathews's actions to
the unrecognized Spanish representative to the United States, Don
lluis de Onis.
But the Madison administration refused to withdraw the occupy-
ing forces unless the Spanish government promised no reprisals
against the "patriots" who had taken part in the rebellion. In the
Ineantime, Governor D.B. Mitchell of Georgia took command of
the .American troops in East Florida and awaited war with Spain.
]~acking the military strength needed to reply to this provocation,
Spain agreed to the demand of the United States not to prosecute
its rebellious subjects.91 Yet Onis rejected an offer made through
the British minister in July 1812 to cede East Florida and give up
the claim to West Florida in exchange for the United States gov-
ernment's dropping of the spoliation claims. Congress also frus-
trated the plans of the Madison administration in July 1812 by
rejecting a measure authorizing the seizure of East Florida. United
States forces finally withdrew from East Florida in May 1813;
West Florida (to the Perdido River) remained under American con-
tro1.92
In 1815, the return of peace and the reinstatement of Ferdinand VII
on the Spanish throne led to the resumption of formal negotiations
over the question of the limits of Louisiana. The long diplomatic
hiatus had worked no substantive changes in the positions of the two
nations. Spanish Minister Onis offered to cede all Spanish lands east
of the Mississippi River in exchange for a western boundary at the
Mississippi. And because matters were further complicated by the
support of American citizens for Spain's rebelling colonies in South
America, Oois called also for the suppression of the recruitment
and arming of patriot expeditions taking place in Philadelphia,
C:harleston, and other cities. He further demanded that the South
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American rebels be excluded from American ports and prevented
from getting supplies from the United States.93 The question of U.s.
aid to the South American revolutionaries worsened an already in-
tractable diplomatic controversy. The issue grew in importance as the
negotiations progressed.
Monroe countered Onis's offer with a proposal drawing the west-
ern boundary at the Colorado River of Texas, include all American
territory to the tributaries of the Mississippi River. But in instruc-
tions to George Erving, United States minister to Spain (the negotia-
tions having been transferred there in early 1816), Monroe wrote that
"if indispensably necessary" President Madison would agree to a
western limit as far east as the Sabine River, with the remainder of the
boundary to be determined by joint commission. Monroe stipulated,
however, that"any adjustment" by commission must not affect the
American claim to the Columbia River.94 Though Erving did not
propose the Sabine boundary to Spain in 1816, Monroe's instructions
are significant because they foreshadow what would later be called
the "sellout" of the claim to Texas as well as the extension of a
transcontinental boundary in 1819. Moreover, it is significant that
when the Madison administration submitted Erving's instructions
for congressional inspection, it omitted that part offering to retreat to
the Sabine, no doubt because of the outrage it would have provoked
among westerners and southerners.95
The reopened negotiations with Spain quickly reestablished the
stalemate of 1805. The talks were transferred several times from
Madrid to Washington and back, as both sides stalled, awaiting a shift
in circumstances that would strengthen their negotiating position.
The Spanish government thought that the United States, weakened
by the recent war, would be in no position to dictate terms. Moreover,
the ministers of Ferdinand VII were confident in 1816 and 1817 that
Great Britain, as the chief defender of monarchical interest, would
support their position. The Madison administration, on the other
hand, recognized the impossibility of retreating too far on the bound-
aries of Louisianaj the Senate would approve no treaty placing its
western limits at the Mississippi. In 1817 the dispute remained
unresolved and seemingly intractable.
Aggravating the conflict with Spain were a number of problems
with Great Britain. The Treaty of Ghent had merely halted the war
with Great Britain; it did not resolve most of the issues that had
caused the conflict. Lingering strife with the British restricted the
options open to James Monroe (elected president in 1816) in bringing
Spain to terms, for the Spanish government knew that so long as
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important issues divided Great Britain and the United States, it could
rely on at least tacit British support for its negotiating position. In this
way the U.S. dispute with Spain was linked to relations with Great
Britain. A favorable settlement with Spain depended upon resolving
the problems with Great Britain.
Much as in the controversy with Spain, an issue involving national
boundaries divided the United States and Great Britain. It too had
origins some years in the past, in this case the Treaty of Paris of 1783.
The treaty stipulated that the Canadian-American boundary be de-
fined by a line drawn due west from the northernmost point of the
Lake of the Woods (which extends north from present-day Minnesota
into Ontario and Manitoba) until it reached the Mississippi River.
Geographers of the eighteenth century; however, did not know that
the northernmost point of the Lake of the Woods was more than 150
miles north of the source of the Mississippi. Several attempts to
resolve this discrepancy had failed. 96
The discoveries of Lewis and Clark and the developing interest
each nation had in the northwestern fur trade extended the boundary
dispute across the Rocky Mountains to the coast, where the United
States and Great Britain vied for control of a region in which Spain
and Russia also had an interest. John Jacob Astor's Pacific Fur Trading
Company complicated the issue in 1811 by founding a settlement
named Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia. Astor envisaged this
post as the hub of a fur trading empire from which he could reach the
markets of the Orient. But the War of 1812 foiled his plans. Fearing
attack, Astor's agents at Astoria sold the post in 1813 to British
subjects, who renamed it Fort George. In British hands it remained,
despite an article in the Treaty of Ghent calling for the restoration of
all territories taken during the war. The burgeoning, lucrative fur
trade had upped the ante; the British Northwest Company urged
London not to abandon the post to the Americans. Here matters
stood in 1817.
Fishing rights off the coasts of British North America formed a
second major area of disagreement between the United States and
(;reat Britain, one of more immediate concern to Americans (es-
pecially New Englanders) than the boundary question. The Treaty of
:Paris of 1783 guaranteed the "liberty" of Americans to fish in the
·wate.rs of British North America, including the Grand Banks, the
:most bountiful fishery in the world. But disagreement arose over the
'word "liberty:" The British understood the word to mean a privilege
that could be revoked; to the Americans the word implied an in-
4alienable right.
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At Ghent the British negotiators argued that the "liberty" to fish
in their colonial waters, suspended during the war, could be rein-
stated only in exchange for American concessions. Over Henry
Clay's heated objection the American commissioners offered Brit-
ain the right to navigate the Mississippi in exchange for renewed
access to the fisheries. This was, in principle, an enormous con-
cession and indicates the importance of the fisheries to the United
States. Yet the British, knowing that the right to navigate a river
that did not extend into Canada was of limited value, rejected this
offer.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the fisheries to the
economy of New England. They constituted the source of the region's
single most important industrYi the Adamses had long championed
their defense. John Adams had been responsible for the insertion of
the word "liberty" in the treaty of 1783, and John Quincy proved no
less committed to ensuring New Englanders continued access to such
an important source of wealth. As minister to Great Britain, Adams
had hinted that the issue might lead again to war-an unauthorized
threat, but one indicating the extent of his commitment to the in-
terest of New England.
A third major dispute between the United States and Great Brit-
ain concerned the terms of their mutual trade. The Commercial
Convention of July 1815 had merely restored reciprocity in the
direct trade between the two nations. Great Britain still prohibited
U.S. vessels from entering its colonial ports in the West Indies. The
problem especially concerned the shipowning and merchant inter-
ests of the Northeast, who stood to make immense profits if the
West Indian trade could be opened. Exclusion from this trade placed
shipowners at a competitive disadvantage, for they could not bene-
fit from the "triangular trade" that allowed British vessels to un-
load their cargoes in the United States, take on American goods,
and then make a profitable stopover in the West Indies before re-
turning home. American ships often made the voyage from Britain
empt~ at enormous cost to their owners. As minister to Great
Britain, John Quincy Adams had lobbied hard but to no avail for
modification of colonial trade restrictions. Despite major changes
in other areas of British societ~ colonial trade monopolies were
still sacrosanct.97
In sum, major stumbling blocks stood in the way of Anglo-
American harmony in the fall of 1817. Although the harsh rhetoric of
war had abated, no substantive issues (with the exception of the
Rush-Bagot Agreement, demilitarizing the Great Lakes) had been
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resolved. For the United States, circumstances demanded reconcilia-
tion: only by eliminating the threat of British naval intervention in
the Western Hemisphere could a strong and independent foreign
policy be pursued. That goal remained distant in 1817.98
Although problems with Spain and Great Britain dominated the
concerns of the Monroe administration, the domestic scene was far
from tranquil. The aftermath of the second war with Great Britain led
to what economic historians term a "readjustment" period for the
.American economy:99 The general though by no means uniform
prosperity of 1815-18 masked an underlying weakness that led to a
depression beginning in mid-1818. By the latter part of 1817 the
outlines of this crisis were clear.
At the heart of the nation's economic problems lay a crippled
currency: The War of 1812 had left a legacy of debt; devalued paper
currency from dozens of state banks flooded the land. Secretary of the
'Treasury Albert Gallatin estimated that by 1816, $68 million worth
of state banknotes were in circulation. loo State banks had stopped
specie payments amid wartime uncertainty in August 1814; financial
chaos ensued as state banks refused to accept other currencies except
at a discount. The federal government was forced to take its revenues
Jin th.ese depreciated state currencies, which could be spent only in
the areas of issue. The rapid inflation that resulted during 1815-18
Jlelped both to fuel the economic expansion and to create the condi-
tions for economic collapse.
Congress created the Second Bank of the United States in 1816 to
restore confidence in the nation's currency: The bank was to resume
specie payments, thereby setting an example for the state banks to
follo~ yet it began operation with only $6 million in specie reserves,
llardly sufficient to engender confidence in the dollar. Moreover, the
bank faced a short-term rnercantile debt to Europe of $64 million,
incuIred in 1816.101 These factors, combined with mismanagement
and fraud by the bank's officers, made the task of stabilizing the
eurrency impossible. 102
OIllyan ad.equate supply of specie could restore faith in the na-
tion's currencies by providing hard money backing. But the supply of
hard currency was shrinking in 1817, largely because of a steady
outflow to the Orient. l03 In 1817 alone, Americans exported $4.5
rnillion in specie primarily in exchange for the highly valued goods of
(:hina. The export of specie by a nation possessing (at that time) no
silver or gold mines angered many Americans. l04 Writers of the
period assailed the effects on the nation's economic health. The
discontent took on a sectional aspect: because nearly all the mer-
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chants engaged in the China trade were located in New England or
New York, it seemed to many that a selfish monied elite was under-
mining the interests of the nation. Adding to the resentment, New
Englanders controlled most of the specie reserves in the United
States. IDS
Anger over the export of specie by northeastern mercantile inter-
ests formed but one aspect of the larger economic struggle usually
known as "sectionalism." In many respects the trans-Appalachian
West and the South functioned as colonies of the Northeast. South-
erners shipped their cotton north to be exported on the vessels of
northeastern mercantile interests, in exchange for manufactured
goods and banking and commercial services. Northeasterners sent
manufactured goods to the West, usually in exchange for agricultural
produce and specie. The West in turn shipped foodstuffs and livestock
to the South in return for plantation products such as molasses and
sugar. I06 Geography and technology reinforced this relation: an ex-
tensive river system created, in the days before the steamboat, a one-
way route from the West to the South, while a bustling coastwise
trade connected the South and the Northeast. High mountains made
land access to the West difficult and expensive, hindering that re-
gion's development. The result was to center financial power in the
Northeast, reinforcing a predominance dating from the time of inde-
pendence. IO?
In 1817, however, the sectional balance of power seemed to be
shifting. Spurred by abundant agricultural production, the West and
the South were experiencing prosperity in the years following the war
with Great Britain, while the Northeast was approaching economic
stagnation. Its re-export trade of foreign goods, upon which so many
fortunes had been built, steadily declined. Shipping of all sorts faced
increased competition from European nations now at peace. No new
source of wealth stood ready to fill the gap; the development of large-
scale manufacturing was still a few years awa~ Nevertheless, the
merchants of the Northeast could call upon powerful resources in
order to maintain their region's supremacy-not least, a newly
elected president favorable to their interests.
Beneath the boundary questions, currency problems, and sectional
disputes lay the intractable question of slaver~ Hopes that the slave
institution would wither away had been shattered by the invention of
the cotton gin. The opening of vast new lands in the Southeast,
combined with the potentially unlimited British demand for cotton,
promised decades of profitability for a slave-based mode of agri-
culture. Indeed, any fair-minded observer recognized that the export
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of cotton and the slavery that produced it were essential to American
economic prosperity:
Yet slavery made a mockery of pretensions to national unity: Its
persistence revealed that the founding fathers had produced not one
American dream but two, and that those two dreams were in conflict.
The attitude of John Quincy Adams captures this conflict. In his
yOllth Adams had been taught by his mother to despise slavery: A
staunch defender of the rights of free blacks, Abigail even fought for
the integration of the Quincy school. l08 As in so many other areas,
John Quincy's outlook 011 race was shaped by his mother. While he
did not view blacks as fully equal to whites, he saw no grounds to
justify their enslavement. More important, he believed that slavery
degraded the moral fiber of the slaveowner. He wrote in his diary that
slavery "taints the very sources of moral principle" by giving Chris-
tian sanction to human bondage and encouraging disdain for labor.
Union with the "slave scourging republicans" of the South called
into question the very legitimacy of the nation that presumed to be
the source of human freedom. As Henry Adams later wr9te, "Slavery
drove the whole Puritan community back on its Puritanism." 109
For years, however, Adams kept his doubts about slavery confined
to his diary: Like other politicians of the day he knew that to voice
thenl publicly would end his hopes for the presidency: In 1804 he
opposed efforts to bar slavery and the importation of slaves in the
Louisiana Territory: As a diplomat, he fought hard to extract indem-
nities from Great Britain for slaves taken during the War of 1812. He
assisted owners in their efforts to recover slaves who had fled to
Canada. No~ as secretary of state, he would have to labor to bring
Florida, yet another slave-holding state, into the Union. 1 10
Adams rationalized his proslavery actions as legal or diplomatic
necessity; but his conscience gnawed at him nonetheless. It had
always been an article of faith with him that the role of the "man of
the whole nation" did not necessitate compromises of personal in-
tegrity; that national leadership required no compromise of moral
values. Yet the slavery question and the other problems facing the
lJnited States in 1817 seemed to demand compromises not just of the
parties involved but of Adams's conscience as well. And no~ occupy-
ing a seat of real power, he could no longer evade responsibility for the
course of public polic~Returning home after years of faithful service
.abroad, his hopes for the presidency depended on the favorable resolu-
tion of these problems.
Tllat seemed an insumlountable task. He wrote in his diary on 21
September 1817, his first day in office as secretary of state, that "the
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path before me is beset with thoms, and it becomes more doubtful
than ever whether I shall be able to continue long in it. At two distinct
periods of my life heretofore my position has been perilous and full of
anxious forecasts, but never so critical and precarious as at this
time." III
TWO
Developing a Strategy
John Quincy Adams arrived in New York on 6 August 1817, ending a
nine-year absence from his native land. The tempestuous fifty-day
voyage from Great Britain (Adams wrote that his wife "thought
herself dying" from seasickness) had not helped still his own anx-
ieties about his new job. He confided in his diary that"so keen indeed
'was the emotion of contemplating the probabilities of the future time
that nothing but a finn reliance upon Him who has ever been my
preserver and the dispenser of every blessing supported me from
despondenc~"1
The elite of New York enthusiastically welcomed the new secre-
tary of state. Adams had been removed from the broils of domestic
politics for nine years and as such had neither the friends nor the
enemies that political involvement entails. Some of the most power-
ful individuals in America gathered to welcome him, including John
Jacob Astor (the richest man in the country), Governor DeWitt Clin-
ton, and Archibald Gracie. For several days Adams was the toast of
New York. He was escorted on a tour of the city's museums, was
made the guest of honor at a fonnal banquet given by the mayor, and
even sat for a portrait.2 A fonnal banquet at Tammany Hall on 11
August 1817 highlighted his stay. With Astor as his escort, he was
feted by two hundred gentlemen described by the local papers as
being "of the greatest respectabilit~"3Given Adams's impatience
with social chitchat, one can be sure that the nation's foreign policy
was a prominent topic of discussion at these gatherings.
From New York, Adarns and his family-wife Louisa Catherine
and sons George (age sixteen), John (age fourteen,) and Charles Francis
{age ten)-joumeyed to Quinc~Massachusetts, for the long-awaited
reunion with Abigail and John. When John Quincy departed for
Russia in 1809, his parents had feared it was a final farewell; his
return sparked a rebirth in both of them. For Abigail, it was the
happiest day of her elderly years; she had lived to see her prized son
accede to his destined place in the highest councils of the land.4
Adams stayed in Quincy for nearly a month, renewing old friend-
ships, visiting old haunts, and basking in the adulation of his parents.
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It must have been a time of deep satisfaction and introspection for
him, an opportunity to savor his considerable achievements. Yet the
demands of his new job did not allow for very much time off. He had
committed himself to being in Washington on 20 September, in time
to welcome' President Monroe back from his tour of the nation. In an
age of slow and undependable transportation, he was not a day late.
Adams felt some trepidation before his meeting with the new
president. In a diary reflection written the day he arrived in Wash-
ington, he wrote: "Whether my appointment was for my own good or
for that of the country is known only to God. As yet I have more
reason to lament than to rejoice at the event." He had not always been
an admirer of Monroe. He knew that he had been selected to head the
Department of State at least in part because of his New England
background. Adams also knew that the president thought his long
absence and lack of political following would tend to work against
any ambitions he might have about succeeding Monroe in the White
House. Adams feared that his fractious and combative nature might
get the better of him amid the intrigues of cabinet politics. He wrote
his mother that "my place is subordinate.... my duty will be to
support and not to ... oppose the President's Administration.... If I
can't, my duty is to withdraw from public service." 5
While it is fair to say that he respected Monroe's judgment, Adams
was often critical of what he perceived to be the president's inde-
cisiveness. The two men never became close friends but nonetheless
developed a solid working relationship. Monroe heeded Adams's
opinions on policy matters more than those of any other adviser.
From the outset, they met daily to discuss matters of state.6 The new
secretary not only knew much more about the actual state of interna-
tional affairs than did the president but could control the infonnation
Monroe received on certain issues such as the negotiations with
Spain. These factors, combined with Adams's impressive powers of
argumentation, explain his dominant influence in foreign affairs. 7
Although Adams did not fonnulate the broad goals of administration
polic~ he was given wide latitude to implement them. It is safe to say
that without his astute management of affairs, the Monroe adminis-
tration would not have would not have enjoyed its impressive
number of foreign policy successes. Adams was exaggerating only
slightly when he later wrote: "Of the public history of Mr. Monroe's
administration, all that will be worth telling to posterity hitherto has
been transacted through the department of state."B
James Monroe, though but nine years older than Adams, had been a
Revolutionary War hero, while Adams watched the hostilities with
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his mother. Along with Supreme Court Justice John Marshall,
Monroe represented the last politically active link to the founding
fathers. He had paid his dues. Like Adams, Monroe had built his life
around public service. He had served as secretary of war and of state
under Madison and in a number of diplomatic posts under Jefferson.
He also had been governor of Virginia and a member of Congress from
that state.9 Shaped in the ideological image of Madison and Jefferson,
he was the natural successor to the presidency in 1816.
Monroe's intellectual prowess certainly did not win him the pres-
idenc~ A contemporary described his mind as "neither rich nor
brilliant, but capable of the most laborious analysis." 10 George Dan-
gerfield calls him "the third of the Virginia Dynasty; in the order of
intelligence no less than in that of succession." 11 Lacking the broad
conceptions and visions of Jefferson and Madison, he was nonetheless
the ideal candidate to carryon the traditions of his illustrious Virgin-
ian predecessors. He maintained a regular correspondence with both
merl during his presidency; keeping them well informed of affairs of
state and remaining anxiously attentive to their advice. I2
Monroe was a committed republican revolutionary; and like
Adams, he identified the preservation and growth of the United States
with the success of the republican cause globall~13 His task as
president, in his vie~was to fulfill a modified Jeffersonian vision of a
nation of independent farmers and merchants based on a balance of
agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. In this vision, the individ-
ual would be free to choose where to live and what to do, unbeholden
to any person or government. While changing times had forced the
modification of Jefferson's pure agrarian vision, the "mission" of
Anlerica had not changed-that of a nation destined to set an exam-
ple of human freedom and republican government to the world. I4
Monroe was convinced that he had a special role to play in bringing
about this global transformation.
James Monroe's view of the political realm, like that of John
Quincy Adams, was largely defined by the myths of classical republi-
canism. Monroe clung to the Revolutionary-era notion that a com-
mon purpose united all Americans. He feared political parties and the
factionalism they represented. Though a strong supporter of the War
of 1812, he knew that it had created divisions in American society
nearly fatal to the republican experiment, and as president he strove
to restore a national unity of purpose. IS
In one sense, Monroe was correct in assuming a national unity of
purpose. Citizens from all segments of society believed that the
United States had a responsibility to spread its values and institu-
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tions to a world dominated by monarchy and desperately in need of
republican-style enlightenment. Few doubted either the superiority
of American ideals or the flow of the tide of history in the direction of
their universal application. Few questioned the fundamental prem-
ises or uniqueness of American society and government, nor would
many have disputed the legitimacy of spreading their values and
institutions to the farthest reaches of the globe.
Yet changing historical conditions in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries made the Jeffersonian vision of America anach-
ronistic even as its realization came within reach. The classic Jeffer-
sonian vision saw a nation of independent farmers and small-scale
manufacturers producing for the domestic market, insulated from
the struggles of Europe. Americans, however, possessed of seemingly
limitless natural resources, and their rapidly improving technology
soon demonstrated an awesome capacity to produce. From the South
came cotton; tobacco, and rice; from the middle states, flour, meat,
tar, and turpentine; and from New England, pot and pearl ash, lumber,
the products of whaling, and fish. 16 Americans produced far more
than the home market (consisting of less than 10 million people in
1817) could consume. This fact made foreign trade the linchpin of
domestic prosperity and drew the United States unavoidably into
world affairs. The abundance of natural resources that made possible
the Jeffersonian image of America as an agrarian paradise ironically
prevented the purest realization of that image by requiring Amer-
icans to produce for a world, not just a domestic, market. I 7
This "problem" of abundance had tangible manifestations. The
War of 1812 had been caused in part by the hardships created when
Americans could not freely export their agricultural surplUS.18 The
war made clear what Republicans had long sensed but never fully
incorporated into their ideology-that foreign trade, rather than
being antithetical to republicanism, was essential to its survival. I9
After the Treaty of Ghent the search for new markets became the
explicit aim of American foreign policy.
Accordingl)', President James Monroe adopted as his primary goal
the expansion of foreign trade. In order for America to serve as an
example to an oppressed world, domestic prosperity had to be en-
sured by finding markets for the nation's produce.20 A contemporary
writer described foreign trade as lithe very lungs of libert)'," the
means not only of ensuring stability at home but also of spreading
American values, institutions, and ideals abroad. The traditional
ambivalence about foreign trade was replaced by the conviction that
not only was foreign trade essential to the quest for a good society but
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that it would also have a missionizing effect on the rest of the
world.21
Yet the consensus that existed in the abstract for the spread of
American institutions and ideals broke down when the extension of
commerce became a prime means for their propagation. It was clear
that, depending on the direction of American commercial expansion,
certain groups and regions stood to gain more than others and that
not all avenues of expansion could be pursued simultaneously: Unity
of purpose did not imply commonality of method. Disagreement over
the direction of commercial expansion would prove a basic point of
political contention during Monroe's presidency:
Three principles guided the Monroe administration in its efforts to
expand American foreign trade: first, the negotiation of reciprocity
treaties with foreign states when possible and the enactment of
commercial retaliation when necessary; second, good relations with
Great Britain; third, a strengthening of the military; with special
emphasis on an enlarged, more powerful navy. These three goals
provided a framework for the administration's foreign policy.
A. commercial policy based on the principle of reciprocity had
evolved out of the traditional American advocacy of free trade be-
tween nations, one of the founding ideals of American indepen-
dence.22 Popularly known through the work of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, free trade had been a radical idea in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. It meant an end to the navigation
acts, colonial monopolies, and other kinds of commercial restrictions
that formed the basis of the European colonial system. Both Benjamin
Fran.klin and John Adams had been advocates of free trade. Adams had
incorporated the principle into the Model Treaty Plan of 1776.23 John
QUillCy Adams carried on this tradition in his own career, elevating
free trade to the status of a moral duty between nations.24
The advocacy of the principle of free trade was another aspect of
the American global challenge to the monarchic-mercantile status
quo. To the American mind, free trade represented a decisive break
with the past and a forward step for humanity. Yet it would be a
mistake to view this American drive too idealistically: As a nation
excluded from most colonial markets, the United States by necessity
advocated free trade. The looming problem of overproduction de-
manded the easing of commercial restrictions. Free trade would allow
.Americans to exploit their substantial comparative advantage in
foreign shipping rates. In the direct trade with Europe and to other
,areas of the world, American shippers could undercut the prices of
their competitors. Indeed, freight rates for American shippers to the
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Far East averaged half that of their foreign rivals.25 Under such condi-
tions "free trade" would assure American dominance in interna-
tional commerce. A historian of American commercial policy Vernon
Setser puts the matter into perspective: "If economists had not al-
ready developed the principles of economic liberalism, American
statesmen would have been under the necessity of inventing
them." 26
In theory committed to a doctrine of perfectly free trade, American
statesmen found this goal unattainable in practice. From the time of
independence the nations of Europe, particularly Great Britain,
worked to limit American access to their colonial markets.27 Euro-
peans resisted efforts to overthrow mercantilism, ignoring the self-
serving American argument that free trade would serve their best
interests in the long run. Opposition to free trade necessitated a
strate~ first developed by James Madison in 1789, of commercial
discrimination in the form of tariff and tonnage duties against nations
that refused to sign reciprocity treaties with the United States.28 This
strategy was aimed at compelling the Europeans to allow at least a
system of equality of duties as a form of reciprocity if they would not
agree to a totally free trade.
The combination of negotiating reciprocity treaties when possible
and enacting commercial retaliation when necessary became a guid-
ing principle of the Monroe administration. A prominent example of
this policy was the determined effort to reopen the British West India
trade, closed to Americans since independence. Between 1815 and
1829 there were no less than five major pieces of legislation, five
diplomatic negotiations, and two presidential proclamations devoted
to securing access to a trade of marginal importance to national
prosperit)T. The Monroe and Adams presidencies marked the period of
open warfare against what remained of the European mercantile sys-
tem.29
At first, reciprocity and commercial discrimination were intended
as tools to be used to bring about a totally free trade. But these tactics
became ends in themselves in the years following the Treaty of
Ghent. Changing economic conditions had inspired a new vision of
American empire based not on free trade but on protection of certain
sectors of the econom)T. The shortages caused by embargo and war
had led to the growth of an extensive manufacturing sector in the
United States and a sizable constituency that wanted it protected
from foreign competition, once peace was restored. Accordingl~ in
1816 Congress passed, with Madison's support, a tariff protecting a
broad array of American manufactured goods. Although the tariff of
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1816 was only moderately protective, it was but the first of several
pieces of protective legislation to be enacted.3D
The support of a protective tariff by a Republican president rep-
resented a dramatic break with the past. Jeffersonian philosophy
traditionally had feared the growth of a large manufacturing sector
as corrosive to the morals of an agrarian society. After the War of
1812, however, it was clear that this belief ill suited the current
circumstances. In order to thrive, America needed a strong man-
ufacturing sector, if only to assure national security and inde-
pendence.31 Indeed, by 1820 the economist Mathew Carey would
argtle that free trade caused economic depression and therefore
endangered national survival. The American Society of the Encour-
agement of American Manufactures was established to fight for a
protective tariff. Its members included Jefferson, Madison, and John
.Adams.32
In short, starting from the moral principle of free trade, American
commercial policy by 1817 had evolved into a neomercantilist doc-
trine intended to expand American agriculture and raw material
exports while protecting domestic manufactures. Reciprocity offered
Americans a natural advantage in foreign trade as surely as navigation
laws guaranteed European trade monopolies.33 The ideal of "free
trade" provided a universalistic basis for a commercial policy essen-
tially nationalistic in its aims.
'This evolution of principles and policies regarding trade repre-
sented a significant departure from revolutionary ideals in the name
of defending the Republican "experiment." Most Americans im-
plicitly believed that prosperity at home contained the seeds for
universal human progress. Monroe and Adams faced a world funda-
mentally hostile to the American nation. The Congress of Vienna
symbolized the effort to stop the spread of republicanism, as did the
vigorous reimposition of colonial navigation laws and other commer-
cial :restrictions in the years after 1815.34 The neomercantilist policy
of expanding raw material and agricultural exports while protecting
man.ufactures was a pragmatic strategy for solidifying republicanism
in tIle United States by increasing the nation's wealth and power.
Though the policy compromised the revolutionary ideal of a truly
free world commerce, Republican leaders would have argued that
with hostile powers threatening the nation's existence, only building
up the United States could ensure that republican ideals would
survive.3s In effect, neomercantilism was a nationalist policy with an
idealistic rationale, a policy designed to advance human progress by
serving American self-interest. At some future time a world order
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might exist favorable to free trade, but for the moment necessity
dictated a compromise of revolutionary ideals.
Reconciliation with Great Britain, the second guiding principle of
the Monroe administration in its efforts to expand American foreign
trade, represented a major foreign policy shift. For nearly forty years
the United States and its former enemy had alternated between open
conflict and uneasy peace. The strife bred bitter feelings on both
sides. British journalists and publicists viewed their one-time colo-
nials with arrogant contempt. American writers responded with
indignant attacks on monarchy and colonialism which to some ex-
tent served to define the nation's identity: This "warfare of the mind,"
as John Quincy Adams termed the verbal hostilities, did not bode well
for better relations between the two nations. Indeed, to anyone read-
ing British and American newspapers and periodicals in the after-
math of the war, the prospects for reconciliation would have seemed
remote.36 Yet in spite of the acrimon~powerful forces were drawing
the United States and Great Britain together.
Historically; the Republican party had opposed close ties to Great
Britain. This constituted one of the party's major differences with the
Federalists over the years. But the near-catastrophic consequences of
the War of 1812led to a reevaluation of traditional Republican policy.
Many Republicans, including Jefferson, came to realize the impor-
tance of Anglo-American cooperation for the prosperity and security
of the United States. Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 1816 that he
now believed the British to be the "natural brethren and friends" of
the Americans. He observed that the national interest required that
Great Britain remain the dominant power in Europe so as to counter-
balance Continental alliances potentially threatening to the Western
Hemisphere. To James Monroe, Jefferson wrote, "Is it not probable
that the circumstances of the war and her own [Great Britain's]
circumstances may have brought her wise men to begin to view us
with ... kindred eyes?" To the Briton Sir John Sinclair, Jefferson
urged that both nations "throw aside all personal feelings" and "look
only to their interests."37
The most important of these interests was the large volume of
trade between the United States and Great Britain. Each nation was
the other's largest trading partner. More than 40 percent of American
agricultural exports went to Great Britain during the period 1815-26.
Cotton accounted for nearly half of those exports. The era of "King
Cotton" had begun; for forty years southern cotton cultivated by the
sweat of black slaves kept British textile mills humming. The British,
in turn, satisfied the American demand for manufactured goods, the
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tariff of 1816 being inadequate to offset Great BritainJs comparative
advantage in this sector. The transatlantic trade proved vital to the
economic health of both nationsJ as the erstwhile belligerents re-
established an important commercial relationship.38
This burgeoning trade drew the United States tightly into the
economic orbit of Great Britain. For a quarter-century after 1815J
fluctuations in the British economy directly effected American pros-
perity. The United States was a primary producer of agricultural
goods and raw materials for British industr~39The Anglo-American
trade cycle worked like this: during periods of economic expansion a
rising demand for American produceJ especially cottonJ led to the
increased import of British manufactured goods into the United
States. As British exports to the United States tended to exceed
American exports to Great BritainJa trade deficit was created. During
the expansion phaseJ this deficit was financed by promises of future
shipments of American produce. As business expansion slowed in
Great BritainJ so did the demand for American goodsJ thereby wors-
enillg the trade deficit. Americans then had to pay for British goods
wit]l specieJ as British merchants in a time of slack demand became
reluctant to accept as payment promises of future shipments of
American produce. The export of specie drained the reserves of the
large banks of the eastern seaboardJwhich as a result were forced to
initiate a nationwide credit contraction. Such was the sequence of
events leading to the depression of 1819. American prosperity hinged
on a strong demand for its agricultural productsJparticularly cottonJ
and Great Britain exercised by far the greatest influence over that
demand.40
A second factor drawing the United States and Great Britain to-
gether in the years after the War of 1812 was the personality and
policies of the British foreign secretar~ Lord Castlereagh. Given wide
latitude by Lord Liverpool to conduct foreign polic~ Castlereagh
cultivated relations with the United States on the basis of economic
self-interestJnot emotion or ideolo~Like Monroe and AdamsJ Cas-
tlereagh ignored that segment of public opinion demanding reprisals
against the former foe. He was not deaf to such appeals; he too viewed
the American declaration of war in 1812 as an unpardonable actJ
coming as it did at one of the most perilous moments of the struggle
against Napoleon. Yet C:astlereagh knew that the final defeat of
Napoleon had left Great Britain dangerously weakened. A massive
war debt undermined the economy and threatened social stability:
John Quincy AdamsJ as minister to Great BritainJ observed these
problems at first hand. In early 1817 he wrote to Monroe that "the
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load of taxation to pay the interest on the national debt is greater than
the [British] nation can bear." Social chaos appeared imminent: "The
very elements of the political system seem to be breaking up.... The
people are in great distress, looking on every side for relief." 41
Under such conditions, national interest demanded reconciliation
with the United States; Great Britain could no longer afford to be the
enemy of its largest trading partner. Moreover, William Huskisson
and Thomas Wallace, influential members of the Board of Trade,
began to advocate the loosening of mercantile restrictions.42 Influ-
enced by the work of Smith and Ricardo, they too had become
convinced of the advantages of a freer world trade. Castlereagh
agreed. Thus, Great Britain moved in the direction of a more liberal
commercial order (albeit one based on the self-interest of compara-
tive advantage) at the same time that Monroe and Adams worked for a
similar end.43
Castlereagh hoped to conciliate not only the United States but
Europe as well. Great Britain required peace in order to recover from
the devastation of the struggle with Napoleon. Castlereagh wrote to
the British minister in Washington, Charles Bagot, that "the avowed
and true policy of Great Britain ... is to appease controvers)T, and to
secure, if possible, for all states a long interval of repose." 44 American
policymakers echoed these lines. John Quincy Adams wrote to his
father in 1816, "My specialty at present is to preach peace," con-
vinced as he was that peace was necessary for the "interests and
happiness of both nations." 45
Reconciliation of the former foes had begun almost immediately
after the end of the war with an agreement in July 1815 reestablishing
commercial ties. The Rush-Bagot Agreement of April 1817, demili-
tarizing the Great Lakes, gave tangible evidence of lessened tensions.
By the fall of 1817, although major issues still divided the two powers,
reconciliation with Great Britain had become a guiding, if publicly
unrecognized, principle of American foreign policy. It would prove
decisive in resolving the dispute with Spain.
The third guiding principle of the Monroe administration in its
effort to expand American foreign trade concerned the construction
and maintenance of a formidable military force. Republicans tradi-
tionally had mistrusted large military establishments as subversive
of republican institutions. Yet once again, the War of 1812 led to a
reevaluation of a basic tenet of the Republican faith. John Quincy
Adams wrote: "The most painful, perhaps the most profitable, lesson
of the war was the primary duty of the nation to place itself in a state
of permanent preparation for self-defense." 46 The buildup had begun
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during the Madison administration. One of Monroe's last acts as
secretary of war had been to draft a report for the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs recommending a 20,OOO-man army; a force four
times its prewar size.47
Madison began the military buildup almost immediately follow-
ing the end of the war. He called for establishing a regular army;
increasing the size of the naV)', improving the system of coastal
defenses, and better disciplining the militia.48 To do so, Madison had
to overcome a congressional desire to shrink the military back to its
prewar size. In April 1816, however, Congress passed a mammoth
naval appropriations bill providing funds for the construction of nine
74-gun ships of the line, twelve 44-gun frigates, and three steam
batteries for coastal defense. The "74s" would be the equal of any
ships afloat. The prospect of a fleet of such warships caused consid-
erable concern to the British government, for the Americans had
proved themselves formidable naval antagonists in the war.49 Still, a
policy of cooperation promised the two nations a virtual monopoly of
the seas.
Ja:mes Monroe's inaugural address made clear why the nation
.needed a military buildup. He called for the rigorous defense of the
commercial and navigation interests upon which all Americans de-
pended for prosperity: Citing the experiences of the war with Great
:Britain, he drew the following conclusions: "We must support our
rights or lose our character, and with it, perhaps, our liberties. A
people who fail to do so can scarcely be said to hold a place among
independent nations. National honor is national property of the high-
est value. The sentiment in the mind of every citizen is national
strength. It ought therefore to be cherished." 50 Accordingly; Monroe
recolnmended further strengthening coastal defenses, the army; and
the navy so as to ensure the rights of American commercial shipping
worldwide. In this respect Monroe's views presaged the theories of
.i\lfred Thayer Mahan, wh.a later in the nineteenth century wrote of
the Ilecessity of a navy sufficiently powerful to defend American
interests around the globe.51
Taken togethe~ the three guiding principles of the Monroe admin-
istration's foreign policy--reciprocity treaties and commercial re-
taliation, reconciliation with Great Britain, and a strengthened
tnilitary-canstituted a blueprint for global expansion. The princi-
ples had been formulated during the last two years of the Madison
~Ldministration and represented the major lessons of the near-
c~atastraphic war with Great Britain. Along with support for a na-
tional bank, they stood as a dramatic break with the traditional
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philosophy of the Republican part~ The vision of a decentralized,
inward looking agrarian republic had been replaced by an imperial
vision which reflected many of the basic tenets of the disgraced
Federalist part~ The irony is that the final collapse of the Federalist
party as a national force saw the substantive triumph of its principles
in the policies of James Monroe.52
To reconcile the divisions caused by the War of 1812, James Monroe
made an extended tour of the Middle Atlantic states, New England,
and the upper West in the summer of 1817. Ostensibly undertaken to
inspect the nation's military fortifications, Monroe's tour had the
unstated purpose of gaining support from both Federalists and Repub-
licans for his new administration. The first incumbent president
since George Washington to take such a tour, Monroe aimed to
reestablish the national consensus fundamental to the republican
vision, a consensus that had been shattered by the War of 1812.
Traveling as a private citizen and at first without official escort,
Monroe evoked the symbols of republican simplicity even as he
articulated a program that rejected it.53
Leaving Washington in June 1817, he made his way up the Atlantic
seaboard, stopping in most of the major cities along the wa~ At
Trenton he visited the battlefield where he had been wounded, reviv-
ing memories of the Revolutionary era and his own ties to it. In New
York Cit~ Monroe was welcomed by a committee of notables includ-
ing Governor DeWitt Clinton, John Jacob Astor, and Senator Rufus
King, the Federalist whom Monroe had defeated in the 1816 election.
The president stayed in New York for a week (as Adams would do in
August), visiting West Point and addressing the New York Society for
the Encouragement of Manufactures, to whom he advocated protec-
tive tariffs for the "glutted markets" of the United States.54
Monroe's meeting with his recent opponent, Rufus King, sym-
bolized his efforts to achieve national reconciliation. King had repre-
sented the remnants of a shattered political party in 1816, a party
tarred with allegations of treason. Now Monroe extended forgive-
ness, and King became a prominent ally of the administration in the
Senate. He received frequent confidential briefings from Adams on
affairs of state. King knew that Monroe as yet lacked a well-defined
base of support, and he did all he could to have his constituency
(primarily the New York mercantile establishment) heard by the
administration. King's ardent attempts to reopen the British West
India trade perhaps explain why the administration took such an
active interest in this issue. When King wrote to Monroe in 1817
DEVELOPING A STRATEGY 49
regarding the scarcity of silver coin in New York, Monroe responded,
"Your suggestions on this, or any other subject, will always be re-
ceived with attention and pleasure." 55
Monroe also had a long and complicated relationship with John
Jacob Astor. A German immigrant who never mastered his adopted
tongue, Astor cultivated the friendship of many influential politi-
cians and, in doing so, was able to exert a significant influence on
Anlerican foreign polic)', if only by his proximity to power. Historian
James Ronda writes: "Few other businessmen in the early republic
had so thoroughly mastered the art of personal politics as had John
Jacob Astor. His politics were not so much a matter of party and
ideology as friendship and influence." 56
Astor played a prominent role in the nation's finances in the early
part of the nineteenth century: Along with merchant David Parish
and financier Stephen Girard, he had saved the federal government
frOlll bankruptcy in 1814 by investing large sums in government
securities. Consequentl)', Astor became an advocate of the establish-
ment of the Second Bank of the United States as a means to stabilize
the llation's currency and ensure that the financial obligation repre-
sented by the securities would be paid in full. He wrote to a business
associate about his desire for a new national bank, "which we must
have or we are all gone." 57 Subsequentl)', Astor purchased a large
block of national bank stock, served on the bank's board of directors,
,and was briefly president of the New York branch.58
Astor had made his fortune in the fur trade. Since 1807 he had been
attempting to wrest control of the trans-Mississippi fur trade from
lCanadian competitors. In this endeavor he was assisted and encour-
aged by the United States government, which viewed his efforts as an
llnofficial yet effective way of extending national power. Astor
planl1ed to establish a chain of trading posts along the route blazed by
Lewis and Clark from which the pelts of the interior could be shipped
to Astoria (founded by Astor's employees in 1811) at the mouth of the
c:olumbia River. From there the furs would be shipped to Canton in
exchange for the teas, spices, and nankeens of China. Furs played a
vital role in developing the China trade, for they were one of the few
American commodities besides specie that the Chinese were inter-
t~sted in acquiring. Jefferson, who thought Astor "a most excellent
Illan," wrote to the fur magnate: "Your name will be handed down
with that of Columbus and Raleigh, as the father of the establish-
rnent and founder of such an empire which will arise from com-
rnerce. " 59
Not formally aligned with any political part)', Astor nonetheless
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was able to secure government action whenever his interests were
threatened. Perhaps the best example of the influence at Astor's
disposal was the "Punqua Wingchong" affair. In 1808, in violation of
the embargo, Jefferson allowed Astor's ship Beaver to embark for
Canton. On board was a supposed eminent Chinese mandarin, Pun-
qua Wingchong, stranded in the United States by the embargo, who
wished to return to his homeland. Jefferson rationalized that to allow
the mandarin's return would be a fine way to curry favor with the
Chinese. Madison and Albert Gallatin also helped to obtain the spe-
cial dispensation, although Gallatin doubted the veracity of the story.
Astor's outraged competitors in the China trade, landlocked by the
embargo, noted that eminent Chinese mandarins did not leave China
to visit other lands. They alleged that Punqua Wingchong was a petty
shopkeeper and that the whole affair was a ruse to allow Astor to
make a killing at the height of the embargo-caused shortage of goods.
Whatever the supposed mandarin's true identity; Astor's ship re-
turned from Canton carrying goods worth $200,000 more than it had
taken to China. "Punqua Wingchong" disappeared into the streets of
Canton, never to be heard from again.60
Astor's biographer, Kenneth Wiggins Porter, describes Madison's
relation to the fur magnate as "undoubtedly something more than a
formal friendship." Yet Astor formed his closest official ties with
James Monroe. In May 1814 Monroe helped him obtain special per-
mission to send a ship to Mackinac Island, which had been captured
by the British, to retrieve goods belonging to Astor and worth a
considerable sum of money. The timing of this grant of permission is
suspicious, considering that Astor only one month earlier had sug-
gested his plan to finance the war by purchasing government se-
curities.61 In 1817 Astor advised Monroe on the dispensing of
patronage in the port of New York-positions of special interest to a
large importer. Astor wrote to Monroe with complete frankness
whenever government policy seemed likely to endanger the interests
of his American Fur Company.62
Further solidifying the relationship of the two men was Monroe's
personal debt to Astor of $5,000. Astor had offered the loan during the
war when he heard that Monroe was experiencing financial difficulty.
The fur magnate showed great forbearance in collecting the debt, as
Monroe's shaky personal finances made it impossible for him to
repay his obligation while president. It was Astor's good fortune to
have a man in the White House who was literally in his debt during
the period 1817-25, a critical time for the American Fur Compan~
This is not to imply overt corruption on Monroe's part; it merely
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demonstrates how well-placed special interests can influence na-
tional polic~ Kenneth Wiggins Porter describes the Monroe-Astor
relationship best: "I do not suggest for a minute that Monroe would,
against his better judgement, allow Astor favors which would be
injurious to the country; but it does seem altogether natural that
whenever Monroe received an application for some consideration of a
nature to which the president could accede without undue strain on
his conscience he would be much more likely to give a favorable
response to Astor than to someone to whom he did not feel the same
sense of obligation.... But what would be the repercussions should a
similar situation be made public today? "63
Astor's American Fur Company and the United States government
maintained a symbiotic relationship in the early nineteenth centur~
Astor relied on federal support of his interests when necessary. The
,government, in tum, viewed his development of the fur trade as the
first stage of the settlement of the West.64 In this way the special
interests of an individual operating beyond the nation's boundaries
became identified with the national interest. Astor and others like
:him bore the responsibility of spreading American civilization and
values into new areas, defining by their enterprises the "national
interest." 65 The irony is that public-spirited men such as Jefferson,
~Madison, Monroe, Adams, and Gallatin pursued their patriotic goals
by w'orking so closely with Astor, a man described by a sympathetic
biographer as "putting his private interests before everything else,
~lnd never pausing to consider the public consequences of his ac-
tion." 66
Although President Monroe spent much of his time in private
consultation with wealthy and powerful individuals such as Astor,
]lis trip was definitely a public affair. The high point of the tour was
]lis arrival in Boston on 2 July 1817. A crowd of 40,000 filled the
streets as he proceeded to the Boston Common to be met by a
bipartisan commission of notables including Governor John Brooks,
C;eneral Henry Dearborn, and Thomas H. Perkins, a prominent mer-
chant with a large interest in the China trade.67 For five days Monroe
toured the fortifications, monuments, and churches of Boston, often
ill the company of influential Federalists who had vehemently op-
posed the wartime policies of Madison but now supported a Republi-
can president who advocated so many of their views. So much
political harmony in what had been the hotbed of Federalism made
party strife seem a thing of the past. Monroe stressed the themes
incorporated in his inaugural address: that "discord does not belong
to our system"; that the American people "constitute one great
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family with a common interest"; that the promotion of "true har-
mony" was the object of his "constant and zealous exertions"; and
that if the United States would persevere "in the path ... already
traced," it would not fail, "under the high favors of a gracious provi-
dence' to attain the high destiny" awaiting it.68
Monroe's visit to the Northeast in the summer of 1817 reinforced
the connections of the administration to the nation's mercantile-
financial elite. That a Virginian would visit the region evoked a
favorable response from many who had been wary of yet another
president from that southern state. Monroe, in turn, was pleased by
the welcome he received. Former Senator Jeremiah Mason, a Feder-
alist from New Hampshire, wrote to Rufus King that Monroe was
"much satisfied" with the reception given him "especially in New
England, where he had never been before and which exceeded his
expectations in all respects." Mason added that Monroe seemed
"inclined to conciliate the federalists and gain their support." He
concluded that "the federalists this way have been tickled and at this
moment feel better disposed towards him [Monroe] than formerly." 69
Another former Federalist senator, Christopher Gore (whom Monroe
had visited at his estate in Waltham, Massachusetts), was even more
candid in a letter he wrote to King: "It is perfectly well understood
that Monroe intends, so soon as his hands are a little stronger, to
follow his instincts and name the distinguished Federalists of New
England to office." 70 The Boston merchant Henry Lee (who also had
a substantial interest in the China trade) summarized the effect of
Monroe's "goodwill tour": "We are now all Republicans, even the
Essex Junto."7!
The exaltation created by the president's visit prompted one
Boston newspaper to proclaim "the era of good feelings" in American
politics.72 Certainly the old Federalist-Republican schism no longer
seemed so great, especially now that a Republican president was
advocating a national bank and a protective tariff. Yet even as the old
conflicts were ending, new divisions appeared in American politics,
this time within the Republican party itself. Western and southern
members of the party had interests very different from those of the
Middle Atlantic and New England states. Not all westerners and
southerners looked favorably on the president's intimacy with the
northeastern economic elite. To speak, as Monroe did, of eliminating
"discord" and "party spirit" is to forget the diversity of interests
within the nation which creates discord and party spirit. A nation's
foreign and domestic policies cannot benefit all factions equally: In
the end, the course chosen reflects those forces exercising real con-
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trol. Monroe's tour in 1817 gave definite indication as to what inter-
ests his administration would serve first in its efforts to serve all. It is
therefore not surprising that William Crawford of Georgia, Monroe's
secretary of the treasur)', wrote to Albert Gallatin: "Seriousl)', I think
that the president has lost as much as he has gained by this tour, at
least in popularity: II 73
John Quincy Adams returned from Great Britain to find the broad
goals and principles of the Monroe administration's foreign policy in
place. They represented a continuation of the directions charted
during the last two years of the Madison presidenc)', which in tum
reflected the the collective wisdom of the Republican party: But it was
JA.dams who solved the riddle of how to handle the dispute with Spain.
John Quincy Adams agreed with James Monroe's plan to defend the
republican experiment by expanding American foreign trade. As min-
ister to Great Britain, Adams had worked for better relations with
that nation, for the principle of reciprocit)', and for a strengthened
military: The program represented the pragmatic pursuit of American
self-interest championed by Adams. Yet the success or failure of a
ll.ation's foreign policy depends on the consistency with which it is
purslled. Dissenting factio:ns, both within Congress and in the admin-
istration, can sabotage the application of a policy: Equally important,
specific diplomatic problems (such as the recognition of South Amer-
ican countries' independellce) may have solutions which per se seem
reasonable but which contradict larger foreign policy goals. Adams's
genills as a statesman was that in dealing with specific crises he never
lost sight of how their solutions affected what he conceived to be the
Ilation's overall interest. In this wa)', Adams exercised a decisive effect
on .Monroe, who at times failed to see the interrelationship of
seemingly discrete diplomatic problems. Adams approached each
diplomatic challenge with cool-headed detachment, making recom-
Inendations based not necessarily on the merits of each case but on
}lOW they fit into the larger foreign policy picture.
Thus, Adams approach.ed the negotiations with Spain within a
broader foreign policy framework. Successful resolution of the dis-
I)"ute with Spain depended less on face-to-face talks with Onis then on
the progress of United States foreign policy generall)', especially in
r'egard to Great Britain. The terms of any treaty reflect the objective
power relationships existing between the contending nations. In the
fall of 1817, in the atmosphere of reaction engendered by the Con-
gress of Vienna and with the continued existence of Anglo-American
t.Lostilit)', that power relationship still seemed to favor Spain.
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Accordingl)', Adams crafted a foreign policy aimed at tilting the
balance of power between the two nations in the direction of the
United States. His twofold strategy involved, first, isolating Spain
from the other European powers (especially Great Britain), and sec-
ond, applying steadily increasing military pressure on the poorly
defended Spanish North American possessions. The intent was to
place Spain in a position in which the United States could dictate the
terms of a treat)', safe in the knowledge that no power stood ready to
aid Spain if the United States chose to assert its claim by force. This
strategy applied two of the guiding principles of administration for-
eign polic)', reconciliation with Great Britain and a stronger militar)',
to a specific diplomatic problem. The "two-track" approach of diplo-
matic and military pressure unfolded bit by bit in 1817-18.
Taking office six months after Monroe's inauguration, Adams
moved quickly to make his presence felt. Because he faced opposition
to his policies and his personality in both the Congress and the
administration, his success as secretary of state depended as much on
outmaneuvering domestic opponents as on dealing with foreign gov-
ernments. He immediately began to demonstrate his mastery of
bureaucratic intrigue.
His first chance to do so came during the preparations for the
departure of the "South American Commission." In Ma)', Monroe
had authorized plans for three commissioners to journey to South
America to gain information on the nature of the revolutionary
struggles occurring there. The United States had not yet formally
recognized any of the rebellious colonies, although private citizens
sympathetic to the patriot cause had provided substantial support.
Influential members in the Congress and the cabinet, including
Speaker of the House Henry Clay and Treasury Secretary William
Crawford, pushed for immediate recognition. 74 Monroe, although
ideologically sympathetic to the patriot cause, was reluctant to take
so important a step as recognition without more knowledge about the
rebels' prospects for success.
Complications delayed the South American Commission's depar-
ture, originally scheduled for July 1817: first, problems in finding
commissioners acceptable to all interested parties, then the illness of
the son of one of those chosen.75 When Adams arrived in New York in
early August, he was briefed on the situation by one of the commis-
sioners, John Graham, chief clerk of the state department and a loyal
supporter of James Monroe. 76
John Quincy Adams opposed the recognition of the South Amer-
ican insurgent governments. Though he sympathized in principle
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with their struggle, Adams doubted that the Latin Americans could
achieve either civil liberty or self-government of the North American
variet~77 He also opposed recognition as needlessly antagonistic
toward Spain. For the United States to aid the rebels by the act of
recognition would worsen the deadlock with Spain; to Adams, the
potential damage to American national interest far outweighed ide-
alistic notions about aiding"our republican brethren to the south."
Monroe came to agree with this view. An unstated purpose of the
South American Commission was to allow him to delay making a
final decision on recognition. 78
Adams, anticipating that Henry Clay would begin a campaign to
force the administration into recognition, moved to delay further the
departure of the commissioners until he could be certain that the
coming session of Congress would be over by the time they returned
with their findings. He did so in a way that made clear his own (and
Monroe's) priorities. The commissioners were scheduled to sail to
South America aboard the USS Ontario, commanded by Captain
James Biddle. In late September, however, Adams issued Biddle new
orders, directing him instead to sail to the Northwest coast and take
possession of Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia. The Treaty of
Ghent stipulated that all territories captured during the war be re-
turned "without delay;" yet Astoria remained in British hands. Now
Adams instructed Biddle, assisted by John Prevost, to depart as soon
as possible for Astoria "to assert there the claim of sovereignty in the
name ... of the United States, by some symbolical or other appropri-
ate mode·of setting up a claim to national authority and dominion."
Adams stressed that "no force is to be employed" in taking the
territory; he intended only that symbolic control be asserted over the
Northwest coast. The expedition represented the first step toward a
transcontinental boundar~79
It is significant that Monroe made arrangements to have John Jacob
.Astor informed of these plans.80 Astor stood to gain more than
anyone from the recovery of the post, and he had agitated for its
reoccupation since the end of the war, at one point offering to send
one of his own ships to accomplish the task. Exactly what precipi-
tated (after two years of inaction) the d~cisionto retake Astoria in the
:fall of 1817 is unclear, but the fact that Astor and other private
citizens with an interest in the northwest coast had recently con-
ferred with both Monroe and Adams suggests that national honor was
Jnot the only reason.81
Compared to the interminable delays associated with the South
.A.merican Commission, the expedition to the Northwest departed
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with amazing speed. Even though the decision to undertake the
mission appears to have been made only in late September, Biddle and
Prevost had set out by 10 October for the northwest coast.82 Mean-
while, the South American Commission remained stalled until a new
vessel and supplies could be procured. The commissioners did not
sail for South America until 4 December 1817. The numerous delays
had caused Clay and Crawford much consternation; to Adams, how-
ever, things had gone exactly as planned.
Meanwhile, Adams's next opportunity to assert his influence
came at the first meeting on 30 October of Monroe's still incomplete
cabinet: Secretary of War John C. Calhoun of South Carolina and
Attorney General William Wirt of Maryland had yet to assume their
posts. Nevertheless, several crucial issues relating to Latin America
and Spain were taken up at the meeting, and the decisions set the tone
for the conduct of administration foreign polic~ Monroe posed a
series of questions to his advisers which, taken together, reveal the
interconnection of the Latin American and Spanish problems:
1. Has the president the power to acknowledge the independence of
the South American insurgent governments?
2. Is recognition a justifiable cause of war for Spain, or any other
power?
3. Is it "expedient" for the United States now to recognize the inde-
pendence of Buenos Aires?
4. What should United States policy be toward Spain?
5. Is it "expedient" to take military action against the insurgent
strongholds at Amelia Island, Florida, and Galveston Island,
Texas?
6. Is it still advisable to send the South American Commission on its
long-delayed mission? 83
The pressure on the administration to recognize the insurgent
governments increased with the arrival in Washington of Buenos
Aires envoy Hermenegildo Aguirre. Aguirre had cultivated influen-
tial friends in the United States, among them Henry Clay; and had
pleaded his country's case to Adams only days before.84 Monroe now
needed to ascertain the limits of presidential power regarding recog-
nition so as to prepare for Clay's challenge to his authorit~At this
early stage in the history of the republic it was still unclear where the
power of recognition lay; although precedent pointed in the direction
of the executive rather than the Congress. Clay's challenge would
prove a decisive test case of this issue. Monroe knew that recognition
of the insurgents would poison relations with Spain. The Spanish
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government, struggling to preserve a decaying empire, had made it
clear that recognition of the rebels would spell the end of the negotia-
tions with the United States. This alone prevented Monroe from
acting on recognition. Yet the rising tide of public opinion in favor of
recognition necessitated finding a constitutional argument to justify
what was in essence a tactical decision to withhold extending diplo-
matic ties to the revolutionary governments of South America.
A. related issue was the occupation of Amelia and Galveston is-
lands by forces allied to the South American revolutionary cause-
only part of a broad pattern of guerrilla activity in the name of South
American independence which was occurring all along the Spanish
borqerlands. The groups harassed Spanish shipping and, when possi-
ble, set up outposts in the name of the insurgent governments.
Though these expeditions included unsavory elements, the revolu-
tionary credentials of most of their leaders were indisputable.85 Moti-
vated by patriotic ardor and dreams of glory; the South American
revolutionaries roamed the Gulf Coast region in defiance of the
Ineager Spanish forces stationed there.
Yet the activities of the seagoing guerrillas threatened United
States interests in two ways. First, some of the privateers, contrary to
orders, had seized American ships in the Gulf. Though few in number
,and committed by renegade elements, the seizures outraged Amer-
icaIl shipowners, who appealed to the government for protection.86
Second, and more important, in the name of South American inde-
pendence the revolutionaries liberated Spanish territory in Texas and
in Florida which the United States coveted for itself. Their presence
complicated resolution of the territorial issues with Spain. The ques-
tion was, should the United States remove the South American
patriot elements from Amelia and Galveston Islands by force?
John Quincy Adams argued for the use of military force. In his
diary he wrote of the cabinet discussion: "It appeared to me that all
the gentlemen were backward upon giving their opinions.... I fi-
]lally' gave mine explicitly that the marauding parties at Amelia
Island and Galveston ought to be broken up immediately:" Adams
also supported going ahead with the South American Commission so
that the commissioners could justify to the insurgent governments
the .American attacks on forces aligning themselves with the revolu-
tion. On these two points Monroe agreed with Adams, as he did with
the secretary of state's recommendation to await the next dispatch
from minister George Erving in Madrid before forming a new policy
toward Spain.87
As frequently would be the case, it was Adams's insights and
S8 Adams and American Global Empire
forthright arguments that convinced Monroe. The decision to attack
Amelia and Galveston represented another step along the two-track
policy of putting military and diplomatic pressure on Spain. It is
significant that Adams labeled the forces already on the two islands
as "marauding parties." Though he was not entirely without justi-
fication in using the term (some American shipping had been seized
by the patriots), the bulk of the evidence indicates that the Amelia
part~ at least, was operating under a commission granted by the
Venezuelan revolutionary government.88 Yet Adams referred to the
post as a "piratical establishment" that United States security inter-
ests demanded be overthrown. Ultimatel~ the true nature of the of
the forces occupying Amelia and Galveston islands was irrelevant to
Adams and Monroe. The liberation of the islands from Spanish con-
trol was not appealing to men attempting to wrest those areas from
Spain. Whatever the character of the forces there, circumstances
demanded that they be labeled pirates in order to justify their re-
moval. The administration could then retain the seized territory (as it
did Amelia Island) on the grounds that Spain was unable to control
them. Thus, under a reasonable pretext a clear message could be sent
to the Spanish government that failure to negotiate would lead to the
outright seizure of disputed territories.
John Quincy Adams had established himself as a force to be reckoned
with less than six weeks after assuming the office of secretary of
state. The diversion of the Ontario to the northwest coast and the
consequent delay of the South American Commission made clear his
priorities. The decisions made at the October 30 cabinet meeting
reflected his geopolitical approach to foreign policy and his Ma-
chiavellian strategic sense. The two incidents set the stage for diplo-
matic triumphs to come.
His auspicious start as secretary of state did little to quell Adams's
nagging sense of self-doubt. Anticipating the difficult road ahead, he
suffered from sleepless nights and painfully drowsy days.89 In a
palsied hand he wrote to his father that his new post was "as burden-
some as I had expected, and how I shall be able to get through the
winter is yet a problem for solution. The moral difficulties have not
yet begun to present themselves." To his mother, John Quincy was
even franker: "I am endeavoring gradually to establish a regular order
in the course of business, for my own observance; but the session of
Congress is at hand which shall quickly increase the load of business,
and until I shall have gone through that trial it will be impossible for
me to ascertain whether my strength will be equal to my task, or will
sink under it." 90
THREE
First Moves
John Quincy Adams did not exaggerate the immensity of his work
load. Only a man who lived to work could have stood the pace. In a
very real sense, Adams was the Department of State. The department,
'which at the time included no-more than a dozen employees, was
without an assistant secretar~which meant that Adams was solely
responsible for all departmental decisions as well as the drafting of
instructions to the American ministers abroad. Moreover, he was in
charge of overseeing the census of 1820, arranging for the publication
of legislation, consulting with the president on pardons, and running
the patent office. l Routine duties ranged from meeting with foreign
dignitaries and advising the president to supervising the daily opera-
tion and reorganization of the Department of State. His tasks were
n.ot made easier by either the confused condition of the department's
files or the incompetence of its chief clerk, Daniel Brent. But Adams,
a first-rate administrator, devised a departmental filing system that
Iemained in use until 1915.2
In addition to his other work, Adams was commissioned by Con-
gress to prepare a report on the various systems of weights and
Ineasures in use throughout the country and the prospects for the
establishment of uniform standards. Adams had for some time been
personally interested in the subject of weights and measures and
seized upon the task wit:h gusto. He somehow found the time to
research and write a landmark treatise that recommended the adop-
tion of the metric system by the United States. Written between 1817
and 1821, Adams's Report on Weights and Measures is an American
classic on the subject. The report is the product of voluminous
research as well as philosophical, historical, and sociological insight.
John Adams described it as a "mass of historical, philosophical,
ehemical, metaphysical, and political knowledge." 3 Yet John Quincy
J\.dams did the project in his spare moments, arising earlier in the
rnorning or taking time during his vacations to write or to do re-
search.4
Besides the drafting of scientific treatises and state papers, Adams
"\ivrote at length in his diar~Beginning in 1785, he had kept a remarka-
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bly inclusive record of his daily affairs and emotions, a practice
continued until his death in 1848. The diary provided Adams with a
private forum in which to vent his frustrations and anxieties; Samuel
Flagg Bemis described it as "a secret tuning fork for his pent-up
emotions." 5 Adams went to great lengths to find time to write in his
diar~ occasionally fearing that it intruded on his other duties. It is
unclear whether or not he intended his diary to be published, as
portions of it were some years after his death. The self-conscious tone
of many of the entries indicates that he thought someone was looking
over his shoulder, even if it was only his own conscience.6 Nonethe-
less, the worth of the diary as a historical source is inestimable.
Whatever tendency Adams had consciously to distort the record he
was compiling, its sheer mass suggests that it provides a remarkably
candid view of Adams himself. The diary's frank observations, com-
prehensiveness, hostilit~ self-loathing, and personal, political, and
historical reflections make it an unparalleled narrative of the early
republic.?
The crush of business required Adams to rise each day between
five and six in the morning and even earlier during the longer days of
summer. After spending his mornings reading scripture and writing
(or working on his report on weights and measures), he would go to
his office at the Department of State around noon, rarely returning
home before five. His evenings were normally spent preparing for the
following day's tasks.8 Despite this Herculean self-discipline, Adams
berated himself for laxness in the performance of his duties. The
specter of inadequacy loomed over him, warded off only by constant
exertion. He feared the loss of his talents: " My most earnest prayer to
God is that if my powers of usefulness and active industry are taken
from me I may be reasonably sensible and humbly resigned to my
condition and removed from the earthly scene before the effects of
my incapacity have been felt in the counsels and affairs of my coun-
try:"9
John Quincy Adams extended the principle of rigid self-discipline
to the upbringing of his three sons. He was a stern father with great
expectations of his children. Indeed, his love for them was condi-
tioned on their achievements. Like his father before him, Adams
raised his three sons to be leaders. The imperatives of the "Adams
family myth" were visited upon his children, with the added burden
of a second generation of greatness for them to live up to.
Adams could be devastating in correcting perceived bree~hes of
good conduct. Soon after becoming secretary of state he wrote a
blistering letter to John Adams, Jr., who was then staying with his
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llncle in Massachusetts: "You conclude by saying that you hope I will
forgive anything rash in my son, but I shall do no such thing. If my son
be rash he must take the consequences.... You boast of studying
]lard, and pray; for whose benefit do you study? Is it for me or for your
lUncle's? -Or are you so much of a baby that you must be coaxed to
spell your letters by sugar plums, or are you such an independent
gentlemen that you can brook no constraint, and must have every-
thing you ask for? If so, I advise you not to write for anything from
lme./ IO
These were strong words from any parent, but particularly so from
one whose duties had kept him separated from his children for years
at a time. While their father was in Russia, George and John endured
six years of separation from their parents, left in the care of their
grandparents Abigail and John. Such long separations meant that like
Jhis father before him, John Quincy Adams exercised much of his
influence over his sons via letter. Yet the trials of separation made
Jhim no less stem a taskmaster, nor did they prevent him from con.di-
tioning his love for his children on their right conduct and achieve-
Jment. Adams clearly felt disappointed by what he perceived to be the
lunderachievement of his sons. He lamented that they did not love
literature and learning as much as he had as a youth. He judged them
to be unruly and lacking the seriousness of purpose necessary for
greatness. In a letter to his mother in 1816 he described them as
.IIaverage" children, adding, "I certainly can imagine something more
flattering.... But I am aware that no amount of labor will tum a
pebble into a diamond." Adams gradually resigned himself to the fact
that his sons suffered from what he termed the "blast of medi-
ocrit~"11
All three of John Quincy Adams's sons became lawyers. George
'Washington Adams, a sensitive and intelligent young man, suffered
:most from his father's expectations. His love of poetry and romance,
:his proclivity toward "wasting time," even the burdens imposed by
:his name made him feel always inadequate to the life set before him.
:He could do nothing to fulfill his father's expectations. Even winning
:Harvard's Boylston's Prize over a group of competitors that included
:Ralph Waldo Emerson failed to quench his father's disappointment.
'George suffered from a recurrent nightmare in which his wooing of a
college sweetheart was interrupted by the image of father advising
:him, "Remember, George, who you are and what you are doing." 12
(;eorge's early promise disintegrated into a life of drinking, gambling,
,and indebtedness. The only true love of his life was a chambermaid,
:Eliza Dolph, who bore him a child but whose social station made her
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unacceptable as a wife. In April 1829, his parents summoned George
to Washington to assist in their return to Quinc~ Facing certain
chastisement for his dissolute living and mortified by the prospect
that his parents would learn of his paternity; George Washington
Adams slipped from the deck of the steamship Benjamin Franklin to
his death in the waters of Long Island Sound. I3
John Adams, Jr., did little better than his older brother in with-
standing the crushing burdens of the Adams family myth. Possessed
of a fiery temperament, in 1823 John led a student rebellion at
Harvard that resulted in his expulsion for riotous behavior. His failure
at managing his father's ill-considered investment in the Columbian
Mills, a grain distribution business in Washington, presaged his slide
into alcoholism and oblivion. He died in Washington in 1834.14
Only the youngest, Charles Francis, fulfilled his father's expecta-
tions. Rather than being intimidated, Charles thrived on his father's
influence. Perhaps owing to the security afforded by a childhood in
the company of his parents, he fought off the bouts of depression
suffered by all the Adams children. Like his older brothers, he was
given to drinking and carousing; in his late teens he even kept a
mistress. Yet his instinct for survival guided him to a marriage with
the socially prominent Abigail Brooks. Taking up the Adams mantle
of greatness for the third generation, Charles in the 1840s became a
leader in the cause of antislaver~ Ironically; his greatest achieve-
ment-preserving British neutrality during the Civil War as Amer-
ican minister to Great Britain-occurred after his father's death. IS
As always in the life of John Quincy Adams, familial concerns took a
back seat to public duties as he and Monroe began to implement their
foreign polic~ The president, in his first annual message to Congress
on 2 December 1817, announced plans to seize Amelia and Galveston
islands from the South American "pirates" who had occupied
them. I6 Monroe introduced three reasons to justify the planned
assault. First, he claimed that the patriot force had violated American
neutrality laws by recruiting United States citizens for their ranks.
Second, Monroe doubted that the patriot operation had been author-
ized by any insurgent governments, "as it would be difficult to
reconcile it with the friendly relations existing between the United
States and the colonies." Finally; the president claimed that the
Amelia establishment "had assumed a more marked character of
unfriendliness to us," becoming"a channel for the illicit introduc-
tion of slaves into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves
from neighboring states, and a port of smuggling of every kind." I?
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The plans to occupy Amelia and Galveston inflamed those suppor-
tive of the South American independence movement. Henry Clay of
:Kentucky led the opposition. He sponsored a resolution calling for
the "just observance" of neutrality in the South American indepen-
dence struggles, arguing that American policy in practice hindered
that cause. He called for the revision of the neutrality laws to correct
their perceived partiality towards Spain. IS To Cla~ the imminent
.actions against Amelia and Galveston were but the most recent
evidence that American policy worked against the cause of South
.American independence.
Despite his strong protests, Clay in early December stopped short
of the outright condemnation of the Amelia and Galveston seizures.
lOthers were not so reticent in expressing their views. William
:Duane, the pugnacious publisher of the Philadelphia Aurora, pulled
no punches in criticizing the administration on this and other topics.
.An ardent advocate of the patriot cause, Duane claimed that the
.Amelia establishment had been authorized by two of the insurgent
governments and that it was"essentially conducive to the promotion
of their independence:" 19 On 9 December, Congressman John Rhea
of Tennessee sponsored a resolution asking that the president lay
before the House"any information he may possess and think proper
to communicate" regarding the character of the Amelia and Gal-
veston "pirates" and that he restate his reasons for suppressing their
activities.2o
John Forsyth of Georgia, who would prove a loyal ally of the
administration in the House, objected to that part of Rhea's resolu-
tion requiring the president to restate the reasons for his actions.
JForsyth claimed that to do so would imply dissatisfaction with the
reasons given in the president's message a week earlier. After some
debate the House adopted Rhea's resolution with Forsyth's amelld-
ment, in effect asking the administration to report on its actions
rather than justify them. In so doing, the House sent a clear signal
that it would do little to challenge the executive in foreign policy
matters, preferring instead to act in an advisory role.
To John Quincy Adams fell the task of assembling the documents
l\1onroe thought "proper to communicate" regarding the forces at
Amelia and Galveston. It was but the first of many occasions in
which Adams would be called upon to report to the Congress on
foreign policy questions. In doing so, he usually demonstrated a
talent for marshaling evidence to support administration positions,
but in this case his report was embarrassingly lacking in documen-
tary evidence to uphold the president's contentions regarding the
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forces at Amelia. The documents submitted to the House on 10
January 1818 comprise mainly the allegations of Beverly Che~
customs collector of New Orleans, that members of the Jean Lafitte
gang had occupied Galveston Island and were using it as a base to
launch attacks against shipping in the Gulf of Mexico. Chew also
charged that the pirates were engaged in smuggling slaves into the
United States.21 Reports of attacks on American shipping in the Gulf
had been arriving periodically for most of 1817.22 These reports also
warned of patriot preparations for an attack on Pensacola.23 Yet Luis
Aur)', the patriot commander, had abandoned Galveston in April
1817, moving first to Matagorda along the Texas Gulf Coast and then
to Amelia Island, where he assumed command of forces formerly
under the control of the Scottish adventurer Gregor MacGregor. Only
after Aury departed from Galveston did Lafitte's gang move in. At
this point the establishment at Galveston became indisputably pi-
ratical in nature, and most of the documents Adams submitted to
Congress refer to it. Yet Monroe repeatedly suspended the orders to
seize Galveston.24
United States land and naval forces did capture Amelia Island on
23 December, but Adams's report contains only one document per-
taining to the nature of the establishment at Amelia. It is a letter from
John McIntosh, a Georgia planter, to Crawford, dated 30 October
1817, alleging that Aury commanded a group of "about one hundred
and thirty brigand negroes-a set of desperate and bloody dogs."
McIntosh claimed that "Aury's blacks ... make this neighborhood
extremely dangerous to a population like ours," and he feared the
possibility that their presence would incite a slave revolt.25 Beyond
this one piece of speculation, Adams's report contains nothing to
substantiate the charges of slave trading and piracy by Aury and his
men. Ironicall)', the administration tolerated the presence of Lafitte's
gang because it was in fact composed of pirates who preyed on
Spanish shipping and who could be removed when necessary-as
they were in March 1821. The very legitimacy of Aury's nascent
patriot government at Amelia Island was what constituted the threat
to the United States, by creating another obstacle to the acquisition of
the Floridas.
Adams's report was little more than an attempt to defuse criticism
of the president's actions by creating an illusion of House participa-
tion in the making of foreign policy. Further evidence that the admin-
istration had no intention of being completely frank with the
Congress is found in Adams's diar)', which reveals that one portion of
the documents "implicat[ed] the British government in such a man-
FIRST MOVES 65
ller that the president has thought it proper to omit certain passages
of the letter in his communications to the House." Yet Monroe
authorized a complete copy of the letter in question to be given to
]Bagot for transmission to his government.26 In short, Monroe and
~A.damswere more candid with the British government than with the
JHouse of Representatives.
When news of the seizure of Amelia Island arrived in early January
1818, the administration faced the question of what to do next.
~Monroe, leaning toward restoring the island to Spain, convened his
cabinet on 6 January to discuss the matter. He presented for consid-
feration a draft message announcing the intention to withdraw from
"A.melia. Adams and Calhoun argued strongly for keeping possession
of the island. Crawford, supported by Wirt and Secretary of the Navy
Benjamin Crowninshield, favored its return. They feared that to
retain Amelia would risk war with Spain.27 Adams put little stock in
Crawford's opinions- "Crawford's point d'honneur is to differ from
Jme, and to find no weight in any reason assigned by me" -and
dismissed Wirt and Crowninshield as sycophants who would always
agree with Monroe. Only Calhoun (who frequently agreed with
i\dams's positions) found favor with the secretary of state: "Calhoun
thinks for himself, independent of all the rest, and with good judg-
lment, quick discriminations, and keen observation. He supports his
opinions with powerful eloquence." 28 The meeting of 6 January
c~ndedwithout having reached a final decision.
Adams continued his efforts to persuade the president to retain
Amelia during a second cabinet meeting on the matter on 9 January.
"I repeated the arguments of the former da~ and new ones as they
occurred to me now." He contended that under the No Transfer
Resolution of 1811 the president had no right to abandon the island
without congressional approval. The division in his cabinet disturbed
]\1onroe, who still did not make a final decision. The infighting made
Cl strong impression on Adams: "The cabinet councils open upon me
Cl new scene of the political world. There is a play of passions,
opinions, and characters different in many respects from those in
which I have been accustomed.... There is slowness, want of deci-
sion, and a spirit of procrastination in the president; which perhaps
arises more from his situation than his personal character." 29
Adams's intense lobbying efforts paid off. On 12 January; Monroe
~lnnouncedhis intention to retain possession of Amelia Island "for
the present." Once again the president's first instincts had been
overridden by the powerful arguments of his secretary of state. Yet
l\1onroe doubted the wisdom of his decision when an unconfirmed
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newspaper report arrived on 19 January that as many as two hundred
American merchant ships had been seized in Havana as retaliation for
the capture of Amelia Island. Adams wrote in his diary of Monroe's
"alarm" at the report and of his fears that the incident might provoke
a war with Spain, backed by other European powers. Adams glumly
noted that "this incident is, in truth, an untoward one, and therefore
most likely to be well founded." 30 By 21 Januar~ Monroe and Adams
had found that the report was false, but the president's panicked
response to the rumor of seized American ships reveals the risk he
perceived in Adams's aggressive border diplomac~
Having decided to keep Amelia, the administration moved to head
off further criticism of its actions. Monroe formally announced the
capture of the island in a 13 January address to Congress, notable as
much for what it did not say as for what it did. Avoiding explicit
reference to the plans to retain Amelia, the message stressed that the
action had been necessary to protect United States security along its
borders. Monroe repeated his claim that the "foreign adventurers" on
the island had acted without the authorization of any South Amer-
ican insurgent government.
The president also introduced a new reason to justify the seizure,
one not contained in his first message of 2 December. He announced
that the "law of 1811" [the No Transfer Resolution] "was considered
applicable to the case" from the very beginning. Only no~ Monroe
said, was the "law of 1811" considered proper to mention, having
been kept secret until this time. The "law of 1811" (actually a series
of resolutions by the Congress) was premised on the idea that "the
United States ... cannot without serious inquietude" see any part of
the Floridas pass into the hands of another foreign power; it em-
powered the president to occupy temporarily any threatened territo-
ries in the province. It had been the basis for the occupation of West
Florida and had also been used to justify the abortive Mathews
mission of 1812. Now Monroe invoked it to defend the suppression of
a force he characterized as "unauthorized by and unknown to the
colonial governments." 31
The No Transfer Resolution had first been used to defend the
Amelia operation in a report to Congress by Henry Middleton, chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Relations, on 10 January 1818. The
report was intended to preface the documents submitted to the
committee by the administration, but the contents of the report bear
the stamp of John Quincy Adams.
Middleton, a close administration all~ prepared the report under
Adams's supervision. At the secretary's prompting, Middleton em-
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phasized the illegal introduction of slaves into the United States as
the major reason for seizing the island.32 Moreover, Adams revealed
to Middleton the "secret laws" of 1811. His diary entry on the subject
shows Adams to be a proponent of a powerful executive branch: "I
gave him [Middleton] all the additional information that I possessed
concerning it-I showed him the secret laws, those singular anoma-
lies of our system which have grown out of the error in our Constitu-
tion which confers upon the legislature the power of declaring war;
which in the theory of government according to Montesquieu and
Rousseau is strictly an executive act. Whenever secrecy is necessary
for an operation of the executive involving the question of peace and
war, Congress must help pass a secret law to give the President the
power-now secrecy is contrary to one of the first principles of
legislation; but this absurdity comes unavoidably from that of being
given to Congress instead of the executive the power of declaring
war." 33
Adams's critique of the congressional wannaking power was char-
acteristic of his view regarding executive authority. He was perhaps
the staunchest advocate of his time of a strong executive branch,
particularly for the cond·uct of foreign policy: He believed that the
secrecy and need for flexibility (including the use of force) associated
with an effective foreign policy required that the president be given
wide latitude to conduct affairs without interference from Congress.
I-Ie argued that the constitutional powers of the executive were more
general, and hence subject to broader interpretation, than those of the
Congress, which were en"umerated.34 His mistrust of the wisdom of
"the. people" is demonstrated by his ridicule of the idea that an
assertive legislature was needed to protect against runaway executive
power. Indeed, for most of his life Adams was more concerned about
the encroachment of the Congress on the powers of the executive.35
T:he new defense of the Amelia action articulated in Middleton's
report provoked widespread criticism in the nation's press. Both the
questionable documentary evidence and the use of the No Transfer
Resolution drew fire. The Kentucky Reporter, noting that Amelia
Island was "beyond our territorial jurisdiction," asserted: "We cannot
... discern the right of the Executive to make a hostile attack upon it.
We cannot perceive in the documents published sufficient grounds to
justify the course." The paper termed the seizure of the island
"premature and unconstitutional." 36 The Argus of Western America
attacked the president's llypocritical use of the No Transfer Resolu-
tion, commenting, "We do not like the two sided vindication of our
government.... Aury [the leader of the Amelia force] could not have
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been a pirate and a lawful commander at the same time. II 3 7 The New
York Evening Post described the president's conduct as "a daring
military usurpation of the most alarming nature, II undertaken "with-
out authority; and diametrically in the face of the Constitution.1I3S
The City of Washington Gazette, though sympathetic to Monroe's
actions, blasted Middleton's report: "Confident that we are that the
administration stands upon pretty solid ground, we are sorry to see its
credit impaired by so futile a document. II 39
The most scathing and comprehensive critique appeared in the
Philadelphia Aurora. In a series of articles, the paper systematically
refuted the administration's arguments justifying the seizure of Ame-
lia, denouncing the "shameless and futile documents presented as a
pretext. II The Aurora described the documents in the Middleton
report as "evidence of the infirmity of the human mind. II It accused
the administration of "bad faith and public deception, II as well as of
causing"articles to be written in the public offices ll for publication in
pro-administration newspapers such as the Washington National In-
telligencer, the Boston Patriot, and the Richmond Enquirer. "By means
of these machines the people are managed-an impulse is then given
to the class of sycophants ... who in every populous place, return the
service of slaves for the emoluments or promises of petty offices. II 40
The Aurora perhaps went too far in asserting the existence of
"machines ll to "managell public opinion. However, it was no exag-
geration to say that some of the nation's newspapers were little more
than mouthpieces for the Monroe administration. One such journal
was the Washington National Intelligencer. Its publishers, Joseph
Gales and William Seaton, were Washington "insiders ll whose edi-
torialloyalty was rewarded by regular access to those in power. Their
paper served as a public forum in which the administration could
publish the documents necessary to marshall public support for its
initiatives.41 The National Intelligencer supported the Amelia action,
as it did nearly all the administration's policies, and in late January
rebutted the Aurora's attacks, declaring that its arguments had "no
real bearing on the question. II 42
Despite the inconsistencies in the president's defense of the sei-
zure of Amelia, Congress did nothing to end the occupation-for
two reasons. First, few congressmen wished to challenge the role of
the executive in conducting foreign policy; as long as even the
illusion of consultation, in the form of the submission of selected
documents, was maintained, most were content to give the presi-
dent a free hand. Second, they knew that the occupation of Amelia
related directly to the stalled negotiations with Spain; even though
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they recognized the contradictions and questionable constitution-
ality of Monroe's actions, the majority would not risk undercutting
the president's bargaining position by challenging his authority to act
militaril~
One would have supposed that direct aggression against Spanish
possessions would cause a serious setback in Spanish-American rela-
tions. The negotiations had been stalled since Januar~when Monroe
had informed Onis of the futility of continued talks.43 A draft project
of a treaty proposed by Spanish Foreign Secretary Cevallos the pre-
vious August had been rejected by American minister Erving on the
grounds that he was not empowered to negotiate.44 In short, virtually
no progress had been made in the talks since their resumption in
1816. This stalemate would not seem to have been helped by the
invasion of Amelia Island.
1"he plans to seize Spanish territory announced in the president's
message of 2 December provoked only a mild protest from Onis,
however. In a note to Adams of 6 December, he avoided direct con-
denlnation of the invasion plans, focusing instead on the failure of the
United States government to prevent the patriot forces from recruit-
ing and outfitting their expeditions in American ports. In the face of a
direct violation of Spanish territor~ Onis refrained from making a
strong protest. Instead, he ended his note with the plaintive observa-
tion that "there was not the slightest motive" for the president's
plans, requesting only "a precise and satisfactory explanation" for
them.45 In fact, on 10 December, in the wake of the announcement to
oCC'upy Amelia Island, Onis wrote to Adams of new instructions he
had just received from Madrid and inquired as to when the negotia-
tiorls could be resumed.46 The Spanish minister's proposal to resume
the talks while a portion of his nation's possessions were under siege
reinforced Adams's belief that the only way to resolve the dispute
with Spain was by the selective application of military force. The two
men met for preliminary talks on 19 December.
Onis's willingness to return to the bargaining table despite u.S.
aggression is explained by the generalized crisis facing the Spanish
empire in the early nineteenth centur~With the exception of Cuba,
all of Spain's Western Hemisphere colonies were in revolt. Initiall~
the Spanish forces in the New World had been able to quell the often
poorly organized and ill-supported rebellions. But by 1817, Buenos
Aires and Chile had firmly established their independence, and the
success of numerous other struggles appeared imminent.47 Unlike
others in the Spanish ruling class, Onis recognized that the empire
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stood on the verge of collapse and that the dispute with the United
States was but a part of this larger problem.
The chaotic state of Spain's government during the post-
Napoleonic restoration prevented the adoption of a coherent, worka-
ble policy to deal with the crisis of empire. Ferdinand VII, "the desired
one," had regained his throne amid great rejoicing by the Spanish
people, yet he proved to be one of the worst kings in Spanish history:
Ignored by his father, Charles I~ and abused by his mother, Maria
Luisa, and her infamous consort Godoy; Ferdinand lacked the self-
confidence and good judgment necessary to be a wise ruler. Sus-
picious of the Spanish governmental bureaucracy (for good reason), he
relied for his advice on an inner circle of favorites known as the
camarilla. This "government within a government" of self-seeking
sycophants played upon the king's pride and fears to prevent the
formuiation of a realistic colonial policy: The inescapable facts were
that Spain was too poor economically and too weak militarily to
maintain an empire in the manner and on the scale that had pre-
viously existed. However, the camarilla, comprising primarily aristo-
crats and courtiers, encouraged Ferdinand to believe that the colonial
rebellions and the dispute with the United States could be resolved by
the firm application of military force and by enlisting the support of
the European powers, especially Great Britain. Their prescriptions
ignored both the decrepit state of the Spanish military and the reluc-
tance of the European powers to become involved in Western Hemi-
sphere affairs.48
While the camarilla connived to maintain its control over the king,
the cabinet of ministers that was nominally in charge attempted to
implement a realistic policy for resolving Spain's problems. This
proved an impossible task, although not for lack of ministerial talent:
besides Onis, men such as Don Pedro Cevallos, Don Jose Pizarro
(foreign ministers), and Martin Garay (minister of finance), among
others, had solid credentials and long experience in governmental
affairs. Yet their efforts to bring Spanish policy into line with reality
failed, both because the precarious terms of their employment (be-
tween 1814 and 1820 government ministers stayed at their posts an
average of six months), and because of the fact that the Consejo de
Estado, the ruling council of ministers, held little real power, being
often preempted by the machinations of the camarilla.49
Nothing illustrates this last point better than the Russian ship deal
of 1817-18. The dream of the military reconquest of South America
had fascinated elements of the Spanish ruling class from the time of
the outbreak of the colonial rebellions. Members of the camarilla
envisioned a powerful force invading the New World and reestablish-
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ing the wealth and glory of bygone centuries. But Spain lacked the
vessels to transport and defend such a force. Ferdinand turned to his
friend and fellow monarch Alexander I of Russia for help. With the
assistance of Russian Minister Dmitri Tatishchev (an intimate of the
Ferdinand) and unbeknown to Foreign Minister Pizarro, an agree-
ment was reached to purchase from the Russian navy eight ships that
were to be the core of an invasion armada. Unfortunatel~ Ferdinand
did not have his agents check the condition of the ships before mak-
ing the deal. Wormeaten and obsolete, six of the eight vessels nearly
sank on the voyage from Russia to Spain and had to be scrapped. Of
the two that did depart for South America, one began taking on water
at the Azores and had to turn back, and the sole remaining vessel of
this pathetic would-be flotilla suffered the ignominy of capture by a
Chilean frigate before firing a shot.50 The huge scandal created by the
incident ironically led to the downfall of the Pizarro ministry in 1818,
in spite of the fact that Pizarro did not learn of the ship deal until six
months after it had been made. The affair typifies the inadequacies of
the 'Spanish government in the years following the restoration of
Ferdinand VII.
Though lacking an effective government, Spain was not bereft of
able diplomats. One of its most talented was Don Luis de Onis. From
a distinguished Salamancan famil~Onis represented the cream of the
Spanish diplomatic corps. Having received a classical education with
an emphasis in the la~ Onis spoke four foreign languages and even
achieved some proficiency as a doctor.51 He had served in numerous
positions both at home and abroad since beginning his diplomatic
career in 1780, earning a reputation for competence and resource-
fulness. Eminently loyal to the Spanish ruling famil~ he cast his lot
with the Regency government-in-exile during the Bonapartist inter-
lude. In 1809 he was appointed minister to the United States.52
Onis met with a cold reception in Washington. The Madison
administration, uncertain as to the outcome of the power struggle in
Spain and unwilling to antagonize either side, refused to recognize
()nis's diplomatic credentials. Nonetheless, Onis stayed in the
United States as the unofficial representative of the Regenc~ taking
up residence in Philadelphia. From there he lobbied the United States
government and the public at large for the cause of Spain. He decried
the use of American ports for the fitting-out of privateers to aid the
South American insurgents. He protested the fomenting of revolu-
tion by American agents in East and West Florida. And he made
Spain's case to the public in a series of pamphlets published under the
pseudonym "Verus" in 1810, 1812, and 1817.53
Onis's formal recognition as minister in 1815 did not improve his
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opinion of the United States or its leaders. He distrusted Madison and
Monroe and considered the United States to be bent on territorial
aggrandizement. He wrote in his Memoria: "The Americans believe
themselves superior to all the nations of Europe, and see their destiny
to extend their dominion to the isthmus of Panama, and in the future
to all of the New World." His opinion of the United States was not
helped by acts of vandalism committed against his Washington resi-
dence, including the hanging of a dead fowl on his bell rope.S4
Onis's greatest attribute as a diplomat was his ability to make
realistic policy recommendations based on a clear assessment of the
state of affairs. The best example of this is his efforts in 1817-18 to
convince the Spanish government that compromise with the South
American insurgents offered the only hope of maintaining even a
semblance of the empire. In several letters to Pizarro (with whom he
had a close personal relationship), Onis advocated a policy granting
essentially commonwealth status to the colonies, allowing them to
trade and manufacture goods without restriction.S5 Pizarro, himself
an advocate of moderation in dealing with the colonial rebellions,
agreed that innovative measures had to be pursued. Yet Onis's sugges-
tions were never formally considered by the Consejo de Estado,
thanks to the opposition of influential members of the camarilla.56
Free trade within the empire was a revolutionary idea, and even if the
camarilla had favored its adoption, it is not certain that the king
would have agreed, certainly not in 1817. Ferdinand had no desire to
preside over the restructuring of the Spanish empire, even when faced
with the possibility of its outright loss. But that the Consejo de
Estado refused even to consider such measures is indicative of the
dogmatism and rigidity characteristic of the Spanish ruling class at
the time.
Thus, Onis was the envoy of a foreign office only nominally in
control of foreign affairs. His great handicap as a negotiator was that
his instructions lacked the flexibility necessary to reach an agree-
ment with the Americans. Certain members of the camarilla feared
that if the foreign minister were given full powers to negotiate, he
might make concessions detrimental to the "honor" of the king.
Hence, Onis's instructions left him little latitude to make the sort of
compromises that might salvage a treaty which, if not ideal in all
respects, would at least represent the best terms possible under the
circumstances. Trapped between the inadequacy of his instructions
and the mounting military pressure of the United States, Onis strug-
gled valiantly to reach an agreement that would ensure the security of
the Spanish "borderlands" of the Southwest. This would prove to be
his primary goal in the negotiation.
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Onis outlined the Spanish position in three notes to Adams, dated
29 December 1817, and 5 and 8 January 1818. In them, he repeated the
argument that West Florida formed no part of Louisiana and that
Spain had acquired both Floridas from Great Britain in the Treaty of
1783. He also claimed that the long history of Spanish exploration
along the Gulf Coast from Mexico to Florida made that area Spanish
territor)'. He contended that French explorers such as La Salle were
interlopers who had never successfully challenged Spanish dominion
over the region. Onis concluded that French Louisiana was restricted
to the territory not controlled by Spain: that is, the lands north and
east of the juncture of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.57 Thus,
the Spaniard showed, to his satisfaction at least, the historical limits
of French Louisiana.
Despite his historical argument, Onis offered a settlement based
on the uti possidetis, or state of possession, as it existed between Spain
and France in 1764. Such terms provided for a western boundary
beginning at the Mermento River and extending north to the Mis-
souri River along a line to be determined by joint commission.58 This
offel~ though it rebutted American claims to a western boundary at
the Rio Bravo, represented one of the first cracks in the Spanish
negotiating position. Formerly adamant about placing the boundary
of Louisiana at the Mississippi River, Onis, by offering to draw the
western boundary even a few miles to the west at the Mermento,
opened the door to further concessions.
Adams made a curt and concise counteroffer on 16 Januar)'. Ob-
serving that Onis's notes had merely restated points first ~ade ten
years earlier during the initial negotiations on the matter between the
two nations, Adams wrote that the president "consider[ed] that it
would be an unprofitable waste of time" to discuss them further.
Instead, Adams listed the American terms: Spain to cede all territory
east of the Mississippi and a western boundary running along the
Colorado River of Texas to its source, thence north along the front
.range of the Rockies. Adams proposed that the claims of Americans
,agail1st Spain be settled according to the unratified Convention of
1802.59 These terms were nearly identical to those offered by Monroe
,and Pinkney in 1805. Adams now restated them vigorousl)'.
Onis responded with equal vigor in a note dated 24 Januar)'. Com-
:menting that "truth is of all times; and reason and justice are founded
on immutable principles," he blasted Adams's dismissal of the Span-
ish position: "There is not a single fact . . . that can affect the
certainty or decisive force" of the claims of his nation. He decried an
offer that called on Spain "to cede provinces and territories of the
:highest importance without proposing an equivalent or compensa-
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tion." 60 Finall)', Onls questioned which Colorado River was being
proposed as the western boundar)', presuming incorrectly that Adams
meant the Colorado River of Natchitoches rather then another river
of the same name located several hundred miles west in Texas. In
short, the two negotiators had not only failed to resolve their dif-
ferences; they could not even communicate their geographic refer-
ences clearly:
Despite his outrage, however, Onls made two more concessions in
his note of 24 January: First, he offered a western boundary running
north from the Gulf along the Arroyo Hondo (formerly a neutral zone
between the Spanish and French outposts at Los Adaes and
Natchitoches, respectively). This would move the western boundary
a little farther west, between the Mermento and Calcasieu Rivers (see
Map 2). Second, Onls agreed to the cession of the Floridas. This was
the first formal offer (Pizarro's unanswered project of August 1817
excepted) to cede the Floridas to the United States. It represented a
unilateral concession, perhaps wrung from the Spanish diplomat by
the invasion of Amelia and Adams's unyielding position as outlined
in his 16 January missive. Onls added only one ne~ meekly worded
demand: that the United States take "effectual measures" to sup-
press the South American privateers operating out of American
ports.61
These concessions must have brought a smile of satisfaction to
Adams's normally hard-boiled countenance. Having labored in-
tensely to prevent Congress from undercutting the attempt to bring
pressure on Spain by the takeover at Amelia, Adams now had the first
tangible evidence of the success of this stratagem. But he did not
indulge in too much self-congratulation; although the offer to cede
the Floridas was a promising start, there was still much he wanted
from his Spanish counterpart. Sensing that he had Onls backpedal-
ing, Adams made no immediate reply to the offer of 24 January:
After waiting for two and a half weeks for a response, Onls again
wrote to Adams on 10 February: He began by speculating that "the
multiplicity of business ... which engages you" must have prevented
a reply to his note of 24 January: This was nonsense. Adams had no
more pressing business than the negotiation with Spain. His delay in
answering Onls was calculated to rattle the Spaniard, to create the
impression that time now favored the Americans. The tactic of dela)',
so effectively used by Spain earlier in the long negotiation between
the two nations, was now employed by the United States to cultivate
the impression that if Spain did not settle matters quickl~ the Flor-
idas might no longer be Spain's to cede. Onls, at the limit of his
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Map 2. The Proposals of January 1818 (projected on the Melish map of 1818)
instructions, requested Adams's patience so that he could "immedi-
ately dispatch a courier to Madrid, to inform the government of the
demands of [Adams], and request more ample powers adopted to
them." 62
Meanwhile, John Quincy Adams was hard at work preparing a
detailed refutation of the :historical claims outlined in Onis's notes of
29 December, 5 Januar)', and 8 January: The document, dated 12
March, combined historical argument with rhetorical assertion in a
manner rarely matched by American diplomatists. Adams began
with a scathing rejoinder to the strong language of Onis's previous
note: "The observation that truth is of all times, and that reason and
justice are founded upon immutable principles, has never been con-
tested by the United Statesj but neither truth, reason, nor justice
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consists in the stubbornness of assertion, nor in the multiplied repeti-
tion of error." The United States could not reply to Onis's arguments,
or even "continue at all a discussion sullied by such unworthy and
groundless imputations." 63
Adams then outlined a detailed, labyrinthine historical argument
designed to prove that the Mississippi River had been discovered by
the French, that La Salle had laid claim to the Texas Gulf Coast region
as far west as the Rio Bravo, and that this boundary was formalized as
Louisiana through the granting of a charter in 1712 by Louis XIV to a
French nobleman named Crozat.64 He introduced a long list of histor-
ical documents to support his assertions, simultaneously accusing
Onis of having "in vain ransacked the records of the Spanish mon-
archy" to support his claims. The imperious, hectoring tone and
vituperative language of Adams's note are remarkably similar to
those of his letters chastising his sons for inferior academic perform-
ance. Indeed, it is difficult to determine whether Adams addressed his
sons in the manner in which he addressed foreign diplomats or
addressed foreign diplomats as he addressed his sons.
Determining the validity of Adams's historical argument as to the
ownership and limits of Louisiana would require extensive investiga-
tion. In the bewildering morass of claims and counterclaims made by
the Spanish and the French, the "truth" of the matter is elusive and
probably unknowable. Ultimately; it was also irrelevant to the nego-
tiation between Spain and the United States. Onis and Adams were
both attempting to cloak nationalistic pretensions in the garb of
historical fact. One can be sure that had their positions been reversed,
each man would have adopted with ease the arguments of the other.
Such is the life of a diplomat. Their sparring in early 1818 merely
represented the opening blows of a contest that both men knew was a
long way from finished.
In the years after the Congress of Vienna, elements of the Spanish
ruling class relied on the assistance of Great Britain in resolving the
territorial dispute with the United States. The Spanish government
was convinced that Great Britain would not allow East Florida to pass
into American hands because of the threat that would pose to British
possessions in the West Indies. Also, Spanish officials judged that the
British would not stand idly by and watch the Americans usurp the
territory of a fellow monarchy:65 In 1817, Pizarro dispatched two
notes to the British minister in Madrid, Henry Wellesley; reminding
him of his nation's interest in the matter and urging British action.66
Spain had also attempted to enlist British support in quashing its
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colonial rebellions. In 1812 efforts had been made to employ Great
Britain to mediate the disputes by offering the British special com-
mercial privileges as incentive to do so. These efforts failed, for
Castlereagh did not want to incite the jealousy of the other European
nations by acquiring special trading privileges for Great Britain. In-
stead, he drafted four preconditions for mediation: Spanish abolition
of the slave trade, a general amnesty for all South American rebels,
legal equality of South Americans with Spaniards, and an open trade
between the South American colonies and the nations of the world
with Spain allowed"a fair preference." And Castlereagh added a fifth
stip'ulation: no force was to be used in the mediation.67 These
"preconditions" for mediation were a prescription for the radical
restructuring of the empire along the lines proposed by Onis and
rejected by the camarilla.
[)espite the mQnarchical sympathies of the British crown, British
policy showed no signs of intervening in the South American re-
bellions on terms acceptable to Spain. One might think this would
have discouraged the Spanish government from expecting British
help in resolving the dispute with the United States, yet throughout
1816 and 1817 Spain attempted to persuade Great Britain to mediate
the dispute with the United States. Castlereagh had no enthusiasm
for this plan. He wrote to Wellesley in April 1817 that he saw no
reason to "entangle ourselves ... with a new and complicated media-
tion with the United States in favor of Spain." Castlereagh distrusted
the Spanish government, terming it "perverse and ... shortsighted."
He was reluctant to endanger British relations with the United States
by engaging in a mediation that offered Great Britain no real bene-
fits,,68 That the Spanish government remained confident of British
assistance in the matter is further indication of the diplomatic myo-
pia prevalent at the Court of Madrid.
With no intention of actually taking part in a mediation with the
United States, Minister Wellesley in Madrid urged Castlereagh to
make it appear that Great Britain was willing to do so. Such a gesture
W011ld mollify Spain and enhance Britain's image as a good all~ The
plan was to offer to mediate if the United States would also invite
such efforts.69 The British knew that the Americans did not want
their involvement in the dispute and so had little fear of U.S. agree-
ment to such a proposal. Charles Bagot made the offer to Adams on 27
January 1818.
Monroe's cabinet, meeting on 31 January 1818, unanimouslyop-
posed the mediation proposal. There was no reason to involve a third
party in the dispute with Spain now that events were moving in the
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favor of the United States. British participation could only lead to a
close examination of the more unsavory aspects of American policy;
such as the Amelia expedition and the U.S. privateers who were
aiding the South American insurgents. More could be obtained by
isolating Spain diplomatically; a third party might propose a settle-
ment giving the United States less than it could get on its own.
Calhoun even feared that the mediation proposal was a trick whereby
Spain would declare war and then use the mediation process to secure
objectives unwinnable on the battlefield. Only Adams questioned the
advisability of flatly rejecting the mediation offer. Fearing that the
Spanish dispute ultimately could not be settled without European
interference, he hesitated to foreclose that option completely:70 But
in the end, Adams too went along with the decision to reject the
British offer.
The administration gave two different explanations for its rejec-
tion of the mediation offer. Adams informed Bagot that mediation
might "excite ill-will and irritation in the minds of the people"
against Great Britain, particularly if that nation were seen as stifling
the aspirations of the United States. 71 To Onis, Adams wrote in his
note of 12 March that the United States wished to remain free of "the
labyrinth of European politics." 72 Of course, these explanations
merely served as excuses for the real reason-that the United States
stood to gain more on its own from Spain than through a mediator.
The rejection of the mediation offer met with no surprise in Great
Britain. Bagot wrote to Castlereagh that "exactly as your Lordship
foresa~" the United States had turned down the offer. Castlereagh's
gambit had worked to perfection: he had posed as a good ally to Spain
by offering to mediate, yet had risked nothing, safe in the knowledge
that the United States would refuse. Bagot added in his letter to
Castlereagh that Monroe had"assured me distinctly" that the United
States would not go to war over the dispute with Spain. Significantly;
Bagot described the administration as "really indifferent" regarding
the western boundary; "being persuaded that it is not with old Spain
that they shall finally have to settle that question." 73
British mediation in the Spanish question could only have harmed
the promising yet still fragile reconciliation between the United
States and Great Britain. The problems of fisheries, neutral rights,
commercial relations, and national boundaries would be difficult
enough to resolve without British involvement in the dispute with
Spain. Moreover, by late 1817 another factor was making reconcilia-
tion between Great Britain and the United States a necessity-a
growing mutual fear of Russia.
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American fears of Russia stemmed from that nation's growing
presence on the northwest coast. Although agents of the tsar had
been active in the region for two hundred years, the Bostonians who
began arriving there in 1790 saw the presence of the Russians as a
threat to American interests. At stake was control of a key corner of
the transoceanic trade with the islands of the South Pacific (par-
ticularly Hawaii) and China. Of course, Great Britain and Spain also
had interests in the region. Spain claimed territory along the coast
extending to 61 degrees north latitude. In 1790 the Spanish seizure of
several British vessels at Nootka Sound nearly caused a war between
the two nations. But Spain's claim was strictly nominal; that nation
:had no settlements north of San Francisco.74 During the last part of
the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth, however,
:Russia had b~en extending its influence by establishing pennanent
settlements: at Kodiak Island in 1783, Sitka in 1799, and Fort Ross
(just north of San Franciso) in 1812. The settlements were part of a
:Russian plan to build a vast fur trading network that would include
(:hina, Hawaii, and California. 75 The partial realization of this plan
disturbed both the British and the Americans, who naturally coveted
t:he wealth of the northwest coast for themselves.
American mercantile interests there dated from Captain Robert
C;ray·'s voyage to the Columbia River in 1787; from this expedition
stem.med all subsequent United States claims to the region. The
lucrative trade in furs from the Northwest to Canton was dominated
by Boston firms, with the exception of John Jacob Astor, whose
interests in the area have already been noted. Americans had clashed
with Russians along the coast as early as 1805. In that year an
emissary of the tsar wrote to St. Petersburg that the region "would be
~ln in.exhaustible source of wealth ... were it not for the Bostonians
who undermine our trade with China in furs, of which they obtain
]luge numbers on our coasts." 76 In the years that followed, the
Russians attempted unsuccessfully to dislodge the Americans from
the n.orthwest coast. In 1809 the first accredited Russian diplomatic
l'epresentative to the United States, Andre Dashko~ failed in his
{~fforts to persuade Washington to restrain Americans from trading
guns to the native peoples of the region.77 In 1810 John Quincy
Adanls, then minister to Russia, rejected Russian proposals to de-
limit a boundary between the claims of the two nations in the
Northwest. This refusal was in keeping with the American policy of
refusing formal recognition of Russian control of any part of the
clrea.'?8
American interest in the northwest coast, interrupted by the War
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of 1812, rekindled after 1815. Between 1815 and 1820, 106 American
trading ships from firms such as Bryant and Sturgis, James and
Thomas H. Perkins, and Astor's American Fur Company sailed to the
area then known as Russian-America.79 As the American economic
stake in the region grew; so did concerns over the burgeoning Russian
presence. These concerns were made known to the administration
through the agency of Nicholas Biddle, a Philadelphia aristocrat with
close ties both to the mercantile elite and to James Monroe.8o In a
letter to the president dated 12 November 1817, Biddle wrote of "a
matter about which I should wish to speak with you. It concerns the
approach of the Russians down our [sic] Pacific Coast. It is not enough
to enjoy a great part of Europe and Asia, not enough to possess the
Northwest Coast down as low as Norfolk Sound and the 47th degree,
but they must cross the Columbia and encroach at Bodega within 30
miles of the Spanish settlements in California. These movements
offer a wide field for reflection-but it would be vain to write about it,
and I must therefore defer it ... until I have the pleasure of seeing
you." 81
Further evidence of the growing concern about Russian expan-
sionism is a presidential memorandum headed "The Political Picture
of Europe, 1817." Although decrying the fact that Great Britain was
ambitious, the document asserted "that the government of Saint
Petersburg is not less so." It warned that "the colossal power of
Russia has been wholly increased ... in a word, Russia has gained
further to the South." Russia, the paper claimed, was now the second
leading power in Europe, and the supreme land power on the Con-
tinent: "Her policy is not very difficult to ascertain-she seeks to
aggrandize herself." 82 The reports of William Pinkne~ then Amer-
ican minister to Russia, fueled suspicions of the tsar's intentions. In
August 1817 Pinkney warned that "the activity of this government in
exploring, and colonizing, and consolidating its power ... seems
rather to increase than to diminish." 83
The tsarist government reacted with alarm to the rapid American
penetration of the northwest coast in the years after 1815. In 1817 the
governing board of the Russian-American company submitted a re-
port detailing the activities of Americans engaged in trading guns to
the native peoples in exchange for furs. The report also lamented the
fact that supplies for the Russian settlements were obtained pri-
marily from Americans, at premium prices.84 Responding to these
concerns, Captain Vasilli Golovnin sailed to the northwest coast to
examine conditions for the tsar at first hand. His findings, released in
1819, stressed the need for "decisive steps" to defend the territory
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from foreign encroachment. He recommended that naval patrols be
established along coastal areas claimed by the tsar, and that in the
future the colony be supplied by shipments from Russia.85 Russian
anxiety about the Americans climaxed in 1821 with the promulga-
tion of the tsar's ukase closing the Russian territorial waters (which
extended for a hundred miles offshore) to all foreign vessels.86
Anglo-Russian relations deteriorated simultaneously with the in-
creasing tensions between Washington and St. Petersburg. The major
difference was that while the Americans clashed with the Russians
only in the matter of the northwest coast, the British disagreed with
their erstwhile ally on a range of issues, the most important of which
concerned the very nature of the postwar alliance. Castlereagh in-
tended that the concert of Europe act only to maintain the balance of
power in Europe. He opposed employing the Quadruple Alliance for
any purpose other than defending monarchy on the Continent.87
(:onversely; Tsar Alexander I, in the grip of a messianic religious
fanaticism, favored the use of the alliance to defend the interests of
rnonarchy wherever it was threatened. To do this, he created the Holy
.Alliance, composed of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France. Cas-
tlereagh, contemptuous of the tsar's crusading zeal, referred to this
organization as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." 88 The
fundamental disagreement between the two dominant powers of the
post··Napoleonic world split the European alliance from the begin-
:ning.89
Bllt this was not the only point at issue between the two dominant
JPowers. In France, the two nations vied for the favor of Louis XVIII. In
Italy and Germany; Great Britain supported Austria in its efforts to
jforestall the growth of Russian influence over the principalities in
those two regions. In Spain, the tsar's support for the reconquest of
the colonies and the tangible manifestation of this support repre-
sented by the ship deal caused as much consternation in London as it
did in Washington. In the East, Russian and British interests clashed
at Constantinople and in Persia. Finally; the two nations locked horns
on tile northwest coast of North America as the drift southward of
Russian settlements collided with British claims to the region. The
final defeat of Napoleon saw the rise of Russia as the preeminent
e:hallenger to British global supremacy:90
<:harged with sorting out this tangled skein of diplomatic and politi-
eal problems, John Quincy Adams closed out his diary in 1817 with a
brief prayer "that I may know and faithfully discharge the duties of
Iny station, and that my heart and mind be prepared for every disputa-
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tion of the divine wisdom and goodness." 91 Certainl~no one would
have accused Adams of laxness in the performance of his duties. By
the spring of 1818 he had already wrung more concessions out of the
Spanish than his predecessors had in a decade. Yet he paid a price for
his accomplishments. His problems with insomnia were com-
pounded by a chronic case of rheumatism.92 Fixated on his work,
Adams had time for little else. Still, his efforts dissatisfied him. He
complained in his diary that "everything is hurried, and of course,
scarcely anything is done well." 93
His wife Louisa Catherine suffered too, hovering on the edge of a
nervous breakdown. In February Adams wrote that she was beset by
"extreme agitation and fatigue beyond the power of her constitution
to bear." 94 The demands of the cabinet post strained further a mar-
riage already lacking in intimacy: A cold formality marked their
relationship. In his diary; Adams referred to her only as "my wife."
Mrs. Adams, left to her own devices by her husband's busy schedule,
spent many evenings dining at the home of the French minister Hyde
de Neuville-that is, when her frequent illnesses did not confine her
to bed.
The former Louisa Catherine Johnson had trod a difficult road as
the wife of John Quincy Adams. They had met in 1796 in London,
where Louisa's father was serving as the American consul. Naturally
shy and given to social awkwardness, she had to endure the jealous
spitefulness of her sisters once it became clear that the son of John
Adams was interested in her. But the courtship of Louisa and John
Quincy (like their marriage) lacked passion and romance. Indeed,
Adams chose Louisa as his mate at least in part because his pragmatic
judgment told him that it was time to take a wife, and the daughter of
a prominent Maryland family seemed a socially appropriate choice
for the ambitious young diplomat. He proposed to her before he
returned to his post at The Hague; despite Louisa's pleadings, how-
ever, he refused to marry her before leaving on the grounds that his
duties and paltry salary would not allow him to attend to a wife. He
admonished her to work on improving her intellect until his return
"which might be in one year or in seven." 95
The two-year separation before their marriage erased whatever
spontaneity or joy the union might have contained. Courtship by
mail proved difficult for Louisa. She worried that letters could not
convey her feelings and that John Quincy would look askance at them
for their imperfections in grammar and expression. Moreover, the
long engagement left her in an unbearably awkward social position.
Yet Adams embraced their separation as an important test of their
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relationship. He wrote that she should"consider untoward events as
,1 test of characte~ and that a large portion of all human events
eonsists of suffering with dignity and composure, without weakness
or unavailing regret." 96 Such words did little to ease Louisa's misery:
She fretted that her suffering would make her unattractive when she
Clnd Adams were finally reunited: "I am so miserably dull, stupid and
",,van that I have gained the appellation of the Nun." 97
The brief moment of bliss experienced by the couple in the wake of
their wedding in London in 1797 was shattered only two weeks later
by the news of the financial ruin of Louisa's father. Nearly penniless,
the Johnsons were forced to depart England quickly; leaving their new
son-in-law to assist in settling the family's affairs.98 A more inaus-
picio'us start to the marriage could hardly be imagined. Adams, al-
ways worried about the precarious state of his own finances, now had
the added concern of his new in-laws' financial setbacks. Louisa
believed that she never fully recovered the confidence of her husband
afterward.99
Lousia did not meet Abigail and John until 1801. Both of Adams's
parents had opposed their son's engagement, but the distance be-
tween them, as well as John Quincy's age (thirty at the time of his
rnarriage) prevented a strong protest. Nonetheless, Abigail had in-
quired before the wedding whether he had gotten over "Maria" (Mary
I:razier); she also lamented the fact that Louisa's mother was English
a.nd fhat she had been raised in Europe. That the interests of Mary
Flrazier should elicit Abigail's concern is ironic, considering her veto
of that relationship a few years earlier. In any case, Louisa's introduc-
tion to the Adams clan in 1801 precipitated further suffering. Her
sense of inadequacy was accentuated amid the bustling and opin-
ionated Adams women, who informed her of John Quincy's love for
the beautiful and talented Mary Frazier. And Abigail's coolness to the
wife of her prized son was immediately apparent. Louisa's reaction to
all this was to seek refuge in illness: "It was lucky for me I was so
depressed, and so ill, or I should certainly have give mortal of-
fense.,"100
John Quincy Adams's constant criticism of Louisa's management
of fanlily affairs and of her limited intellectual achievements did not
h,elp her already poor self-image. She always felt inferior to Abigail,
"rell known as one of the best-read women in the United States.
lrncomfortable with the social events of European court life, she
experienced acute feelings of loneliness and isolation; and as the wife
of the nation's most widely traveled diplomat, she endured continual
cJhan.ges of address and years of life away from friends and family: 101
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Her husband's official absences and grueling work schedule meant
that she was often left to raise the boys (notoriously unmanageable)
alone. The long separations, the lack of intimacy between herself and
her husband, and the pain and sacrifice that a public career required
made Louisa doubt whether John Quincy's strivings were worth it: "I
was not patriotic enough to endure such heavy personal trials for the
political welfare of the nation whose honor was dearly bought at the
expense of all domestic happiness. 1I 102
John Quincy Adams's relationship to his wife was yet another way
in which his personal experience mirrored that of the nation. The
spirit of sharing and cooperation that was central to John and Abigail
seems to have been almost entirely absent between John Quincy and
Louisa. Lousia was neither the emotional soulmate nor the practical
helpmate to John Quincy that Abigail was to John. Rather than a
partner in marriage, Louisa functioned as John Quincy's subordinate,
in charge of maintaining a happy and well-run home but largely
excluded from a meaningful role herself. It is clear that she chafed at
her position; she wrote to a friend of the unhappiness of living with a
man who considered himself "utterly superior to myself. II 103 In this
respect, Louisa's marriage as compared with Abigail's reflected the
evolution of the status of American women from the comparative
equality of the Revolutionary era to their more restricted role as
guardians of the hearth in the nineteenth centur~104
Yet one should keep John Quincy Adams's insensitive-indeed,
despotic-treatment of his wife in perspective. He had warned her of
the suffering and sacrifice that marriage to a man of national destiny
would entai1. 10S Moreover, it is fair to say that her suffering merely
matched his own. His career as a public servant was neither finan-
cially nor emotionally rewarding. The position of secretary of state,
like his previous public posts, offered Adams little personal or famil-
ial happiness. The tranquil life of a man of letters for which he
yearned seemed more distant than ever, given parental expectations,
his sense of duty to God, and the demands of a nation's destiny.
In the spring of 1818 John Quincy Adams prepared to meet yet
another challenge, this time from opponents of the president's South
American polic~ Their aims threatened to shatter Adams's fragile
diplomatic structure.
FOUR
"The South American Questionl1
l~he South American struggles for independence complicated the
efforts of Monroe and Adams to expand the power and influence of
{he United States. There is no doubt that most North Americans, in a
demonstration of reflexive ideological affinit~ exulted at the pros-
pect of republicanism triumphant in the Western Hemisphere; they
equated Spanish rule with colonialism, Catholicism, and corruption.
Despite this popular ideological sympath~ geopolitical considera-
tions prevented Monroe and Adams from taking any substantive
action to aid the South Anlerican insurgents. Spanish officials made
it clear that to do so would result in the breaking off of negotiations
and possibly war. Great Britain, too, nervously watched the devel-
opment of u.S. relations with the rebel governments. Castlereagh
feared that the United States might exploit its ideological and hemi-
spheric ties to the South Americans as a means of gaining commer-
cial supremacy in what promised to be a lucrative market. Unilateral
steps by the United States in favor of the South American insurgents
would severely set back the process of reconciliation with Great
Britain which was integral to the success of Monroe and Adams's
foreign polic~ Consequentl~ in 1817 and 1818 the Monroe adminis-
tration adopted a policy of what it termed "an impartial neutrality"
toward the South America:n struggles.
This policy displeased a sizable number of politically active Amer-
icans, primarily from the trans-Allegheny West, whose interests in
the South American cause went beyond mere ideological sympath~
They called for active U.S. support of the South American insurgent
governments. Motivated by a combination of ideological, altruistic,
and self-interested consid{~rations, their efforts to influence South
A.merican policy posed a direct challenge to the foreign policy of
Monroe and Adams. Indeed, the success of their foreign policy hinged
on successfully meeting th.at challenge.
Ja.mes Monroe's "impartial neutrality" toward the South American
insurgent governments, like so many of his other policies, followed
the course charted by James Madison. South America had become a
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serious issue only after 1815. Until that time, preoccupation with the
war with Great Britain and the rebels' dubious prospects for success
prevented the formulation of a clear policy toward the South Amer-
ican insurgents. l Their struggles for independence presented a new
problem for North American decisionmakers in that the neutrality
statutes of the 1790s applied to wars only between independent
states, not between mother country and colony. Although Madison
did not extend direct aid to the rebels, he did interpret the neutrality
statutes in such a way as to allow rebel vessels into American ports,
in effect recognizing their belligerency; without extending diplo-
matic recognition to the insurgent governments, he permitted United
States citizens to trade with the rebels in direct violation of the
Spanish colonial monopol)'. Onis, who considered the insurgent ves-
sels piratical, protested this policy to no avail.2
When Monroe took office in April 1817, there was mounting
evidence that the patriots would soon be victorious. In July 1816 the
United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (present-day Argentina) had
declared their independence. The following February the victory of
Jose de San Martin's forces at Chacabuco brought Chilean indepen-
dence a giant step closer. In the spring of 1817 popular interest in and
enthusiasm for the patriots escalated, partly because of their suc-
cesses and partly as a result of the agitation of public figures such as
Henry Clay; who mustered all his oratorical skill on their behalf.3
American public support of the revolutionary movements went
beyond mere rhetoric. A thriving underground trade network, cen-
tered in Philadelphia and Baltimore, supplied the rebel movements
with arms, supplies, and, in some cases, mercenary forces. Privateers,
outfitted in and operating out of American ports, enjoyed the lucra-
tive spoils of plundered Spanish shipping. Neither repeated protests
to the American government by Don Luis de Onis nor the passage of
further neutrality statutes in March 1817 and April 1818 were effec-
tive in suppressing this popularly supported and profitable activit)'.
So extensive was the de facto aid to the revolutionary cause that
Monroe privately suggested that formal recognition would do little to
increase the material support the rebels were already receiving.4
Responding to the increasing public and congressional pressure to
act, Monroe agreed in late April 1817 to send a commission to tour
South America, ostensibly for the purpose of gathering information
on the revolutionists and assessing their prospects for success (see
Chapter 2). Yet the commission's real purpose was to provide an
excuse for the administration not to act, for Monroe at that time had
no intention of aiding the South American insurgents, whatever their
condition.5 There were three reasons.
"THE SOUTH AMERICAN QUESTION" 87
First and most obvious, Spain would not tolerate direct u.S. aid to
the insurgents, either diplomatic, economic, or militar~ The wide-
spread and illegal outfitting of privateers and recruitment of merce-
rLaries occurring in American ports outraged the Spanish but could be
rationalized by them as beyond the control of the federal government.
I~ormal executive action in favor of the South American insurgents,
lLowever, would force the Spanish government, for reasons of pride
alld international prestige, at the very least to break off negotiations
,vith the United States. The Monroe administration was well aware
of Spain's attitude on this question. In August 1817 Minister Erving
in Madrid wrote to Adams that while the Spanish-American dispute
,vas "full of difficulties," the "greatest arises out of the misconcep-
tion of this government with regard to our obligations as a neutral
between her and her colonies." 6 Indeed, preventing the United States
from recognizing the insurgent governments was a primary Spanish
a.im in the negotiations. Pizarro wrote to Onis that the way to head off
recognition by the Americans would be to "stuff their mouths with
tile negotiation." 7
A second and more important factor restraining the United States
from recognizing the South American insurgent governments was
the fear of antagonizing Great Britain. Monroe and Adams's entire
foreign policy hinged on cultivating good relations with that nation
(see Chapter 2). Recognition or other forms of direct aid to the South
American rebels would have provoked a severe response-although
llot one due to British concern over the integrity of the Spanish
empire. Ambiguity marked British policy toward South America in
t:he years after the final defeat of Napoleon. The European powers
looke.d to Great Britain, the presumed archdefender of monarch~ to
cllampion the restoration of monarchical influence in South Amer-
ica. ·yet the British had engaged in a prosperous, growing, and illegal
trade with the Spanish colonies throughout most of the eighteenth
centur~8Necessitated by the shortages of the Napoleonic wars, this
trade proved vital to the British econom~ particularly during Jeffer-
son's embargo. In short, while restorationist ideology pushed Great
Britain toward the restoration of Spanish rule in South America,
commercial self-interest pulled in favor of the colonies' indepen-
dence.9
Accordingl~ Castlereagh crafted a policy that appeared to support
the restoration of Spanish rule but only under such conditions as to
ensure their commercial independence. In principle, he was willing
to mediate the South American conflictsj in practice, his precondi-
tions (including commercial freedom for the South American na-
tions) such a mediation ensured that Spain would reject his offer. Io
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Thus, Great Britain, though taking no substantive measures, main-
tained its status as a loyal ally to Spain, thereby restraining precipi-
tate action by other members of the alliance, especially Russia.
Moreover, this ambiguous policy kept the United States guessing as
to British intentions in South America. I I
In fact, the actions of the United States played a major role in
shaping Britain's South American policy: During the first decade of
the nineteenth century the United States became Britain's major
competitor for the burgeoning South American trade. 12 After th~war
the North American presence remained substantial in such areas as
Cuba and Chile. I3 Castlereagh was obsessed by the fear that the
United States might use its ideological and hemispheric ties to the
South Americans to preempt British commercial interests. I4 Diplo-
matic recognition of the insurgent governments by the United States
therefore represented a major threat to Great Britain, and Bagot was
alarmed by the efforts of Clay and others to force such a move.
Hence, Castlereagh made clear to the U.S. government the pos-
sible consequences of recognition. Adams warned Monroe in 1816
that Great Britain would side with Spain in a conflict arising from
diplomatic recognition of the rebels. IS Although Adams gradually
began to perceive the true nature of British South American polic~
in early 1818 he still feared the consequences of recognition on
Anglo-American relations. From 1815 to at least 1818, Castlereagh
walked a diplomatic tightrope that simultaneously created a fear in
Washington of European intervention in the New World and avoided
committing Great Britain to any definite course of action. I6 It was
an adroit act of statesmanshp during a period often termed "the
golden age of diplomacy:"
Significantl~ Great Britain exercised greater influence over u.S.
South American policy in 1817-18 than did Spain. Had Castlereagh
been willing to join or at least acquiesce in the diplomatic recognition
of the colonies, the United States would have had little to fear from
the reaction of Spain or the other European powers. Conversel~
without the support of British sea power, the military reconquest of
South America was idle speculation. I?
The third factor restraining Monroe and Adams from active sup-
port of the South American insurgents, one whose relative weight is
difficult to judge but whose importance is indisputable, was the
opposition of the northeastern mercantile establishment to direct aid
for the South American patriots. These merchant capitalists, whose
influence on the Monroe administration has already been noted,
strongly supported the president's policy of "impartial neutrality"
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because they feared the consequences to their direct trade with the
loyal Spanish colonies should the United States antagonize Spain by
aiding the rebels. In 1817-18, North American trade with the loyal
Spanish colonies far exceeded that with the rebellious provinces. IS
C:uba in particular provided a valuable market, annually importing
approximately 100,000 barrels of American flour. 19 In return, the
"Pearl of the Antilles" supplied the United States with sugar, coffee,
and molasses. Finally; Cuba proved an indispensable source of specie
at a time when u.s. reserves of the precious metals were inadequate
to maintain the stability of the dollar. John C. Calhoun alluded to this
last point when he observed that a cutoff of the Cuban trade "would
greatly increase the embarrassments of our circulating medium." 20
III 1820 Calhoun wrote to Andrew Jackson that Cuba "is in my
opinion, not only the first commercial and political position in the
""orld, but is the key stone of our Union. No American statesmen
ollght to ever withdraw his eye from it; and the greatest calamity
ought to be endured by us, rather than it should pass into the hands of
Engla:nd." 21
In 1818, approximately fifty American vessels arrived in Havana
each month, the great majority of which belonged to New York and
New :England shipowners. Their interest in the Cuban trade dated
from the last years of the eighteenth century: After a period of decline,
tIle Cuban trade had rebounded vigorously with the resumption of
peace in 1815.22 To threaten this lucrative trade by aiding the pa-
triots, whatever the moral or political arguments, would court eco-
nomie disaster for this particular group of Americans. It is therefore
not sllrprising that in December 1817 Nicholas Biddle wrote to
Nlonroe urging continued neutrality in South American affairs "for
our own security:" 23
The concerns of the northeastern mercantile establishment were
articulated in a slim yet influential volume know as "Yard's Pam-
p]llet,'" after its author James Yard. Published in early 1818, the work
predicted that direct aid to the insurgents would lead to war with
Spain and in grave terms described the consequences of such a con-
flict to American commerce. Yard speculated that in the event of war,
Great Britain would seize both Cuba and Puerto Rico. He rejected
argum.ents that a free South. America would be a commercial boon to
tble Ullited States, commenting that "the intercourse we now have
with the single island of Cuba, is of more value to the United States,
in. one year, than that with Mexic9 would be in ten! " 24 He feared that
South American agricultural products would compete with those of
th.e United States on the world market, and that Great Britain ul-
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timately stood to gain the most from a free South American trade.25
Biddle, in another letter to Monroe, described "Yard's Pamphlet" as
"a very able argument," adding that "the hopes of great commercial
advantage from the emancipation [of South America] are completely
illusory:" 26
In sum, geopolitical considerations and the domestic special inter-
ests that had informed those considerations prevented Monroe and
Adams from actively supporting the South American revolutionary
cause in 1817-18. Yet divisions within the Republican party lead-
ership as to the nature and viability of the new governments to the
south also worked to prevent American aid to the rebels.
On the one hand, Madison and Monroe were solidly behind the
insurgents and did not doubt their capacity for self-government.
Madison called on Monroe to support the revolutionaries "whatever
may be the consequences" and in 1823 suggested a joint proclamation
with Great Britain in favor of South American independence. Madi-
son idealistically viewed the conflicts as part of "the great struggle of
the epoch between liberty and despotism."27 Monroe, too, had no
doubt that the interest of human progress lay in the emancipation of
the Spanish colonies. The foreign policy considerations that re-
trained him from recognizing the insurgent governments did not
diminish his sympathy for their struggles.28
Conversely; Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams both se-
riously doubted the capacity of the South Americans for self-
government. In May 1817, Jefferson wrote to Lafayette that although
the independence of South America was "no longer in question," the
prospects for republicanism were considerably less bright. "Ig-
norance and bigotry; like other insanities, are incapable of self-
government," wrote the Sage of Monticello. To Baron Alexander von
Humboldt, Jefferson commented: "Whether the blinds of bigotry and
the shackles of the priesthood, and the fascinating glare of rank and
wealth, give fair play to the common sense of the mass of people, so
far as to qualify them for self-government, is what we don't know."
Jefferson feared that postrevolutionary chaos in the colonies could
give rise to a South American Bonaparte.29
John Quincy Adams held even deeper suspicions regarding the
South Americans. His inveterate Hispanophobia was not confined to
Old Spain. Adams rejected as "superficial" the perceived similarities
between the South American insurgencies and the American Revolu-
tion: "Ours was a war of freemen for political independence-This is
a war of slaves against their masters." He viewed the Amer~can
Revolution as a two-stage struggle for both political and civil rights,
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'whereas in the South American conflicts, "civil rights, if not entirely
out of the question, appear to have been equally disregarded or tram-
pled upon by all parties. 1I Adams asserted (without evidence) that
"there is no more liberty of the press at Buenos Aires than at Madrid. II
To him, the upheavals in South America more closely resembled the
French Revolution than the American War of Independence. Beyond
his ideological mistrust of the independence movements, Adams
doubted that the South American market would be of great value to
the United States: "Do what we can, the commerce with South
America will be more important and useful to Great Britain than to
us, and Great Britain will be vastly more important to them than we,
for the simple reason that she has the power of supplying their wants
by her manufactures. We have few such supplies to furnish them. II 30
In light of these suspicions and considering his role as the chief
architect of American foreign policy; it is not surprising that of all the
cabinet members, John Quincy Adams pushed hardest for remaining
neutral toward the South American revolutionary movements.
MOllroe, though aware of the larger goals of American diplomacy;
mig.ht have been swayed by public and congressional pressure to take
action on behalf of the new republics had Adams not constantly
reminded him of the stakes involved. Adams knew that the adminis-
tration's South American policy was the trump card in the negotia-
tions with Spain. The spring of 1818 was not yet the time to play it.
Opposition to the administration's neutrality policy centered in the
trans-Allegheny West. To many politicians and journalists of the
"New West,lI neutrality in a struggle between republicanism and
monarchy was an abnegation of the American mission to foster
republicanism. Few were as ambivalent as Adams and Jefferson re-
garding the capacity of the South Americans for self-government; a
widespread belief was that though they might be oppressed and
degraded, the sheer power of republican institutions and ideals would
uplift them. Henry Clay captured this sentiment: "Whenever I think
of Spanish America, the image irresistibly forces itself upon my mind
of an elder brother, whose education has been neglected, whose
person has been abused, and who has been disinherited by the un-
kindness of an unnatural parent. II 31 Clay's sympathetic yet paternal
tone illustrates well the dominant outlook of westerners towards the
South American independence movements.
Certain that the South American struggle was just, westerners
were equally sure that its ultimate success depended on support from
the United States. The Congress of Vienna symbolized the global
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reaction against republicanism; to stand by while the Europeans
snuffed out the growth of liberty in South America was to court its
extinction in the United States as wel1.32 A state of mind developed
that the United States could not remain neutral in a struggle in which
its interests were so integrall~ if indirectl~ involved.
Many westerners, including Cla~ little feared the possible con-
sequences of diplomatic or military involvement in the South Amer-
ican struggles. Toward Spain, the politicians and newspapermen of
the region held an almost uniform contempt. A contentious editorial
on the recognition question in the Nashville Clarion reflects this
sentiment: "What then, have we to apprehend? Perhaps-yes! per-
haps-a quarrel with Old Spain. Let it come. If Old Spain wishes to
draw the sword because we will not acknowledge the sway of the
Pope, Ferdinand, and the Inquisition, in contradistinction to a ra-
tional system of republican government, let her come on." 33 Toward
Great Britain, the westerners evinced similar disdain. The near-
catastrophe of the War of 1812 did little to temper the jingoistic
enthusiasms of men who remembered the triumphs of Jackson and
Perry while forgetting the burning of Washington and the Essex Junto.
Westerners either did not understand or did not appreciate the inti-
mate connection between South American policy and the relations of
the United States to the European powers. From this perspective,
Western agitation for aid to the insurgent governments appears ill-
considered and detrimental to the interests of the nation as a whole.
But the debate over South American policy highlights the funda-
mental differences between the interests of the trans-Allegheny West
and those of the Northeast and the South. The prosperity of both the
Northeast and the South hinged on expanding trading ties with Great
Britain and avoiding war with Spain, an occurrence that would be
disastrous for American commerce. Northeastern commercial and
southern agricultural interests had little to gain from aiding the
South Americans and everything to lose if such a policy disrupted
relations with Great Britain and Spain. In contrast, westerners shared
indirectly; if at all, in the transatlantic and Cuban trades and therefore
had substantially less concern that they not be interrupted. To the
"Men of the Western Waters," America's commercial future lay in
the potentially great market of South America. In short, beneath the
political debate over South American policy lay a very real clash of
sectional commercial interests.
Geography played a major role in defining these sectional inter-
ests. The Allegheny Mountains formed an imposing barrier to trade
and travel; the few roads that linked the West to the coast were poorly
"THE SOUTH AMERICAN QUESTION" 93
maintained and often impassable. So difficult was travel in the days
before the railroad that in 1817 the journey from Cincinnati to New
York took at least fifty days. (In contrast, packets on the westward run
from Liverpool to New York averaged less than forty days to complete
their voyage.)34 Such remoteness had a profound effect on western
economic development. High freight rates made manufactured goods
brought from the coast prohibitively expensive.3s Moreover, western
agricultural products, thanks to their bulk, could not profitably be
tran.sported to the coasts; thus westerners were deprived of a substan-
tial portion of the home market.36 Representative Henry St. George
'Tuc:ker of Virginia commented on this situation in 1818: "Even in the
country where I reside, not 80 miles from Tidewater, it takes the
farnler one bushel of wheat to pay the expense of carrying two to a
seaport town." 37
l'he effects of peacetime foreign competition further hindered
·western economic development. The shortages created by the disrup-
tion.s of the Napoleonic era had spawned a small yet significant
maIlufacturing sector in the West; cities such as Pittsburgh, Lex-
ington, and Cincinnati flourished as manufacturing centers during
the early years of the nineteenth centur~38 After 1815, however,
western manufacturers faced severe competition from cheap British
goods, which in the years after the War of 1812 were exported to the
United States and sold below cost.39
Compounding the problems of high freight rates and foreign com-
petition, westerners faced a severe shortage of hard currency after the
War of 1812. The traditional shortages caused by the flow of specie
eastward to pay for manufactured goods and defray freight rates had
been worsened by a serious balance-of-payments deficit in the years
1816-18. This deficit drained the nation of a substantial portion of its
hard currency reserves, and as an outlying region the West felt the
contraction most acutely.40 A flood of paper money distributed by the
dozens of state banks created after the war made the situation worse.
In sum, the trans-Allegheny West remained in quasi-colonial rela-
tion to the coastal regions in the years following the War of 1812.
Despite the West's growing economic and political power, the region's
futllre depended on the policies of an administration whose chief
constituency was the old-line mercantile interests of the Northeast.
The West's advocacy of aid to the South American patriots was but
one aspect of this larger sectional struggle.
Henry Clay devised a comprehensive plan to alleviate the prob-
lems of the West. To protect infant manufactures of the region, he
proposed a tariff. To solve the problem of inadequate transportation,
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he advocated a federal role in internal improvements. And to provide
credit for all who desired it, he supported the establishment of the
Second Bank of the United States. Together, these three elements
were known as the"American System" and would become a major
part of Clay's legacy to American political development. By 1818 he
had already established its legitimacy by adroit legislative alliance
building. Solidly backed by the trans-Allegheny West on all three
issues, he engineered alliances in the Fifteenth Congress first with
the South and West on the National Bank question, then with the
Northeast and West on the tariff. On the question of federal subsidies
for internal improvements Clay gained the clear support of the West,
while the Northeast and the South split on the issue.41 Thus, Henry
Clay pushed through the House a program that met the needs of his
region. Whatever his political ambitions, he spoke for his constitu-
ency as surely as Monroe and Adams did for theirs. In Cla~ they faced
an articulate and energetic politician whose support for the South
American revolutions was merely the foreign policy side of a popular
domestic agenda.
Westerners envisioned double benefits from a free South America:
the end of Spanish rule would open the region to the merchants of the
Ohio and Misissippi River valleys, with New Orleans as the natural
gateway to the southern markets; in return for their goods, wes-
terners would receive the fabled gold and silver of Spanish America,
which would finance noninflationary economic growth and free
them of dependency on the U.S. coastal regions. Clay alluded to this
prospect when he said to the House: "We may safely trust to the
daring enterprise of our merchants.... The precious metals are in
South America and they would command the articles wanted in
South America.... Our navigation would be benefited by the trans-
portation and our country will realize the mercantile profits." 42
Diplomatic recognition would be but the first step in capturing the
South American market. Ultimatel~ aggressive American action
would ensure not only the elimination from the region not only of
Spain but of Great Britain as well. Americans would reap the full
political and economic benefits of republicanism triumphant in the
Western Hemisphere. A popular maxim of the day captures the es-
sence of this plan: "U.S. textiles plus rational liberty equals the
exclusion of European influence from Latin America./I 43
Competing neomercantilist visions of American empire, then, under-
lay the debate over South American policy which took place in 1817
and 1818. The Northeast and the South opposed a policy that might
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disrupt the Anglo-Asiatic trade nexus critical to their prosperity: The
trans-Allegheny West, fueled by republican ideology and visions of
commercial dominion in a free South America, favored a more active
role in the independence struggles. The "South American question"
is a prominent example in the history of the early republic of a
sectionally based foreign policy conflict.
John Quincy Adams did not see it that way: Opponents of the
administration's neutrality policy he judged guilty of a misguided
idealism. He equated those who wished to aid the South American
eause with the Francophiles of the 1790s. Adams believed that both
groups were willing to jeopardize the interests of the United States
(and hence the interests of the republican cause) by committing the
nation to a struggle of dubious legitimacy: He wrote to his father in
December 1817: "And no~ as at the early stages of the French Revo-
lution, we have ardent spirits who are for rushing into the conflict,
without looking to the consequences." 44
Adams took an even harsher view of Henry Clay's championing of
the South American cause. His suspicions of the Kentuckian dated at
least from the time they had served together as negotiators at Ghent.
There, Clay's whiskey drinking and all-night card parties had of-
fended the puritan sensibilities of Adams, who believed that frivolity
had no place in such important business as peace negotiations. Clay's
advocacy of the South American rebellions Adams now interpreted as
a vindictive attempt to destroy both himself and the administration,
Inotivated by Clay's anger over not having been named secretary of
state. At the opening of the Fifteenth Congress in December 1817,
Adams noted in his diary that "Mr. Clay has already mounted his
South American great horse ... Clay's project is that in which John
Randolph failed, to control or overthrow the executive, by swaying
the House of Representatives." 45 He was convinced that by "violent,
systematic opposition" to the administration, Clay intended to pave
the .way to the presidenc~46These comments typify Adams's ten-
dency to personalize every political issue and to attribute selfish
motives to those who opposed him.
John Quincy Adams considered himself above such petty political
machinations. He feigned a lack of interest in the presidency-the
end to which his efforts were ultimately directed. He replied "very
explicitly in the negative" when asked by his friend Alexander H.
Everett why he did not"expose" Clay's motives publicly: "I told him
I should do absolutely nothing ... my business was to serve the
public to the best of my abilities, in the station assigned to me, and
:not to intrigue for further advancement-I never by the most distant
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hint to anyone ever expressed a wish for any public office, and I
should not now begin to ask, for that [the presidency] which of all the
others ought to be most freely and spontaneously bestowed." 47
These words are vintage Adams. They both capture his reflexive
tendency to deny his desire for public office and reveal what was to
him the only acceptable way to fulfill his inexpressible yet undenia-
ble ambition. Adams's refusal to woo the electorate was rooted in his
basic suspicion of popular democrac~This suspicion, like so many of
his other beliefs, derived from his parents and what he perceived to be
the lessons of classical republicanism. From them he had come to
distrust the complete sovereignty of the people via the ballot box as
potentially disruptive, given his perception of the public's impulse to
be swayed by its passion and enthusiasms. Adams believed in a
political leadership drawn from a natural aristocracy possessed of the
moral and spiritual values needed to ensure the survival of the repub-
lic. The task of political leaders was to lead, not follo~ the masses by
articulating the true interests of the nation.48
Adams was by nature and upbringing incapable of actively cam-
paigning for election. Making promises to interest groups, kissing
babies, playing to the crowd were unthinkable to him, violations both
of the"Adams family myth" and of the vision of the Founders. Only
once in his life did he spontaneously and naturally mix with a
political crowd.49 His belief that achievement, not politicking, was
the path to high office was augmented by the perception of his destiny
to lead. In this respect, it is not surprising that Adams viewed his
political opponents as motivated by either naked ambition or a desire
to damage him personall~He had, after all, been raised to believe in
his unique role in the maintenance of the republican"experiment" in
free government. His professional career, oriented as it was to the
assumption of the identity of the nation's interests with his own,
naturally led him to characterize opponents as motivated by selfish,
unpatriotic concerns.
These attitudes made Adams contemptuous of Cla}T, who, like
many politicians of the day; wore his ambitions on his sleeve. Indeed,
Adams's reference to the presidency as the office "which of all others
ought to be freely and spontaneously bestowed" reveals that he
mentally inhabited a world that no longer existed (if it ever had), a
republic in which leaders were chosen on the basis of merit and
service rather than political wheeling and dealing. In Adams's ide-
alized republic, no legitimate diversity of interests could exist. Raised
to believe that virtue and achievement would be rewarded, he was
learning that in post-War of 1812 American politics, how one played
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the game was irrelevant to one's chances for success. Self-interest,
not selfless service, was the prime vehicle for political advancement.
It was a fact that Adams found impossible to acknowledge full~50
Confronted with Clay's opposition to the administration's foreign
policy and to his own presidential ambitions, Adams attempted to
sway public and congressional opinion on the South American ques-
tion. He first did so in a series of letters published in the National
Intelligencer under the pseudonym "Phocion."51 Appearing in De-
cember 1817, the Phocion letters articulated the case for continued
neutrality in South American affairs even as they distorted the issues
involved. They asserted that their"only object" was"to produce such
a discussion as may serve to enlighten the public mind," and that
"the establishment of truth should be the object of all parties." From
there, Adams proceeded to misrepresent not only the South Amer-
ican cause but the purposes of administration foreign polic~Warning
that Americans were not "propagandists ... making it our business
to send missionaries through the world to preach the true political
faith.," he observed that "the ferment of the Spanish colonies, not
having been founded on principles, but having merely grown out of
circumstances, has nearly subsided ... and has been put down in
great measure by the dissensions of the colonists and the misconduct
of t]leir leaders." In other words, Phocion doubted the influence of
repILblicanism in the South American revolutions, denied any con-
nection to the North American independence struggle, and mini-
mized the prospects for victory. He claimed that the South American
revolutionary leaders had been "limited to an endeavor to obtain a
place of refuge ... in the pestilential soil of Guayaquil." 52
Nothing could have been further from the truth. By December
1817 the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata had maintained their
independence for four years. San Martin's victory at Chacabuco in
February 1817 proved decisive in winning Chilean independence. In
the north, Bolivar's daring maneuvers culminated in the liberation of
Bogota in 1819. The South American independence movement was
flourishing by late 1817, and although Adams correctly pointed out
its differences in some respects from the North American struggle, to
dismiss the patriot efforts entirely was a distortion of the truth.
Phocion's distortion of the movement as a whole led him to ques-
tion the nature of the forces at Amelia and Galveston Islands. These
he characterized as an "association of adventurers, renegades, and
desperadoes, from the four corners of the earth," whose sole aim was
the indiscriminate plunder of commercial shipping. He asserted the
right of the United States "to constitute itself the protector of its own
98 Adams and American Global Empire
seas" and "protect the renewal of the scenes of horror" such as "when
Lafitte held Barataria." 53 This defense of the seizure of Amelia was
made ironic by the reference to Lafitte, who remained undisturbed in
his stronghold at Galveston until 1821.
The Phocion letters next questioned the interests of Great Britain
in the South American struggles. The British, he observed, would like
nothing better than that the United States play "the cats-paw" in
expediting South American independence. Desiring a free South
America yet unwilling to say so openl~ the British wanted the United
States to act as "abettors of rebellion," "causing us to be viewed with
distrust and suspicion by all those powers (the nations of Europe) who
are our natural allies." Phocion claimed that while the British knew
the United States would gain little commercially from a free South
America, Great Britain "must gain immensel~" "It is apparent we
should certainly be no great gainers by doing the dirty work of Great
Britain." 54
This utterly distorted the actual state of affairs. Castlereagh aimed
to prevent, not to encourage, the United States from aiding the South
Americans. Adams kne~ however, that the American public, still
smarting from the recent war, would never accept a neutrality policy
motivated in part by desire not to offend Great Britain. Therefore, he
constructed an argument calculated to be well received by the public
rather than the one that comported with the facts.
In a second Phocion letter, Adams addressed the role of blacks in
the South American revolutions. Knowing that the votes of southern
congressmen would be decisive in defeating Cla~ he crafted an argu-
ment designed to play on their greatest fears. Commenting that "this
is no time to engage the scruples of a false delicacy; in the discussion
of dangers, which, being understood, may possibly be averted by a
wise policy;" Adams described "the preponderating weight" that
blacks were playing in the revolutionary struggles and the threat they
posed to the hemisphere. He argued that black emancipation should
be gradual, "proportioned to the moral improvement that may be
visible among them." He raised the specter of more Santo Domingos,
of a mass of freed slaves spreading throughout the Western Hemi-
sphere, endangering the American South. Nothing could have been
better calculated to frighten southerners into withholding support
for South American independence. That Phocion greatly exaggerated
both the influence of blacks in the independence struggles (black
participation being minimal in most of the conflicts) is secondary to
the fears his predictions must have engendered in the minds of many
Americans.55
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That the Phocion letters systematically distorted the truth in
discussing the South American revolutions is worsened by the at-
titude Adams adopted in writing them. Claiming that "the establish-
l11ent of truth should be the object of all parties," he propagated
falsehoods on a crucially important issue about which most Amer-
icans had little knowledge.56 Adams avoided discussion of the admin-
istration's geopolitical strategy; in which South America was merely
a. pawn, because of the public outcry it would cause. Instead, he
supported administration policy with arguments which he knew to
be false but which were calculated to be effe.ctive in making his case.
Adams's choice of a pseudonym-Phocion was an Athenian leader
of the fifth century B.C. known for his selfless service to Athens,
austere life-style, and fear of democratic"extremism" -is revealing.
Adams, like his Athenian predecessor, apparently was sufficiently
fearful of popular debate that he deemed it necessary to mislead the
public, presumably so that it would not pursue actions against its
own interests. The duplicitous nature of the Phocion letters reveals
t:hat Adams's continual affirmations of the importance of virtuous
conduct did not preclude his own manipulation of public opinion.
l~he letters highlight the contradictions inherent in Adams's attempt
to maintain an impeccable record of personal integrity while acting
ill the public realm of politics.
Adams also acted to thwart the efforts of Don Manuel Hermeni-
gildo de Aguirre to pressure the administration into recognizing the
lJnited Provinces. Aguirre had been sent as an agent of the Buenos
Airean and Chilean insurgent governments to obtain both diplomatic
recognition and military aid for San Martin's struggle to liberate
Peru.s7 Arriving in July 1817, Aguirre had no success convincing
Acting Secretary of State Richard Rush to alter the neutrality polic)T.
Several meetings with Adams in late October proved equally futile.
E~ut Clay's campaign in favor of recognition rejuvenated Aguirre's
m.ission. Feted by Washington society as the representative of a legiti-
mate South American government, Aguirre attempted to use his
popularity to increase the pressure on the administration. In early
I)ecember he sent a note to Adams "demanding" recognition of the
lJnited Provinces-a note that Adams conveniently misplaced.58 In
allY case, Adams rejected Aguirre's plea for recognition on the
grounds that his credentials did not empower him to make such a
request.59 After several more fruitless meetings, Aguirre asked
whether he should go to Baltimore or Philadelphia (where sympathies
for the South American patriots ran high) to make his case directly to
tJhe people. Adams, refusing to be intimidated, replied that his de-
100 Adams and American Global Empire
mands were "under consideration" by the president and that if
Aguirre's presence should needed in Washington, he could imme-
diately be "given notice." 60 Frustrated by such evasiveness, Aguirre
threatened the closure of Buenos Aires to the commerce of the
United States. Adams now had the South American where he wanted
him; he rejoined that if the port of Buenos Aires was to be closed to
American shipping, he wanted to see it in writing so that the United
States could prepare an appropriate response.61 Embittered, Aguirre
left the country in early 1818, writing to his superiors: "I believe that
if they [the United States] do anything in our favor even indirectl~
it will be for the purpose of enriching their merchants." 62
In early 1818 another South American emissar~ Don Vicente
Pazos, arrived in Washington to protest the seizure of Amelia Island.
Pazos had been instrumental in drafting a constitution for the abor-
tive "Republic of Florida" and had been elected a member of its short-
lived representative assembly:63 Now he tried to obtain reparations
from the United States for property seized during the occupation. His
credentials to do so were enhanced by the support of Lino de Cle-
mente, agent of the insurgent government of Venezuela, who called
on Pazos to protest the Amelia Island attack as a violation of the
rights of the South American republics.64
Once in the United States, Pazos gained the support of William
Thornton, commissioner of patents and an ardent advocate of the
patriot cause. Through Thornton, Pazos met many influential Amer-
icans: Cla~ the journalist Baptis Irvine, and Commodore David Por-
ter, among others. With the assistance of Irvine and Porter, Pazos
began work on a pamphlet detailing his grievances. In early February
he presented his "Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest" to
Adams.65 The work argued that while intemationallaw prohibited
the United States from seizing Amelia, the South American repub-
lics, as recognized belligerents of war, could legally capture the island
from Spain. Moreove~ Pazos brought to Washington sworn deposi-
tions from Americans living in St. Marys, Georgia (across the sound
from Amelia) that no runaway slaves had been harbored by Aury's
force, and that goods captured on the high seas had been deposited at
the St. Marys custom house, not smuggled into the United States as
Monroe had charged.66
Pazos's pamphlet received much publicity in the press and the
enthusiastic support of Cla~ who saw it as a sure way to embarrass
the administration. Pazos met several times with Adams and Monroe
during February without receiving any firm reply to his pleas for
reparations. IIi early March with Monroe's approval, Adams informed
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IJazos that the president saw "no reason for revoking any of the
rneasures which have been [taken] ... and nothing that requires any
other answer to your representations." 67 Rebuffed, Pazos took his
ease directly to the Congress. On 6 March he prepared a memorial
outlining his grievances and requesting reparations. Clay presented
the nlemorial to the House on 11 March, touching off a three-hour
debate over whether it should be formally received.
The Pazos Memorial debate exposed the sectional cleavages in the
I-Iouse. Administration supporters, led by John Forsyth of Georgia
(soon to replace Erving as minister to Spain), argued that Pazos, as an
agent of a foreign power, was acting improperly in appealing to the
<:ongress for redress. Supporters of Pazos pointed to the legitimacy of
llis grievances and the failure of the administration to respond to
t]lem.68 Eventuall~ by a vote of 124 to 28, the House passed Forsyth's
resolution to refuse the memorial. Nearly every opponent of For-
syth's measure came from the trans-Allegheny West.69
The House's refusal to accept the Pazos Memorial was a major
eongressional victory for the administration. It signaled that Clay
lnight not be able to marshal the same support on foreign policy
questions that he could command on domestic issues. Adams savored
t]le triumph. He naturally saw Pazos and Clemente, as well as
Aguirre, as "tools against the administration," whose actions were
"in concert with and dictated by Cla~"7o
Despite overcoming the efforts of Aguirre and Pazos, John Quincy
Adams could not rest easy regarding"the South American question."
C:lay had yet to raise the issue on the floor of the House, as he had
threatened to do since December; his wine-induced pledge "I'll beat
you, by---! II still rang in Adams's ears. 71 No~ as Congress neared
the end of session, his Kentucky nemesis prepared to act. The only
question was what form Clay's challenge would take. In order to
shore up congressional support for the administration, Monroe di-
rected Adams to collect documents in the government's possession
relating to South American independence and the negotiations with
Spain. The aim, as with the Amelia documents, was to create the
illusion of consulting with the Congress on foreign affairs. Congress
h,ad requested the documents in December; now Adams concen-
trated on completing the task of assembling them in order to provide
a counterweight to the arguments of Cla~
Neither the documents relating to the independence of South
.l~mericanor those concerning the negotiations with Spain revealed
lnuch substaritive information. Those on South America were chosen
to prove Adams's contention that Aguirre was not empowered to
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request the recognition of the United States.72 Nothing in the collec-
tion (comprising primarily Aguirre's letters to Adams) helped Con-
gress to understand either the nature of or the prospects for success of
the South American independence struggles. Similarl~ the docu-
ments relating to the negotiations with Spain failed even to hint at
the role of Great Britain in bringing Spain to terms. Adams merely
assembled the notes exchanged between himself and Onis, ending
with his own vitriolic missive of 12 March (see Chapter 3). The net
effect was to cast Adams in the role of a stern and unyielding defender
of American national interests, an impression spread far and wide by
the publication of the letters in a special supplement to the National
Intelligencer of 24 March 1818.73
Adams also assembled a third set of documents, relating to the
Amelia Island affair. The controversy over the incident refused to die.
House critics, dissatisfied with the administration's defense of its
actions, on 20 March requested all documents not previously released
that related to the occupation of the island "if not inconsistent with
the public interest."74 Monroe prefaced these documents by claim-
ing that no patriot government had sanctioned Aury's actions, and
that the "Republic of Florida" had been created solely to prevent the
cession of East Florida to the United States.75 The documents them-
selves supported neither of Monroe's claims. Most concerned Onis's
complaints to Adams over the operations of privateers out of Amer-
ican ports, a long-standing and illegal practice (and one the federal
government had done little to halt) but one that had no direct link to
the patriot actions at Amelia. 76 Indeed, the few documents even
mentioning Amelia Island concerned allegations that some members
of the patriot force had been recruited in New York-a serious charge,
but hardly proof of Monroe and Adams's contention that Aury's force
was sheerly piratical.77
Adams finished compiling the documents not a day too soon.
Monroe submitted them to the House on 25 March, the same day on
which Clay formally raised "the South American question." The
timing was more than coincidental, for on 24 March, Congressman
Hugh Nelson of Virginia (a loyal administration ally) warned Adams
that Clay's challenge was imminent.78 The first full-scale congres-
sional debate on South American policy in United States history
began on this note.79
Clay refrained from a direct assault on Monroe's South American
polic~ recognizing that control of foreign affairs traditionally rested
with the executive. Instead, he introduced a resolution calling for
$18,000 to be added to the annual appropriations bill currently under
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consideration. The funds would pay the salary and expenses for a
minister to the United Provinces, to be sent "whenever the president
shall deem it expedient to do SO."80 The resolution would allow
House members to express their support for recognition (symbolized
by the appointment of a minister to an insurgent government) while
not obligating Monroe to take action. Even though such a measure
would effect no immediate substantive change in polic~-its passage
would be a major political victory for Clay: if Monroe yielded and
recognized the United Provinces, American neutrality in the inde-
pendence struggles would effectively be ended; if the president still
refused to act, Clay could claim that he was ignoring both public and
congressional opinion. In either case, Clay would emerge stronger
politically.
C:lay opened the debate with a three-hour oration that wrapped a
profusion of idealistic rhetoric around a cold assessment of what the
United States stood to gain from South American independence. He
stressed the commercial benefits to the United States. He pointed out
the advantages of the "direct distribution" to the United States of the
region's precious metals, which probably would result in "the entire
command of the India trade." Moreover, he minimized the danger
that Spain might react violently to recognition, observing that the
Spanish monarchy' did not have the financial resources to declare war.
He argued that Great Britain "is more concerned than even this
country in the success of the cause of independence in Spanish
.America." 81 Though he coyly noted that his measure merely recom-
mended a course of action to the president, Clay also defended the
involvement of the House in the making of foreign policy: "nowhere"
did the Constitution imply "that the executive act of sending a
min.ister to a foreign couIltry should precede the legislative act which
shall provide payment of salary:" Foreign polic~ he said, should be
made jointly by the executive and legislative branches.82
Clay's speech voiced the opinions of many congressmen from the
trans-Allegheny West, th.ereby setting the tone for the remainder of
the debate. Opponents of the resolution minimized the commercial
advantages of a free South America, feared that recognition would
lead to war with Spain, and denied the constitutionality of allowing
the House to share directly in the making of foreign policy:83 Further-
more, the fact that the South American Commission had yet to
return with its findings (thanks to Adams's machinations) influenced
some House members to vote against the measure.84 Contrasting
commercial interests within the House also influenced the outcome
of the debate. At one POillt Clay accused Samuel Smith of Maryland
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of opposing recognition because it might jeopardize Smith's own
special trading privileges with the loyal Spanish colonies.85 Smith
answered this charge by noting that the trade of Spain and its loyal
colonies with the United States exceeded that of any other nation
except for Great Britain and France.86 "Yard's Pamphlet" too per-
suaded some House members that the United States stood to gain
little commercially from a free South America.87 Clay acknowledged
Yard's influence when he said "permit me to express a distrust of all
pamphlets of this kind." 88
After four days of debate, the House rejected, by a vote of 45 to lIS,
Clay's resolution to provide monies for a minister to South America.
The Kentuckian's strategy of winning the western vote while gaining
at least a split in the coastal regions, so successful in domestic
questions, failed when applied to foreign affairs. The vote again
reflected sectional divisions, but this time Clay won only a small
majority of the trans-Alleghency West vote, while the Northeast and
the South overwhelmingly rejected his measure.89 A potentially dev-
astating blow to administration foreign policy had been thwarted.
Adams smugly noted in his diary the defeat of Clay's resolution: "The
present session [of Congress] will stand remarkable in the annals of
the Union for showing how a legislature can keep itself employed
when having nothing to do.... The proposed appropriation for a
minister to Buenos Ayres has gone the way of other things lost upon
earth, like the purchase of oil for lighthouses in the western coun-
try: "90 The defeat of Clay's measure, along with the rejection of
Pazos's and Aguirre's pleas, meant that for the moment Adams was
free to pursue his two-track diplomatic and military strategy to bring
Spain to terms.
Adams had played a major role in defeating Clay; indeed, William
Duane thought the secretary had overstepped his bounds. He wrote in
the Aurora that "the department of state [that is, Adams] did shame-
lessly interfere to influence a vote in Congress.... when the ques-
tion concerning South America was about to be brought forward in
Congress by Mr. Clay; the whole weight, influence, and activity of the
executive was brought to bear upon the members of Congress ... the
sole end and purpose in view was to prostrate Mr. Clay and arrest his
popularity: " 91
Adams ignored such charges as the soured grapes of the opposition.
All that mattered to him was that he fended off a major challenge to
administration foreign policy. Circumstances, however, would not
allow Adams any respite from his duties. Even as he savored the
defeat of Clay; a new crisis was brewing in the swamps of East Florida.
FIVE
Jackson's Invasion of Florida
John Quincy Adams was not the only one satisfied by Clay/s defeat.
The initial widespread support for South American recognition stead-
ily eroded as the public realized its implications for the United States.
Madison astutely observed in a letter to Monroe that"the nation will
... disapprove any measure unnecessarily involving it in the danger
of war. II 1 Even the Richmond Enquirer, a critic of the administration/s
neutrality policy; welcomed the defeat of Clay/s resolution: "The
proposition of Mr. Clay is wrong.... It is a proposition against the
established order.... What has the House of Representatives to do
with foreign embassies? We believe the president to be a warm and
sincere friend of the patriot cause.... We believe he might recognize
the independence of La Plata [Buenos Aires]-but he wishes to make
up his mind with the utmost deliberation and await the return of the
commissioners; why not allow him time? 112
Of course, it was neither the possibility of war with Spain nor the
failure of the South American commissioners to make their report
that had influenced Monroe to refuse to recognize the South Amer-
ican republics. These factors had served merely as public rationales
for administration policy: Yet they were very effective in controlling
the activities of the Housel ·which had for the moment assured ex-
ecutive control of foreign affairs. At this point, Monroe and Adams/s
biggest problem in the House concerned the misguided efforts of
their putative ally Forsyth. Characterized by Clay as a tool of the
administration, Forsyth set out to prove his independence by intro-
ducing a resolution authorizing the president to seize East Florida.
Monroe and Adams opposed this provocative measure which, iron-
ically; would have given formal sanction to what they planned to
do anyway: Fortunately for the administration, Forsyth/s proposal
quickly disappeared from the House agenda.3
The British government also welcomed the defeat of Clay/s meas-
ure. American recognition would have placed Castlereagh in a dif-
ficult position: to do nothing would be undeniable proof to the
continental powers that Great Britain ultimately favored South
American independence, yet substantive steps to punish the United
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States for its actions would have jeopardized Anglo-American recon-
ciliation, the cornerstone of Castlereagh's policy: Hence, Castlereagh
was undoubtedly relieved when Bagot wrote: "It appears evident that
it is not the intention of the Government, nor, I think, the disposition
of the country in general, to take at present any step which can be
considered as a direct acknowledgement of the independence of those
colonies, or as tending to change, in fact, the neutral position" of the
United States.4
While Adams labored to defeat Clay's efforts in the House, Andrew
Jackson had embarked on a mission that proved decisive in the
making of the Transcontinental Treaty: Fifteen years of diplomatic
wrangling had failed to secure the Floridas for the United States.
Jackson now acted to accomplish the deed by an exhibition of murder
and plunder known as the First Seminole War.
The Seminole War was but one part of the American policy aimed
at removing or eliminating native Americans from the Southeast.
The removal process had begun during the Creek War of 1812-13. The
Treaty of Fort Jackson imposed by Jackson near the end of the war
resulted, in the words of Robert Remini, in the "virtual annihilation"
of the Creek nation. Under its terms, 23 million acres were taken
from the tribes. Ironically; the treaty was negotiated with those
Creeks who had been allied with Jackson during the warj the Creek
chiefs (including Hillis Hadjo, known as Francis the Prophet) and
their followers who resisted Jackson had fled into Florida. Nonethe-
less, Jackson justified his punitive treaty on the grounds that the
entire Creek nation must pay for the acts of those who had fought the
United States.5
Between 1816 and 1818, Jackson negotiated five more cessions of
land from the Cherokee, Chocta~ and Chickasaw tribes of the
Southeast. Using bribery and intimidation to obtain the signature of
recalcitrant chiefs, he made the deep South (with the exception of
Florida) safe for cotton cultivation and the slavery that went with it.6
Yet Florida remained beyond the grasp of Americans. During the
War of 1812 the British had used the peninsula as a base from which to
attack the southern U.S. frontier. Even more outrageous from the
American perspective was the use of Florida as a haven for Indians and
runaway slaves. In 1815 several hundred blacks and mestizos had
occupied an abandoned British garrison at Prospect Bluff on the
Apalachicola River. Together with houses extending for several miles
along the river, the "Negro Fort" (as the abandoned British post
became known) was the largest slave refuge in the history of North
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J~merica until it was destroyed by an American gunboat in April
1816.7 The destruction of the Negro Fort, howeve~ did not end the
threat posed to American domination of blacks and Indians; the
]~lorida peninsula remained an asylum for those fleeing either the
,,vrath of Jackson or slavery:
Creek chiefs who had escaped into Florida after the Creek War of
1813-15 claimed that the Treaty of Fort Jackson by which they had
been dispossessed of their land was void. In the first place, they had
Ilot signed the agreement. Second, Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent
stipulated that lands lost by Britain's allies during the war would be
Ieturned to them. Moreover, the chiefs had been encouraged in their
claims by British agents Edward Nicholls and George Woodbine, who
had signed an agreement assuring that their lands would be returned.
In 1815, Chief Hillis Hadjo, escorted by Nicholls, had gone to London
to plead with the English to make good their co~mitments.8
But Jackson had no intention of returning the lands obtained by the
1rreaty of Fort Jackson. Although the United States government in-
structed him in June 1815 to begin to return captured lands, the
general ignored the directive, and the eviction of the tribes continued.
The Madison administration, fearful of provoking the wrath of Jack-
son's supporters (including many who stood to own the newly ac-
quired land), let the issue drop. Great Britain, eager to reconcile its
differences with the United States, did not press the matter on behalf
of its putative Indian allies.9 In short, the process of Indian removal
fhat had begun during the Creek War gained speed after the end of
hlostilities between the United States and Great Britain. That many
C:reeks, assisted by their Seminole and free black allies, were as yet
unresigned to being uprooted from their ancestral homelands assured
the outbreak of another war. 10
The incident that precipitated the First Seminole War began as a
direct result of the attempt to implement the Treaty of Fort Jackson.
A small band of Seminoles living in the village of Fowltown just north
of the Florida border refused to vacate their lands when ordered to do
so by General Edmund E Gaines. On 21 November 1817 a detach-
nlent of soldiers under the command of Gaines stormed the settle-
ment, killed several of the villagers, drove off the rest, and burned
Fowltown to the ground. Ironically; the Seminoles living in Fowltown
had neither signed the Treaty of Fort Jackson nor sided with the
C:reeks who fought Jackson during the Creek War. Nonetheless, they
sllffered the fate of summary removal. I I
Fowltown marked the beginning of the Seminole War; the Indians
soon retaliated. On 30 November the Seminoles attacked a supply
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boat under the command of Lieutenant R.W. Scott as it ascended the
.l\.palachicola Rive~ and of some fifty passengers (including women
.and children) only about ten escaped with their lives. On 16 De-
cember, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun ordered Gaines to punish
the Seminoles, pursuing them into Florida if necessary: On 26 De-
eembe~ Calhoun ordered Jackson to assu.me command of the forces
lInder Gaines, instructing him to "adopt the necessary measures to
terminate" the conflict. Two days later Monroe wrote to Jackson that
the "movement ... against the Seminoles ... will bring you on a
theatre where you may possibly have other services to perform. Great
interests are at issue.... This is not a time for repose ... until our
cause is carried triumphantly thro'." 12
Jackson had already recognized the opportunity at hand. Upon
llearing of the attack on the Scott part)'J he had (without authoriza-
tion) called out the Tennessee militia and prepared to march south. 13
()n 6 January (before he had received either Calhoun's or Monroe's
rnessage) he wrote to the president, arguing that "the whole of East
I~lorida [should be] seized and held as an indemnity for the outrages of
Spain upon the property of our citizensj this done, it puts all opposi-
tion down, secures to our citizens a complete indemnit)'J and saves us
from a war with Spain. This can be done without implicating the
governmentj let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr.
Flhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable ... and in
sixty days it will be accomplished." 14
Monroe denied having read until a year later Jackson's letter out-
lining his bold plan to take East Florida from Spain, yet the presi-
dent's contention that he had not authorized the seizure of Florida
must be viewed skeptically: Jackson knew that when Monroe spoke
of the "great interests" at stake and of "other services" the president
did not refer to the problems with the Seminoles. Signi£icantl)'J
n.either Calhoun's orders nor Monroe's letter specifically instructed
J~lcksonto avoid engaging the Spanish. Given Jackson's reputation for
n,ot shirking conflict, the omission of direct orders not to seize
Spanish posts is perhaps the strongest proof that the administration
",ranted benefits of a Jackson rampage in Florida without having to
sh.oulder the blame for sanctioning aggression against another coun-
try: 15 .Moreover, given Monroe's involvement in previous attempts to
seize the Floridas (as secretary of state in 1811, he had ordered the
l\Jiathews mission into East Florida, only to disavow the expedition
when public criticism became too intense), it is not unreasonable to
assume that he would tacitly authorize another invasion of the pen-
iIlsula. 16
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In any case, by mid-March, Jackson and a force of nearly 5,000
Tennessee volunteers, American troops, and Creek allies had moved
into East Florida, descending the Apalachicola River as far south as
the site of the destroyed Negro Fort, where Jackson ordered an Amer-
ican garrison built. He met minimal opposition; the Seminoles and
their allies (numbering perhaps a thousand warriors in the entire
province) fled his advance, and the Spanish were too weak militarily
to offer any resistance to Old Hickory. Nonetheless, Jackson em-
barked On a campaign of terror, devastation, and intimidation, laying
waste the Seminole villages of Miccosukee and Boleck's Town and
capturing the Spanish garrisons at St. Mark's and Pensacola, the
capital of West Florida. Unable to engage the Seminoles in battle, he
destroyed their sources of food in a calculated effort to inflict starva-
tion on the tribes, who sought refuge from his wrath in the swamps. I?
While Jackson did not kill as many Seminoles as he might have
liked, he did, through a combination of luck and tricker)', capture
several important enemy leaders. Creek chieftains Hillis Hadjo and
Himmilemmico were taken after being lured aboard an American
naval vessel flying the British flag. At St. Mark's, Jackson discovered
Alexander Arbuthnot, a seventy-year-old Scottish trader who had
befriended the Seminoles and who had been given power of attorney
by them in their dealings with whites. And at Boleck's Town, Jackson
had captured Robert C. Ambrister of the Royal Marines, an aboli-
tionist, adventurer, and ally of the Seminoles who had wandered into
Jackson's camp at night. On the person of Ambrister's companion was
a letter from Arbuthnot to his son, warning him and the Seminoles
not to resist Jackson's overwhelming force.
The court-martial of Arbuthnot and Ambrister-"unprincipled
villains," as Jackson called the two Britons-had a predetermined
outcome. Arbuthnot stood trial first. Charged with II exciting and
stirring up the Creek Indians" as well as "acting as a sp)', aiding and
abetting the enem)'," he undertook his own defense. While not deny-
ing that he had supplied Boleck's people with ten kegs of gunpowder,
he claimed that that amount was no more than was necessary for
hunting-a reasonable argument. The letter to his son warning of
Jackson's advance was written, he claimed, to protect his personal
property from destruction. Finall)', Arbuthnot threw himself upon
the mercy of the court, "persuaded that sympathy nowhere more
abounds than in a generous American breast." 18
In fact, Arbuthnot's greatest "crime" was befriending the Semi-
noles. Through his honest dealings he 'had gained the tribes' trust to
such a degree that they had extended to him power of attorne~
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i\rbuthnot had not instigated the Seminole War-the attack upon
lPowltown in November had done that. He had only warned the
Seminoles not to trust the words or treaties of the Americans. None-
theless, the military jury found him guilty and sentenced him to be
llanged. 19
Ambrister came next. This veteran of the Napoleonic Wars had in
fact come to Florida with the intent of leading the Seminoles in battle
against the Americans. Yet he too was guilty primarily of encouraging
the Seminoles to stand up for their rights in the face of United States
t:~xpansionism along the southern frontier-an unpardonable crime
in the eyes of Jackson.20 After first sentencing Ambrister to be shot,
the jury reconsidered and reduced his penalty to fifty lashes and a
)rear's hard labor. Jackson set aside this reconsideration, reimposed
the first sentence on Ambrister, and affirmed that of Arbuthnot. He
wanted the execution of the two Britons to serve as "an awful exam-
ple" to the Seminoles.21 Here lay the true meaning of the execution of
the two men. Jackson, indeed most Americans, could not accept the
fa.ct that SemInole attacks on border settlements might be legitimate
3.cts of self-defense against an expansionist neighbor. Instead, Jackson
maintained the fiction that there were "good Indians" (those who
submitted to American demands) and "bad Indians" (those who did
110t), t:he latter usually having been led astray by evil white men.22 In
fhis way Arbuthnot and Ambrister functioned as scapegoats for a
fllation incapable of confronting its own acts of injustice. Never mind
questions of jurisdiction and impartiality (the jury was hardly com-
posed of peers of the condemned men): for a few short weeks in 1818,
Andrew Jackson was the law in Florida. On the morning of 29 April,
Arbuthnot was hanged from the yardarm of his own schooner, and
Ambrister faced a firing squad.
Jac:kson did not stay to witness the executions. Early on 29 April
the general and 1,200 men marched west toward Pensacola, the
c4a.pital of West Florida. He informed Calhoun of his plans, charging
th.at the Spanish garrison there harbored four or five hundred Semi-
noles warriors. Pensacola, he wrote, "must be occupied by American
force." 23
Meanwhile, an incident occurred in Georgia that in retrospect
seems an inevitable outgrowth of Jackson's indiscriminate violence
ill Florida. On orders from the governor of Georgia, a company of
lTlilitiamen under the command of Major Obed Wright d~scended
upon the Creek village of Chehaw and slaughtered a dozen men,
w'omen, and children, including the chief. Wright's men then burned
tile village to the ground. Tragically; nearly all the men of the Chehaw
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village were away at the time of the attack-serving under Jackson in
Florida. In fact, these villagers had fed JacksonJs half-starved troops
during their march from Tennessee to Fort Scott. Now their town had
been destroyed by an unauthorized act of wanton destruction and
murderJ made possible by the Indian-hating hysteria the Seminole
War had unleashed. Jackson was outraged by the incident and wrote
to the governor of Georgia demanding Wright's prosecution.24 The
general prided himself on what he considered an ability to treat
native Americans with fairness; moreover, he realized that the mas-
sacre threatened his efforts to "pacify" the tribes of .the region. Yet
Jackson must share the guilt for the Chehaw massacre because he
contributed to an atmosphere that legitimated the destruction of
villages and the slaughter of native Americans. As for Wright, a
Georgia jury eventually found him innocent of any wrongdoing.25
On 24 May; Jackson and his army seized Pensacola, driving the
Spanish territorial governor and his men to nearby Fort Barrancas.
Mter a brief siege the garrison surrendered. Jackson then declared
Pensacola a United States revenue district and deported the Spanish
governor and his troops to Havana. The capture of West Florida was
complete. Jackson wrote to a friend: /I All that I regret was that I had
not stormed the works, captured the governor, put him on trial for the
murder of Stokes and his family [Americans settlers killed by the
Seminoles], and hung him for the deed. 11 26
Jackson had not found the hundreds of Seminole warriors whose
supposed presence had justified the attack on Pensacola. In fact, the
general produced no substantive evidence whatever of the presence of
any Seminoles near Pensacola, with the exception of about a hundred
old men, women, and children whom the Spanish governor had sent
north with an American officer for resettlement.27 The alleged pres-
ence of hostiles was an excuse to allow Jackson to capture Pensacola,
as he stated he would do in his letter of 6 Januar~ His stationing of
two hundred men at St. MarkJs, the establishment of a garrison at the
Negro Fort (which he renamed Fort Gadsden), and his orders to Gen-
eral Gaines (subsequently countermanded by Calhoun) to seize St.
Augustine, are further evidence that from the very beginning Jackson
planned to seize both East and West Florida from Spain. In his 6
January letter, Jackson had promised to deliver both Floridas within
sixty days. From the time he entered the province, it actually took
him seventy-nine.
During the spring of 1818, reports of Jackson's exploits, often un-
verified, trickled northward. Adams watched nervously. At this crit-
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ical stage, neither he nor Calhoun nor Monroe sent Jackson any
further orders clarifying his mission or warning him not to seize the
Spanish posts. Onis, lacking confirmation of the rumors of Jackson's
depredations, for the time being chose to ignore them and left Wash-
in.gton for his summer home in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Monroe, too,
departed the capital for a vacation at his farm in Loudon Count~
,rirginia. Adams remained in Washington, bathing frequently in the
p1otomac to escape the stifling heat.
In mid-June, Onis received word from the governor of Pensacola of
the capture of St. Mark's, and immediately dispatched a strongly
~rorded letter of protest to Adams, describing Jackson's actions as
"enormous vexations, unexampled in history:" Yet he chose to be-
lieve that the administration had not sanctioned the invasion, expect-
iIlg that once all the facts were in, St. Mark's would be restored to
Spain.28 Onis's faith in American good intentions was undiminished
even by reports a week later of the capture of Pensacola. Again he
wrrote for clarification of the administration's position.29 Only when
he received direct word from the governor of Pensacola confirming
tIle capture of the town and the full dimensions of Jackson's actions
did Onis return to Washington, rousing Adams from his bed on 8 July
with the charge that "peace [has] been violated, and rights trampled
under foot." Onis correctly asserted that neither he nor the governor
of 'West Florida had been notified of the war against the Seminoles. H:e
concluded that "the war against the Seminoles has been merely a
pretext for General Jackson to fall, as a conqueror, upon the Spanish
pI'ovin.ces . . . for the purpose of establishing there the dominion of
thlis republic upon the odious basis of violence and bloodshed"-
strong language from a diplomat, yet a painfully precise description of
:how th.e United States first came to control the province of Florida.
In spite of everything, however, Onis still refused to believe that
th.e administration "authorized this hostile, blood~ and ferocious
invasion of the dominions of Spain." He quoted from Monroe's ad-
dress to Congress on 25 March that "if, in the course of the [Seminole]
war, it should be necessary to enter into the Spanish territor)', the
authorities of Spain are to be respected and their territory evacuated
the moment the war is at an end." That statement, combined with
the administration's repeated assurances of pacific intentions toward
Spain, led Onis to conclude that "General Jackson has acted contrary
to the orders of the president." The Spanish minister awaited the
speedy return of St. Mark's and Pensacola and the punishment of
Jaekson.30
()nis was not alone in his astonishment at Jackson's exploits.
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Newspaper editorialists were mixed in their response to Old Hick-
ory's bold moves. In general, editors sympathetic to the administra-
tion applauded the action, while those in opposition condemned it as
a breach of the Constitution.3 ! Few could acknowledge that it had
actually been either the administration's or Jackson's intent to seize
the Floridas. In Washington, Adams awaited Monroe's return, com-
menting that "the storm is rapidly thickening."
On 15 Jul~ Monroe's cabinet met to decide how to handle the
Jackson affair. All present considered that Jackson had exceeded his
orders and that his actions must be disavowed-all, that is, except
John Quincy Adams. He contended that "there was no real, though an
apparent, violation of the instructions, that the proceedings were
justified by the necessity of the case, and by the misconduct of the
Spanish commanding officers in Florida." Adams argued that al-
though only Congress had the right to declare war, the executive
could "authorize hostilities . . . defensively:" Calhoun came out
strongly in favor of disavowing the general. Both Calhoun and
Crawford had personal reasons for wishing Jackson to be publicly
rebuked: each man saw in Jackson a rival to his own presidential
hopes. But it is also clear that Calhoun, Crawford, and Monroe feared
that the repercussions of the invasion could bring down the adminis-
tration. After five long hours of debate, Adams "obtained an adjourn-
ment of the question" without any final decision.32
Calhoun's intense desire to disavow Jackson's actions deserves
close scrutiny: It is a fascinating case of "what did the secretary of war
know and when did he know it? " The legitimacy of Calhoun's anti-
Jackson stand hinges on the plausibility of his belief that the general
did in fact willfully exceed his orders, and the likelihood that Jack-
son's "Rhea letter" of 6 January requesting covert approval for a
conquest of the Floridas was unknown to Calhoun and Monroe. Yet
this scenario seems doubtful. First, as Bemis asserts, "it is certain
that the Secretary of War, if not the President himself, well knew the
contents of Jackson's letter of January 6 as soon as it was received in
Washington." 33 This virtual certaint~ combined with Calhoun and
Monroe's open-ended instructions of 26 and 28 December and their
subsequent failure to clarify the mission to Jackson, makes his al-
leged violation of orders dubious. Are we to believe that Calhoun's
razor-sharp mind "forgot" about the letter of 6 January during the
extended cabinet debate on the matter? Moreover, if Monroe and
Calhoun sought only a narrowly punitive cross-border raid, why did
they replace the competent Gaines with Jackson, a man notorious for
boldness? Finall~ it is clear that the acquisition of the Floridas and
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the removal of the Indians from the Southeast were at the top of
Calhoun's (and tl;1e South's) priorities. Calhoun's readiness at the first
sign of controversy to disavow Jackson's indisputable success in the
Floridas appears retrospectively to have been an act of utter cynicism.
If Calhoun and Monroe were truly afraid of Jackson's potential as a
military usurper of civilian authority; they would not have placed
him at the head of a column marching into the Floridas with orders
to "adopt the necessary measures to terminate the conflict." The
evidence suggests that Calhoun was using Jackson's alleged violation
of orders as a means to neutralize a potential political rival. Small
wonder that Jackson would go to his grave regretting that he had not
had the chance to hang John C. Calhoun.34
The cabinet met again the following day; concerned that public and
world opinion demanded Jackson's censure yet uncertain as to the
form that censure should take. Crawford feared that outright dis-
avowal might prompt Jackson's resignation from the army and bring
the wrath of the general's huge public following down on the admin-
istration. It became clear that the challenge was to devise a way to
l'estore the captured posts to Spain without seeming to disavow
Jackson's actions-a formidable task. Again the cabinet adjourned
undecided.35
On 17 Jul)', Adams repeated his argument that Jackson had acted
defensivel)', appealing "first to the facts, then to the laws of nations,
and lastly to the Constitution" to defend his opinion.36 Slowly; a
response began to take shape. Monroe decided to send a "friendly
letter" to Jackson, complimenting the general for valiant service to
his country yet explaining the "constitutional grounds upon which
I-'ensacola would be restored to Spain."37 Left undetermined was
'what language Adams would use to answer the Spanish protest. On
.20 Jul)', Adams arrived at "a new point of view" : that the governor of
'West Florida had threatened to drive Jackson out of the province by
:force and that the general seized Pensacola as "his only alternative
'... to prevent the execution of the threat." Even Adams recognized
the a.bsurdity of this explanation: "I admitted that it was necessary to
carry the reasoning upon my principles to the utmost extent it would
bear to come to this conclusion-But if the question was dubious, it
'was better to err on the side of vigor than on the side of weakness-on
the side of an officer who had rendered the most eminent service to
his nation than on the side of our bitterest enemies." 38
Adams's formulation of the Jackson affair is interesting for two
reasons. First, the question was not "dubious." Jackson's invasion of
the Floridas-either done without orders, as Calhoun alleged, or done
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with the tacit authorization of the president, as seems more likely-
was a significant transgression of the executive's constitutional pre-
rogative. Only by constructing a tenuous rationalization did Adams
make the issue"dubious." It was less a question of deciding between
"an officer who had rendered the most eminent service to his nation"
and "our bitterest enemies" that it was a choice between endorsing a
significant expansion of executive warmaking power and adhering to
the founding principles of the American Constitution. Yet given
Adams's critique of congressional warmaking powers and the stakes
involved in the Jackson affair, it is not surprising that he strongly
supported the actions of Old Hickor)'.
Adams summed up the situation in his diary entry of 21 July: "The
administration were [sic] placed in a dilemma from which it is impos-
sible to escape censure by some, and factious recriminations by man)'.
If they avow and approve Jackson's conduct, they incur the double
responsibility of having committed a war against Spain, and of war-
ring in violation of the Constitution without the authority of Con-
gress. If they disavowed him, they must give offense to all his friends,
encounter the shock of his popularit~ and have the appearance of
truckling to Spain. For all this I should be prepared. But the mischief
of this determination lies deeper. (1) It is weakness and a confession of
weakness. (2) The disclaimer of power in the executive is a dangerous
example; and of evil consequences. (3) There is injustice to the officer
in disavowing him, when in principle he is strictly justified." 39
At this point, Adams had convinced himself that his tortuous
defense of Jackson was not only expedient but true. How can one
explain this delusion? The answer lies in Adams's personal stake in
the outcome of the negotiations with Spain and his awareness of the
crucial part Jackson's actions played in bringing Onis to terms.
Adams's long experience as a diplomat made him aware that to
censure Jackson, whatever the constitutional grounds for doing so,
invited further intransigence at the bargaining table, where power,
not principle, was the ultimate determinant. Although Jackson had
gone farther in "chastising" the Seminoles than Adams would have
liked, to disavow the general now would undermine and perhaps
erase the gains Adams had made at the bargaining table since the
previous December. Moreover, Adams knew that empire building
required an executive with broader warmaking powers than the Con-
stitution allowed. In that sense the Jackson affair stood as an impor-
tant precedent from which there could be no retreat.
Equally if not more important than the constitutional issues in-
volved were the compelling personal reasons Adams had for defend-
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ing Jackson. Adams's hopes for the presidency hinged on the success
of the negotiations with Spain. His reputation as an ardent expan-
sionist, first established when he supported the Louisiana Purchase,
had been essential to his success as a Republican. Now he hoped to
complete the work of Jefferson by defining the boundaries of Loui-
siana in the most expansive way possible. If Adams could deliver a
favorable treaty; he could present himself as the "man of the whole
nation" and indisputably the next president. To disavow Jackson
would be to renounce his only leverage in dealing with Onis-the
threat of military force. Without this threat Spain might never agree
to cede the Floridas or to formalize a western boundary favorable to
the United States. Adams knew that such an outcome would dash his
llopes for the presidency by making him appear to be an ineffectual
secretary of state.
In defending Jackson, Adams was acting in what he perceived to be
his own and the nation's self-interest. He had not taken part in the
decision to order Jackson into Florida; that had been done by Monroe
and Calhoun.40 Nevertheless, events now gave Adams the largest
personal interest in seeing that Jackson was defended. Adams's deter-
mined defense of the Seminole War campaign saved the general from
probable censure and disgrace. It is impossible to know how this
'would have affected Jackson's future political career, but one can
safely say that it would not have helped it. Ironically; it did not occur
to Adams that Jackson might someday be a rival for the presidenc)T.41
:Had Adams been able to see into the future, perhaps he would have
chosen a different course.42
The July cabinet meetings revealed the dominant influence Adams
Jhad on the other members of the administration. He had found the
'words to defend what was seemingly indefensible and then, by tena-
cious argument, had convinced his colleagues of the efficacy of his
explanation. Few times in his long public career were his rhetorical
skills more severely challenged or more impressively demonstrated.
Accordingly; his note to Onis of 23 July; the result of a week's worth
of cabinet haggling, in essence defended Jackson's conduct. Although
~~dams claims to have "given in" to the views of the other cabinet
lnembers, the note represents the substantive triumph of his posi-
1ion. He began by calling Onis's attention "to a series of events which
l1ecessitated and justified the entrance of United States troops" into
l?lorida. He charged that "the treacherous, unrelenting, and exter-
lninating character of Indian hostilities" along the Georgia-Florida
border violated Pinckney's Treaty of 1795, which obligated Spain to
restrain such activities. Adams denied that the Seminoles had any
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just motive for their actions: "The permanent and unvarying policy of
the United States with regard to all of the Indian tribes within their
borders is that of peace, friendship, and liberality:" He asserted that
"for many years" the United States had not fought "with any Indian
tribe, unless stimulated by the influence of foreign incendiaries." 43
Having justified the mission to chastise the Seminoles, Adams
undertook to defend the capture of St. Mark's and Pensacola. He
charged that the governor of Pensacola was guilty of giving"succor"
to the Seminoles, as well as endangering Jackson's men by exacting
lIexorbitant duties" on American supply boats ascending the Ap-
alachicola River. Adams claimed that a "large body" of Seminoles
IIwere overtaken, surprised, and defeated" by Jackson "within one
mile of Pensacola." These facts, combined with the governor's
"threatening" letter denouncing Jackson's lIaggression against
Spain," made necessary the capture of St. Mark's and Pensacola.44
These charges had no basis in fact. Jackson produced no evidence
(Adams's claims to the contrary) that the governor of Pensacola aided
any Seminoles beyond the few refugees who were escorted to
Georgia. Far from being charged"exorbitant duties," the supply boat
had in fact been given special permission by the governor to pass
through Spanish territory and had been charged with the standard
rates.45 No record exists of Jackson's having engaged any "large body"
of Seminoles near Pensacola, or anywhere else in Florida during the
entire campaign. In fact, the terrified tribes fled Old Hickory's over-
whelming force. This leaves the governor's IIthreatening letter" to
Jackson as the sole remaining justification for the seizure of the
posts-a hollow threat indeed, when one considers the disparity
between the Spanish and American forces.
Adams's argument is a classic example of blaming the victim,
whereby the aggrieved party is held responsible for provoking the
aggressor. Adams concluded his audacious communique by demand-
ing the punishment of the Spanish colonial officials "who, the Presi-
dent is persuaded, have then acted contrary to the express orders of
their sovereign." As a post-script, Adams casually added that Pen-
sacola would be returned to any duly authorized Spanish official, and
that St. Mark's, "being in the heart of Indian country;" would be
delivered to any Spanish force sufficiently strong to hold it.46 Thus
the administration solved the problem of how to return the captured
posts without seeming to disavow Jackson.
As a historical document, Adams's 23 July note to Onis stands as a
monumental distortion of the causes and conduct of Jackson's con-
quest of Florida, reminding historians not to search for truth in
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official explanations of events. Yet as a diplomatic instrument, the
:note worked extremely well. It served notice to Onis that Monroe and
.Adams would meet public criticism of Jackson's aggression with a
vigorous, self-righteous counterargument. Onis could not use the
situation to gain easy advantage in the court of international opinion.
This would prove to be crucial, for even as the cabinet deliberated
'what to do about the Jackson affair, the negotiations reached a critical
turning point.
IOn 8 July; the day Onis returned to Washington to protest formally
the invasion of Florida, he told Adams of new instructions he had just
Ieceived from Madrid giving him greater latitude to compromise than
Jhe had been given to date. The Spaniard asserted, however, that the
Jackson affair erected a new obstacle to a settlement.47 On 10 July;
~A.dams met with Baron Jean Guillaume Hyde de Neuville, France's
Jminister to the United States, who bore an important message: Spain
'was willing to cede the Floridas in exchange for a compromise on the
elaims question and a western boundary beginning at the Sabine
JRiver (the present Louisiana-Texas boundary). Hyde added that it was
n.ot 11ecessary to answer the Spanish protest over the invasion of
JFlorida for a "month or two," or "perhaps not at all if in the meantime
"we could come to an arrangement of the other differences." Adams
termed the proposal of a western boundary at the Sabine "impossi-
ble" j but the meeting made clear that rather than provoking war with
Spain or interrupting the negotiations, Jackson's actions might serve
as a lever to extract further concessions from Madrid.
011 11 July; Adams and Onis met again in what would prove a
landmark session in the negotiations. Onis began with a muted
protest of the invasion but added that the events in Florida need not
iIlterrupt the negotiations. He followed with a new western boundary
proposal: along the course of either the Mermento or Calcasieu
]~ivers (about 100 miles west of the mouth of the Mississippi), north
along the Arroyo Hondo, between Los Adaes and Natchitoches, to the
l~.ed River, and along its eourse to the Missouri. From there, Onis
proposed a boundary runrling along the Missouri to its source, or a
line to be determined by joint commission. This offer represented an
important Spanish concessionj theretofore Madrid had clung to a
western boundary approximating the Mississippi River. Adams rec-
ognized that the offer represented a significant change in the Spanish
position, and he responded. with an equally surprising counteroffer: a
lvestern boundary beginning at the Bahia de San Bernardo in Texas
(the mouth of the Colorado), along the course of the river to its source,
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then north to the Missouri and following that river to its source, and
from there a line directly to the Pacific coast.
This"suggestion," as Adams termed it, was the first mention of a
transcontinental boundary. PreviousI)', the administration's claims
had extended no farther west than the front range of the Rockies.
Onis, taken aback by this startling new proposal, accused Adams of
wanting to dispossess Spain of all territories claimed in the North-
west by Juan de Fuca. Adams termed this charge "foolishness" (de-
liria), pointing to the conflicting claims of Great Britain and Russia to
the region and asserting that the United States had the strongest right
to the Columbia River because it had established settlements at its
mouth and therefore needed to open communications to the inte-
rior.48
This critical conversation between Adams and Onis ended without
agreement, yet both parties knew that the negotiations had entered a
new ph-ase. Onis returned to Bristol to await formal reply to his
protest; the honor of the king of Spain required that his minister not
appear to continue negotiating while American troops occupied Flor-
ida. The negotiations did continue, however, through the good offices
of Hyde de Neuville.
The French minister, a respected member of the diplomatic corps,
friend to both Adams and Onis, and frequent dinner host to Mrs.
Adams, played a crucial role in the negotiations from this point on.
On 16 Jul)', the same day the cabinet gathered to discuss the Jackson
affair, Adams made an oral offer of a western boundary to Hyde de
Neuville, to be communicated by him to Onis. The new offer, "agreed
to at the president's," differed significantly from that made by Adams
to Onis only five days earlier. It began by following the Trinity River
in Texas "from its mouth to its source, then a line due north to the
Red River, following the course of that river to its source, then
crossing the Rio del Norte [Rio Grande], and following the course of
it, or the summit of a chain of mountains northward and parallel to it;
then stop, or take a line west to the Pacific" (see map 4).49 Although
still transcontinental, this new line to the Pacific began at a point
several hundred miles south of the line Adams had suggested on 11
Jul~ One cannot be certain why Monroe and Adams arrived at such
dramatically different terms over a period of five days. Perhaps, as
Samuel Flagg Bemis suggests, Onis misunderstood Adams's offer of
11 July.50 Perhaps the offer of 11 July was designed as a ploy to keep
Onis from storming out of the negotiations and withdrawn once it
became clear that he would not do so. In any event, Hyde de Neuville
soon departed for Bristol with both the administration's reply to the
Jackson protest and a new boundary proposal.
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Adams's offer of 16 July 1818
- ---- Onis's counteroffer of
24 October 1818
Map 4. The Proposals of July and October 1818 (projected on the Melish
map of 1818)
One might wonder why Onis, confronted by overt aggression
against the possessions of his countr~ would continue to negotiate
with Adams. The simple fact is that he had no choice. To break off the
talks now; with Jackson in Florida and no European powers emerging
to assist Spain, would invite the Americans to take possession not
only of the Floridas but of lexas as well. Spain was in danger of losing,
without compensation, all the territories the United States coveted.
C)nis urged Pizarro that he be allowed to make the best deal possible,
noting that Spain's bargaining position"certainly won't be better for
a long time." 51
The map of Spanish North America showed Onis an empire be-
sieged. Jackson's invasion was only the latest assault. American
troops still occupied Amelia Island. In Texas, Bonapartist exiles under
tile command of Henri L'Allemand were plotting to seize the
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province, preparing one more in a long line of guerrilla attacks on the
Gulf Coast region.52 Galveston remained occupied by the Lafitte
gang, whose privateers harassed Spanish shipping, hindering resup-
ply efforts. Onis recognized that Spain could not defend its interests
militarily and that no European power had shown any inclination to
do so. Spain stood alone in its dispute with the United States, and
Onis had sufficient experience as a diplomat to know that no matter
how humiliating, he must continue the negotiations or invite further
American aggression. This explains the infinitely understanding
tone of his letters of protest, as he contrived to give the administra-
tion every benefit of the doubt regarding the invasion of Florida. In an
implacably difficult position, Onis swallowed hard and prepared to
make the best deal he could.
The breakthrough on the western boundary question also explains
the zeal with which Adams defended Jackson in the July cabinet
meetings. While the administration debated what to do about events
in Florida, Adams had already gotten a taste of a potentially monu-
mental transcontinental boundary which whetted his already sub-
stantial appetite for a treaty with Spain.
During July ISIS the focus of the negotiations shifted from the
acquisition of the Floridas (Spain's cession of them being already
assured) to the delineation of a transcontinental boundary between
Spanish possessions and the United States. The question remains,
why did Monroe and Adams now propose a boundary to the Pacific?
All previous demands had extended no further west than the front
range of the Rockies. Was it because, as Bemis suggests, Monroe and
Adams had not previously understood the relationship between the
Anglo-American Northwest boundary question and the Spanish-
American dispute in the Southwest? 53
This explanation does justice neither to Monroe and Adams nor to
the facts of the situation. The president and his secretary of state,
with nearly fifty years of diplomatic experience between them, could
not have overlooked the implications of defining a western boundary
with Spain east of the Rockies while still contending with Great
Britain and Russia for control of the Northwest. Moreover, the record
reveals that Monroe and Adams's diplomacy had linked the two
questions from the start. Biddle's reoccupation of Astoria (accom-
plished in August ISIS) was the first step. The Yellowstone Expedi-
tion of iSlS-19 (more commonly known as the Long-Atkinson
Expedition) aimed to establish American control of the upper
Missouri River watershed. Conceived in late lS17 as a pet project of
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Monroe and Calhoun, the thousand-man expedition's ostensibly sci-
entific nature masked other purposes. Calhoun stated its aim to be
"the protection of our northwestern frontier and the greater exten-
sion of our fur trade." 54 Although the Yellowstone Expedition was
concerned primarily with lessening British influence in the North-
west, one must conclude that it also planned to extinguish the linger-
ing Spanish claims to the region. Finall~ in late May 1818 the
administration had instructed Richard Rush in London to begin talks
focused on resolving the Anglo-American dispute over the North-
west.55
Monroe and Adams were moving toward establishing a transconti-
nental boundary long before Adams first suggested it to Onis in July
1818. Indeed, American diplomats had yearned for a "window on the
I?acific" since the time of Jefferson (see Chapter 1). The proposal
certainly did not surprise Onis; he had long claimed that the United
States had a "grand plan" to expand to the Pacific.56 That the tra.ns-
continental proposal was not made sooner is explained by the shre.wd
negotiating strategy of Monroe and Adams and, more important, by
their fear of a negative domestic reaction.
Charles K. Webster has observed that diplomatists sometimes
reach agreement by a circuitous route, that the art of negotiation
requires knowing when to propose what is most desired.57 A proposal
made too soon risks being bargained away; made too late, it risks
interfering with progress achieved on other issues. The challenge is to
introduce one's maximum demand only when circumstances are
:most favorable to its being agreed upon. Webster's model explains
'why Monroe and Adams waited until they did to propose a transconti-
:nental boundary: To have made such a proposal in early 1818, in light
of ten years of Spanish insistence on a western boundary at the
.Mississippi, would have been futile; neither Onis's instructions nor
the power relationships existing at the time between the two nations
'would have allowed him to consider it. By Jul~ however, the situation
:had changed dramatically: In the wake of the Amelia Island occupa-
tion and the Jackson affair, Onis knew that the United States was
:moving to assert its claims militarily. His goal in the talks had shifted
from hemming the United States in at the Mississippi to negotiating
la boundary that would ensure the security of Texas and New Mexico.
~Monroe and Adams sensed that, with the pressure on, this was the
time to make their maximum demand of a transcontinental bound-
ar~ particularly when they could hold out to Onis a tantalizing
tradeoff-concession of Texas.
In short, Monroe and Adams planned to obtain a transcontinental
124 Adams and American Global Empire
boundary in exchange for United States claims to Texas. Although
Adams later said he had opposed the eventual retreat to the Sabine
River as a western boundar~ the transcontinental offer of 16 July-
which he and Monroe had arrived at jointly-in substance did con-
cede Texas. That offer proposed that the western boundary begin
along the Trinity River of Texas, less than seventy-five miles from the
Sabine. Adams's diary of July 1818 contains no record of his objecting
to the tradeoff of Texas for the Northwest. His later protestations that
he did object, in light of the political climate of sectionalism in which
they were made, must be viewed skeptically:58
The sectional controversy is a second reason why Monroe and
Adams waited to propose a transcontinental boundary: Had the Amer-
ican public, particularly in the South and West, known in advance of
the plan to exchange Texas for the Northwest, it is likely that the
outcry would have prevented the Treaty of 1819. As it happened,
Adams made no written proposal to Onis of the deal until October,
and the public knew virtually nothing of it until the treaty was
presented to Congress for ratification. Adams's last public boundary
offer, that of 12 March, had asserted Americans claims as far south as
the Rio Grande, but by July he and Monroe had conceded Texas. It is
easy to understand why the two men wanted that fact kept secret as
long as possible.
July 1818 was an exhausting month for John Quincy Adams. The
uproar over Jackson's invasion, combined with his other official
duties, consumed all his energies, leaving little time for his wife or for
much-needed rest. What sleep he did get was disturbed by the stifling
temperatures of a Washington summer which made it "scarcely
possible to lie on the bed." The chronic weakness and palsy in his
right hand worsened so that he could barely write.59
Adams was not alone in his distress. The pressure and anxiety
created by the Jackson affair also took its toll on Monroe. Adams
wrote that the president was"so much absorbed in the subject that he
rebels at thinking of any other," at times stopping in midsentence to
say "something about Jackson and Pensacola." 60 At the end of the
month, the weary Monroe returned to his farm in Virginia for rest.
Not so Adams. He remained in Washington to monitor both do-
mestic and international reactions to the Jackson invasion. He was
pessimistic about the chances for a favorable outcome to the crisis.
On 11 July; his fifty-first birthday (and, coincidentall~ the first day he
suggested the transcontinental boundary to Onis), Adams prayed for
God's help in surmounting the "trial I am now undergoing." He
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prayed "above all, that 'till I die, I may not suffer my integrity to
depart from me, and that whatever dispensation of Providence here-
after awaits me, I may be prepared to receive it with prudence,
temperance, justice, and fortitude." 61
Adams's prayers for the preservation of his integrity reveal the
profound crisis of conscience he experienced as a result of his actions
~lS secretary of state. Perhaps more than any other statesman of the
t~arly republic, he had believed in the Jeffersonian idea that there was
but one code of morality' for nations as well as individuals. This
principle resonated with everything in his puritan heritage; it was
central to the belief that the American Revolution marked the birth
of a novus oIdo seclorum.·-a new world order. As late as 1816, in
response to naval hero Stephen Decatur's famous toast "My country
right or wrong," Adams had written to his father that "I cannot ask of
l-Ieaven success even for my country in a cause where she should be in
the wrong.... I declaim as unsound all patriotism incompatible with
the principles of eternal justice." 62
No~ less than two years after expressing these sentiments, Adams
found himself embroiled in an ethical quagmire in which "patri-
otism." seemed opposed to the "principles of eternal justice." As
secretary of state, he had consciously distorted, dissembled, and lied
about the goals and conduct of American foreign policy to both the
C:ongress and the public so that a slave labor-based society he loathed
eould expand into the Floridas. Adams had begun to discover that
fllifilling one's destiny might involve compromises of one's personal
iIltegrity previously unsuspected.
In a recent study of Jefferson's foreign polic)', Robert W. Tucker and
I)avid C. Hendrickson have suggested that "'reason and morality'
",,vithout reference to 'power and expediency' can subtly derange a
statecraft, subvert the modest tasks of diplomac)', and end in betray-
ing both physical security and economic interest." 63 It is a restate-
Inent of the classic "realist" perspective of American foreign polic~
Yet the formulation fails to recognize that the goals of early American
diplomac)', far from being "modest," were (and remain) to remake the
",,vorld in America's image. The assertion of a liberal international
c:ommercial system in the face of the established mercantile order
",,,,as vigorously pursued precisely because it was presumed to be based
on "reason and morality" rather than "power and expediency."
":Balance of power" politics lacked legitimacy because it was founded
on "power and expediency" rather than "reason and moralit)'," the
touchstones of the American Revolution.
Adams, again perhaps more than any other American statesman of
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his time, was acutely aware that "reason and morality" were not
subject to being tempered by "power and expediency:" He knew well
that it is the ability to resist the temptations of expediency and the
lure of power that characterize a truly moral man and nation. He
recognized that once a statesman and a nation ventured down the
slippery slope of "power and expediency" there could be little hope of
turning back. In the end, there is no dichotomy between the morality
of the statesman and the morality of the nation-the two are an
identity. The choices of the statesman define not just the nation's
morality but that of the statesman as well. To put it another wa~
Adams had believed his entire life that holding public office carried
with it the burden of moral leadership and that a truly moral nation
could not be led by immoral men. Abigail Adams's admonitions
continued to intrude on the consciousness of the secretary of state.
He sensed that his defense of Jackson not only violated his own
integrity but also betrayed the hope that the United States would not
adopt the corrupt practices and rationales of European diplomacy. His
prayers indicate his regret for the portion of his integrity that he
feared was already lost.
SIX
On18 Brought to a Point
])on Luis de Onis responded to Adams's defense of Jackson's conduct
by rebutting the secretary's assertions point by point. He rejected the
c;harge that Spanish troops had failed to restrain the Seminoles from
cross-border forays into Georgia, claiming that correspondence from
the Spanish governor in Florida indicated instead that the tribesmen
llad frequently protested attacks by North Americans. He alluded to
other documents that contradicted allegations of interference with
the American supply convoy and of aiding and abetting Seminole
warriors. Onis demanded Jackson's punishment, yet he pledged to
investigate the actions of the Spanish officials in Florida and mete out
suitable punishment should any wrongdoing on their part be dis-
covered. I
Although he disagreed 'with Adams's assessment of Jackson's ac-
tivities in Florida, Onis ended his note by repeating his wish for a
comprehensive settlement of the Spanish-American controversy: He
claimed to have "no doubt" that his new instructions from Madrid
would allow for a "treaty mutually satisfactory" to both sides. Yet his
official optimism masked a private pessimism that bordered on de-
spair. He wrote to Pizarro of the difficulties in negotiating amidst the
udemocratic demagogues" and "rabid Jacobinism" of Washington
and recommended that the talks be shifted to Madrid.2 He warned
fhat the mounting impatience of the administration combined with
fhe warlike, anti-Spanish Inood of the public might lead to recogni-
tion of South American independence and possibly a declaration of
war against Spain by the end of the next session of Congress.3 Onis
pleaded that Spain not rely on the European powers, especially Great
Britain, to assist in the dispute with the United States. Nor, he added,
s:hould too much faith be put in the so-called "good offices" of Hyde
de Neuville, for he judged the French minister to be under orders to
ingratiate himself and his nation with the United States government,
even at the price of "sacrificing the interests of [France's] most inti-
nlate all~" Spain. Once again, Onis called for compromise with the
South American states as the only solution to Spain's difficulties.4
In spite of his official protestations, Onis still believed that an
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agreement might be reached. He wrote to Pizarro that Monroe and
Adams wanted a settlement before the beginning of the next session
of Congress but noted three points upon which they would not
compromise. First, they would accept no clause prohibiting recogni-
tion of the South American insurgent governments by the United
States. Second, they would not agree to draw the Texas border any
farther east than the Sabine River. Third, they were adamant that the
treaty include a western boundary allowing access to the Pacific
Ocean via the Columbia River.5 A settlement along these lines would
fulfill a major Spanish objective: establishment of a recognized
boundary between the United States and the "borderlands" of New
Spain. Unfortunately for Onis, his instructions as of early August
1818 prevented him from settling according to these terms. At that
point, he was not empowered to offer a western boundary extending
west of the Missouri River. Nor was he allowed to settle without
extracting a pledge of nonrecognition from the United States. Onis
could see the outlines of a treaty but a majority of the Consejo de
Estado (primarily those members who were part of the camarilla)
refused him powers sufficient to reach agreement. As a result, Onis
attempted to stall Adams, pledging his willingness to negotiate while
still lacking the authority to do so effectively.
Meanwhile, Monroe and Adams worked to paint Spain more tightly
into a diplomatic corner. Even as the startling news of Jackson's
execution of two Britons reverberated throughout Great Britain, ne-
gotiations were under way to resolve the remaining differences of the
combatants of the War of 1812. The talks, if successful, would signal a
new phase of Anglo-American reconciliation and extinguish once
and for all Spanish hopes for British aid in resolving the dispute with
the United States.
The spring of 1818 seemed a perfect time for Great Britain and the
United States to settle the issues that had caused the War of 1812.
Time and mutual interest had cooled passions sufficiently so that
thorny subjects such as impressment, compensation for slaves seized
by the British, and the rights of American fisherman in the waters of
British North America might be resolved. Commercial questions also
loomed large. The Commercial Convention of 1815 would soon ex-
pire, and the United States wanted the terms of bilateral trade modi-
fied to allow for unrestricted access to British colonial possessions in
the Western Hemisphere, especially the West Indies. Finally; and
most important in the context of the dispute with Spain, the United
States and Great Britain needed to demarcate the Canadian-Amer-
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ican boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Pacific. The border
separating Canada from the United States had been vaguely defined
since the time of independence; the problem took on added signifi-
(;ance now that both nations had a growing interest in the northwest
eoast.
In early 1818 all signs pointed to a settlement of these issues. From
]~ondon, Richard Rush wrote of the conciliatory attitude of the Brit-
ish government generally and of Castlereagh in particular. Rush
reported conversations in which the British foreign secretary indi-
cated a willingness to compromise on the slave and boundary issues
and even hinted that Parliament might consent to reopen the British
';Vest Indies trade to American merchants.6 This last item had been
for decades the great desideratum of the merchant interests of the
Northeast.
Great Britain's restrained response to the impending reoccupation
of Astoria by Captain Biddle provided further evidence of its concil-
i.atory mood. Although Bagot had registered a polite protest upon
hearing in November 1817 of the expedition to the northwest coast,
:he was mollified by Adams's assurances of the peaceful intentions of
t:he mission. Adams pushed the issue in private talks with Bagot on 15
IVlay 1818. Asserting that "no force was intended to be used" in the
occupation of Astoria, Adams claimed that u.S. rights to the Colum-
bia River region dated to the "purchase of a large tract of the country
Drlade from the Indians in the year 1787." 7
In May; Adams wrote to Rush clarifying the administration's view
of the Astoria situation. He claimed that Great Britain had not been
informed of the Biddle expedition because of Monroe's"absence from
th.e seat of government 11 when the mission began. In any event,
Adams boldly asserted, Britain could not be offended by American
efforts to exert control over the northwest coast in light of u.S.
",rillingness to acquiesce in British control of other parts of the globe.
I:[e argued that it was "not consistent either with a wise or friendly
policy" for Great Britain to "watch with jealousy and alarm every
possibility of extension of our natural dominion in North America." B
C:astlereagh chose to overlook this high-handed assertion of Amer-
ican "rights11 i indeed, he instructed the British commanders at As-
toria to cooperate in the restoration of the post to the Americans.
R.lISh wrote that despite the Astoria issue, his talks with the foreign
s(~cretarydid not contain"a single expression not adopted to the good
feelings . . . between the two governments. 11 9
Under these auspices a general negotiation of all the points at issue
between the United States and Great Britain began in July 1818.
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Adams ordered Albert Gallatin to vacate his post as minister to
France temporarily and journey to London to take charge of the talks.
In making the move, Adams alluded to Gallatin's "long experience
and ,great knowledge," but the change also indicates what little faith
Monroe and Adams had in the talents of Rush, described by Rufus
King as being "a soft and empty pedant." 10
Castlereagh welcomed the prospect of cementing Anglo-American
relations. The uncertainty attached to the upcoming congress of
European sovereigns at Aix-Ia-Chapelle made him eager to resolve
lingering disputes with the United States. Castlereagh did not know
quite what to expect from the first conference ever held by the
European powers to regulate international affairs. 1 1 The congress
would decide whether the European alliance was to be primarily
defensive in nature (as Castlereagh wished) or committed to active
intervention to defend the interests of monarchy wherever it was
threatened, including the Western Hemisphere. 12 Tsar Alexander of
Russia, the most ardent advocate of the second view; was attempting
to turn the congress into a general forum of European states along the
lines of the Congress of Vienna. Essential to his plans would be
securing an invitation to the conference for Ferdinand VII. If Spain's
plight could be dramatized, it might create pressure on Britain to
agree to take part in an armed mediation of the South American
conflicts. Castlereagh, conversel~ wished to confine the conference
to the major European states and keep the agenda as limited as
possible. He dreaded any action by the congress beyond mutual
expressions of good will and a pledge to meet again. I3
Thus, Castlereagh wanted to solidify relations with United States
in order to bolster Britain's position vis-a-vis the European powers.
Beginning talks with the Americans would allow Great Britain to
attend the conference at Aix and vigorously oppose armed mediation
efforts in the New World while being reasonably sure that the United
States would not undercut that stand by recognizing one of the South
American states. Castlereagh struck this note of mutual self-interest
at the beginning of the Anglo-American talks when he said to Rush
and Gallatin: "~et us strive to regulate our intercourse in all respects,
as that each nation may be able to do its utmost towards making the
other rich and happy." 14
In Madrid, members of the Spanish ruling class eyed with great
anticipation the upcoming congress at Aix-Ia-Chappelle. Ferdinand,
encouraged by the efforts made on his behalf by his fellow monarch
Alexander, still hoped that the European powers might intervene to
save his New World empire from collapse. He held on to this hope
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despite the opposition of Foreign Secretary Pizarro, an experienced
~and savvy diplomat who knew that the Spanish empire could not be
:maintained in its historic form; he wrote in his memoirs, "For me,
.America was lost from the time of Cadiz (1810) ... and in the year
1817 I had no doubts of its loss and that it was time to think of
4acquiring what advantages [we could] from a separation that was now
inevitable." 15 As foreign secretary; Pizarro faced the challenge of
presiding over this inevitable decline. In 1817 and 1818 he pushed for
a policy of pacification based on colonial free trade and amnesty for
Spanish exiles to prevent the complete independence of the South
_American states.
Pizarro also favored compromise in the dispute with the United
States. War with the United States would be the ultimate disaster for
Spain, endangering all of that nation's New World possessions, in-
cluding Cuba. Hence, he advocated the concession of a transconti-
11ental boundary to the United States in exchange for a secure,
lrecognized border for Texas. Moreover, Pizarro saw few options in
lresponding to Jackson's invasion of Florida. The incident served as
further evidence that Spain must either compromise or risk losing
c~verything. Communiques from the Duke of San Carlos in London
confirmed his opinion that Spain could not expect British assistance
in dealing with the United States. The duke reported that Cas-
tlereagh had responded in "generalities" and with "indifference" to
the u.S. invasion of Florida. 16
Despite the dire need for a treaty with the United States, Pizarro
still could not persuade a majority of the Consejo de Estado to grant
Onis full negotiating powers. Although the members realized that
Spainls impotence made a military response to the Jackson affair out
of the question, they would not consent to giving Onis the latitude he
11eeded to ensure a settlement. Indeed, the Duke of Parque, a member
of the camarilla, voiced his suspicion that Onis would make unaccep-
table concessions if given enlarged powers. He argued for the dispatch
of a second negotiator as insurance against such an outcome-a cruel
rebuke to Onis after his thirty-eight years of faithful service to the
Spanish king. Ultimately; a majority of the Consejo de Estado, to
l?izarro's frustration, decreed that Spain should continue to put its
faith in the European powers, at least until after the conference at Aix
in September. They directed Pizarro to protest formally the invasion
of Florida and suspend the negotiations until the United States con-
demned Jackson's conduct and restored all captured territory to
Spain. Pizarro included a concise statement of the Spanish view of
the incident in his note, which was circulated to all the courts of
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Europe as well as to newspapers in the United States. I ? Onis was
given no new negotiating authority as Spain continued to place its
hopes on the assistance of the European powers. IS
Back in Washington, John Quincy Adams sent instructions to the
American ministers in Europe urging them to be especially vigilant
in monitoring the actions of the European governments. To George
Campbell, newly appointed minister to Russia, Adams wrote of the
need for "observing with the most attentive assiduity" Russian rela-
tions with its European allies. Adams even suggested that Campbell
cultivate clandestine sources of information within the tsarist bu-
reaucrac~ adding that Monroe relied on his "vigilance," "penetra-
tion, " and"discretion." 19 To Alexander Everett at The Hague, Adams
urged a "friendly intercourse with all European ministers at court"
and communication of "all interesting information." 20 To both men
Adams suggested "frequent and confidential" correspondence with
the other American ministers in Europe in order "to extend the
sphere and multiply the sources of information."
Adams, like Pizarro, knew that the success of his policies de-
pended in large part on accurate and timely intelligence from abroad.
Adams used his control of foreign intelligence to persuade the presi-
dent and the Congress to support his foreign policy initiatives. Pizar-
ro, in contrast, neither controlled the flow of foreign intelligence (he
had been unaware of the Russian ship deal) nor had the full confi-
dence of the king. These factors largely explain the difference in the
effectiveness of the two statesmen.
While direct negotiations with Onis were stalled, pending the
outcome of the Jackson affair, Adams endeavored to make progress
toward a settlement through continued discussions with Hyde de
Neuville. The French minister played a vital role in keeping the talks
alive during a period in which Onis and Adams found it difficult to be
in the same room together, much less reach agreement on the issues
that divided their nations. In a meeting on 9 August, Hyde de Neu-
ville reported that although Onis was"extremely anxious to preserve
peace," the Spanish government would not agree to the western
boundary proposals made by the United States. Adams responded
strongly: "The Spanish government says, 'let there be peace,' but will
agree to nothing which is necessary to secure peace." 21 Impatient
and annoyed, he abruptly ended the meeting.
Adams retired to his office and brooded. Months of steadily in-
creasing military and diplomatic pressure had failed to crack the
Spanish will to resist the demands of the United States. Now the
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Spanish government appeared ready to use the Jackson affair to gain
sympathy and support from the European powers. But Adams had one
last card, short of a declaration of war, to pressure Spain into an
agreement. In early August he began to prepare to play that card.
Adams knew that recognition of South American independence by
the United States was Spain's greatest fear. A North American align-
ment with the insurgents would extinguish all hopes for the recon-
quest of South America. Onis had firm instructions to break off talks
with Adams should the United States open diplomatic ties with any
insurgent government (see Chapter 4Ji this had been a major factor in
preventing U.S. recognition of the insurgents. No~ howeveJ; pros-
pects for a settlement were at best uncertain, and Spain appeared
ready to procrastinate indefinitely. Therefore, with Monroe's assent,
Adams began to threaten recognition in order to force concessions
from Spain. Moves toward recognition would send an unambiguous
signal to Madrid that the United States had lost faith in diplomacy
and no longer feared the possible consequences (including a war) of an
end to the talks. It was a dangerous ploYi Spain might choose to fight a
war it could not win rather than capitulate to the American demands,
and Adams and Monroe knew that war could be as disastrous for the
United States as it would be for Spain. Nonetheless, the logic of their
policy of pressure diplomacy had brought them to this point. They
GOllld not tum back.
Monroe first proposed recognizing one of the South American
states in late July when he instructed Adams to suggest to Bagot "an
immediate cooperation between the United States and Great Britain
to promote the independence of South America." 22 Adams at that
time dissuaded the president from pursuing the plan, claiming that
"Great Britain was not yet prepared for such a direct proposition."
Monroe temporarily abandoned his "crude" (as Adams termed it)
idea. Yet by mid-August the administration showed signs of moving
in the direction of recognition. At that time Adams sent to Rush in
London the following dispatch: "Referring to you my late letters on
the subject of South American affairs, I am now directed to enquire
what part you think the British government will take in regard to the
dispute between Spain and her colonies, and in what light will they
view the acknowledgement of the independence of the colonies by
the United States? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to
Spain, and in case Spain should declare war against us, in con-
sequence, whether Great Britain will take part with her in it? "23 He
sent similar notes to Gallatin in Paris and Campbell in St. Petersburg.
This abrupt reversal on the South American recognition question
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was a bold diplomatic gambit. Adams calculated that letting the
major powers of Europe (and, hence, Spain) know that the United
States intended to recognize the South American patriot govern-
ments in the near future would stampede Spain into concessions
rather than precipitate European intervention on Spain's behalf.
That the deadlock with Spain, rather than any substantive change
in the South American struggles, caused this new policy is indicated
by Adams's comments on the South American commission's long-
awaited reports, delivered to Congress in November. In a cabinet
meeting of 7 November, Adams commented that the divided opinions
of the commissioners (each member submitted a separate report)
"afforded ample reason for postponing" recognition still longer. He
cited the halfhearted mediation efforts of the European allies as
another"equally decisive" reason for not acting and called for letting
the mediation efforts run their course before extending recognition.
At that time the United States would be "at perfect liberty to recog-
nize any of the South American republics." 24 In short, Adams wished
to create in the courts of Europe the appearance that recognition was
imminent while opposing domestic efforts to speed such actions.
The negotiations with Spain temporarily suspended, Adams jour-
neyed to Quincy in early September for a brief visit with his parents.
He sorely needed a vacation. The relentless duties of his office and the
lack of tangible progress in the negotiations with Spain rekindled
feelings of persecution in Adams that were never far beneath the
surface. In late August he wrote: "The administration is assailed in
various ways, both in the House of Representatives, in Congress, and
in the public newspapers-assailed both insidiously and openl~ and
the attack in regard to its object has been concentrated exclusively
upon me. The defense has been absolutely nothing. The faithful
execution of my duties, to the utmost of my power, is the only answer
I can give to censure." Here again is a familiar theme in the writings
of John Quincy Adams-that silent martyrdom is the only response
to public criticism. Responding to an accusation by Harrison Gray
Otis that Monroe was "influenced entirely" by Adams, he wrote,
"Mr. Otis has always chosen to see me as a rival. He never misses an
opportunity to give me a backhand thrust-and as yet I have never
returned it." 25
Adams used his vacation in Quincy to renew his sagging body and
spirit. Heavy rains confined him to his parents' house, allowing him
the leisure of reading the classics, one of his favorite pastimes. The
life of the philosopher still appealed to Adams. "If the study of Plato
were my proper business, I should be wasting my time with some-
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thing else," he wrote. He was less impressed with the philosophy of
Socrates. The notion that all things are produced by their contraries
Adams denounced as "an absurdity:" Yet he was taken by one aspect
of Socratic thought-lithe spiritual, simple, uncompounded nature
of the soul, and the inference from it that the soul is therefore not
subject to death." His month-long stay in Quincy allowed him time
for such reflections. "I feel an attraction for these places more power-
ful than any other spot upon Earth," he wrote. Sadl~ his career of
public service had allowed him but two brief visits home in a dec-
ade.26
Upon his return to Wa.shington, Adams prepared to renew direct
talks with Onis. The "honor" of the king of Spain had now been
preserved by the promise to return Pensacola and St. Mark's, and
Adams anticipated rapid progress in the negotiations. Boosting these
hopes was Onis's announcement that he was empowered to exchange
ratifications of the Commercial Claims Convention of 1802, long
held hostage to the other disputes dividing the two nations.
Hence, Adams and Monroe were deeply disappointed by Onis's
new proposal of 24 October. A reexamination by his government of a
"multitude of authentic papers and documents," the Spaniard began,
,~gain proved the "incontestable evidence of all the rights hitherto
sustained by the crown of Spain." Onis repeated nearly word for word
:his historical argument of the previous March asserting Spain's sov-
ereignty over Texas and Florida. He then moved to specific treaty
points: the Floridas to be ceded in exchange for a western boundary
beginning at the gulf of Mexico and running north along the Arroyo
:Hondo line to the Red Rive~ then directly north to the Missouri and
follo'wing the course of that river to its source high in the Rockies (see
~Map 3). Onis added that both the Missouri and the Mississippi were
to remain open to Spanish navigation. Moreove~ he called for the
lJnited States to "declare that they deeply regret the violation of
Spanish territory" by Jackson and agree to pay for all damages done to
Spanish citizens and property by his invasion.27
Adams and Monroe were enraged., Although the proposed north-
west boundary following the Missouri River closely resembled that
suggested by Adams the previous March (see Chapter 2), the president
Clnd secretary of state were now determined to extend the western
boundary all the way to the Pacific. Onis's offer denied access to the
ocean except for a narrow corridor north of the source of the Missouri,
through the high mountains of present-day Glacier National Park.28
IV1oreover, Onis proposed to draw the Texas boundary even farther
t~ast than the Sabine River-especially insulting in light of the major
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concession the administration had made in July by agreeing to retreat
from the Rio Grande to the Sabine. Monroe termed the proposal
"altogether inadmissible" and told Adams that "it was time to bring
to Onis to a point, and if he would not agree to reasonable terms, to
break off the negotiation." 29
The president was losing patience with diplomac~The seizure of
Amelia, the invasion of Florida by Jackson, and the steadily improv-
ing relations with Great Britain made it clear to him that the United
States could bring Spain to terms with military force. Monroe told
Adams that "he now thought it of much less consequence then it was
a year ago whether we made any adjustment with Spain at all," and
that "Onis's instructions were such that he would either sign no
treaty at all or sign one upon our own terms." 30 The president
directed Adams to prepare "a final offer" for Onis.
Adams delivered this "final" offer on 31 October in the form of an
ultimatum. He dismissed Onis's historical argument as irrelevant to
the American "right ... to the river Mississippi and all the waters
flowing into it," a right he declared to be "henceforth ... not subject
to refutation." Rejecting demands that the United States apologize
for the Jackson affair, Adams moved to the critical western boundary
question. He proposed a line beginning at the Sabine River and
extending north to 32 degrees north latitude, then directly north to
the Red River and following that stream to its source in the Sangre de
Cristo Mountains of Colorado. From the summit of those mountains
the boundary would extend from to the 41 st parallel and then directly
to the Pacific (see Map 5). Adams concluded his note with a thinly
veiled threat: "The president is deeply penetrated with the convic-
tion that further discussion of the points at issue between our govern-
ments cannot terminate in a manner satisfactory to them. From your
answer to this letter, he must conclude whether or not a final adjust-
ment of all our differences is now to be accomplished, or whether all
hope of such a desirable result is, on the part of the United States, to
be abandoned."31
This hard-line response did not surprise Onis. He had known that
his proposal of 24 October would provoke Monroe and Adams, but his
instructions still allowed little room for compromise. His 16 Novem-
ber reply to Adams's ultimatum differed little from the position
outlined in the 24 October note. He responded to Adams's warning
with a weak plea: "The only discretionary power left me is to request
of the president ... that the negotiations ... may be submitted to
the decision of the great monarchs now assembled at Aix-la-
Chapelle."32 There was no chance that Monroe would agree to that.
--- Adams's "final offer" or
ultimatum of 31 October 1818
---- Onis's counteroffer of
16 November 1818
Map 5. The Proposals of October and November 1818 (projected on the
Melish map of 1818)
Adams also informed Hyde de Neuville that the president had
reached the end of his patience. In a meeting with the French minister
on 4 November he said that the administration "had retreated to the
wall" and that Onis could only answer "yes" or "no" to the proposal
of 31 October. Adams added that "the president was more indifferent
now than he had been a year ago to the issue of this negotiation; that
\Jve knew we should obtain more by delay than we now offered to
a.ccept, and that we might quietly wait for the operation of time." 33
Adams ended the discussion on that note, confident that Hyde de
Neuville would report all to Onis.
The ultimatum of 31 October and Adams's tough talk to Hyde de
l'~euville initiated yet another phase in the negotiations between the
lJnited States and Spain. Spain had previously enjoyed the luxury of
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procrastination, relying on the support of the European powers and
the weakness of the United States to guarantee the status quo until a
treaty favorable to Spanish interests could be obtained. In that con-
text, Madrid had had little to fear from the interruption of negotia-
tions. Now the balance between the two nations had shifted, and it
was the United States that anticipated advantage in breaking off the
talks.
Monroe had concluded that the negotiations were reaching a cli-
max. Either an agreement would be made soon, or war would be the
likely result. A cabinet meeting of 7 November, devoted to the for-
mulation of the annual message to Congress, reflected the president's
new outlook. Monroe had come around to Adams's view that the
rebel forces at Amelia Island should be linked to the provocations of
the Seminoles as part of a defense of the administration's actions in
Florida. Adams, of course, had produced documents purporting to
show the connection between the two incidents.34 Yet the main
reason for Monroe's "new view ll of affairs was his realization that he
needed a comprehensive, coherent justification of American actions
in Florida in order to prevent a backlash against the administration
either in Congress or in the courts of Europe. If war with Spain was a
possibilit~ now was the time to seize the moral high ground. A
strongly worded, unequivocal statement of the American position
(however little it corresponded to fact) might even prevent conflict by
justifying to the European nations the seizure of Amelia Island and
the invasion of Florida.
To Adams, the draft message to Congress that took shape in early
November represented the complete triumph of his analysis of the
situation: "It certainly does countenance much more strongly the
ground that I took in favor of Jackson's proceedings at the cabinet
meetings in July than I was able to obtain then. 1I3s For months,
Monroe and the rest of the cabinet had resisted Adams's bold, au-
dacious recommendations. They had refused full support of Jackson's
unauthorized conquest of the Floridas-not, perhaps, because of
constitutional or ethical considerations but because of the possible
repercussions in congress and abroad. Now the president and the rest
of the cabinet (with the exception of Crawford) recognized that hav-
ing come this far, they had no choice but to defend Jackson's illegal
campaign wholeheartedl~To do anything less would risk incurring
the wrath of the general and his many supporters and, more impor-
tant, would give Onis hope of turning the affair to Spain's advantage.
The president outlined this new hard-line position in his annual
message to Congress on 16 November, and Adams sent along another
mass of documents purporting to support the administration's case.36
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On 8 November, Adams began work on an even more impor-
tant message-a letter to Erving in Madrid explaining the admin-
istration's position and designed to be circulated to all the courts
of Europe. Adams described it as "a succinct account of the late
Seminole War from its origin, ... in such a manner as completely
to justify the measures of this government relating to it, and as far
as possible the proceedings of General Jackson." He recognized
the importance of his assignment; his letter would be crucial in
influencing perceptions of American actions. "The task is of the
highest order," he wrote in his diar~ "May I not be found inferior
to it!" 37
Although the letter to Erving is usually described as Adams's
defense of Jackson, it is much more; it is also a defense of Jackson-
ianism, of American expansionism, and of Manifest Destin~ Even
though the last term had not yet been coined, its spirit thrived in the
personage of Jackson and those who admired him. It became Adams's
task, as the presumed "man of the whole nation," to give voice to that
spirit and to embellish Jackson's own defense of his actions with all
the logic, evidence, and force that could be mustered.38 In defending
Jackson, Adams was implicitly defending Indian removal, slaver~ and
the use of military force without congressional approval-all of
'which he would, as a congressman, later oppose. Even in 1818 there
'was a large gap between. Adams's private feelings and his public
position on slaver~Yet at this stage of his career his intense desire to
'wrest a treaty from Spain that would .give him a claim to the presi-
dency dictated that he defend Jackson (whom Adams would later
describe as 1/a barbarian"). It proved a crucial act of expediency in the
life of a man renowned for his devotion to principle.
To defend Jackson's invasion seemed difficult. Whether authorized
or unauthorized by the executive, the campaign was an act of war
without congressional approval and therefore a violation of the Con-
stitution. To avoid meeting head-on criticism of that sort, Adams
eonstructed what he termed a "narrative of dark and complicated
depravity" which placed Jackson's actions in the larger context of a
struggle in the swamps of Florida of American "good" versus British,
Spanish, Indian, and black /Ievil." As narrator, Adams could choose
the events marking the "beginning" and "end" of the stor~ could
illtroduce evidence that supported his case (and disregard that which
eontradicted it), and, perhaps most important, establish the emo-
tional context of the drama by the terms he used to describe the
players.39 Adams realized that the bare facts of Jackson's actions
Inight be excused by the public and Congress if he could place those
actions in the context of the mythic American struggle against the
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wiles of foreign intrigues and the "uncivilized" natures of "inferior"
races.40
Adams labored diligently on what would be one of the most fa-
mous state papers of his long life of public service, drafting and
redrafting the message, endeavoring to show that the problems in
Florida had their roots in British provocations during the War of 1812.
Indeed, Monroe feared that Adams's indictment of Great Britain and
vigorous defense of the execution of Ambrister and Arbuthnot would
offend Castlereagh. The president also worried that his secretary of
state had "gone too far" in defending Jackson and that the letter
should be aimed at "shielding and supporting him" without tying the
administration directly to his actions. Adams resisted any weakening
of his text, persuading Monroe to submit his criticisms to the full
cabinet before making any final decision.41 After three weeks of
intense drafting and debate, Monroe had made only minor revisions
of the text, and Adams prepared to send it to Erving. The letter, dated
28 November, took the form of instructions to the minister, and
documents purporting to support Adams's argument accompanied
the dispatch.42
Adams framed his letter to Erving in the shape of a reply to Spanish
Foreign Secretary Pizarro's diplomatic protests of the invasion. Not-
ing the intentions of the American government to return Pensacola
and St. Mark's to Spain, he charged that Pizarro's notes were"doubt-
less intended to be understood as a menace of war." Accordingl~
Adams claimed it necessary to give the American side of the matter
or, as he put it, "to remind the Government of the Catholic Majesty of
the incidents in which the Seminole War originated" and the reasons
Jackson was "impelled, from the necessity of self-defence" to invade
Florida.43 Thus the document began by casting the United States in
the role of the party threatened by aggression, not as the aggressor.
Adams claimed that the Seminole War had its origins in the machi-
nations of Great Britain in Florida during the War of 1812. Nicholls
and Woodbine were guilty of encouraging"all the runaway negroes,
all the savage Indians, all the pirates, and all the traitors to their
country ... to join their standard, and wage an exterminating war"
against the United States.44 Even worse, Nicholls and Woodbine
encouraged the Seminoles and Red Sticks (the American term for the
defiant Creeks) to believe "that they were entitled, by virtue of the
Treaty of Ghent, to all lands which had belonged to the Creek nation
within the United States in the year 1811, and that the government of
Great Britain would support them in that pretension." British treach-
ery had been compounded by allowing the abandoned post at Pros-
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pect Bluff (the Negro Fort) to be "occupied by banditti" and used "as a
post from which to commit depredations, outrages, and murders, and
as a receptacle for fugitive slaves and malefactors."45 An American
gunboat had destroyed the Negro Fort, Adams claimed, only after
first being fired upon.
Adams placed direct responsibility for the Seminole War on Alex-
ander Arbuthnot, whom he described as "the firebrand by whose
touch this negro-Indian war against our borders had been rekindled."
Because of Arbuthnot's "infernal instigations," including his "reviv-
ing the pretence" that the Creeks were entitled to lands lost in the
'Treaty of Fort Jackson, the "peaceful inhabitants" of the United
States were "visited with all the horrors of savage war." Only after
IIrepeated expostulations, warnings, and offers of peace" by the
United States had been met with "renewed outrages" by the Indians
was Jackson ordered to punish the "mingled hordes of lawless Indians
and negroes" responsible.46 That these "hordes" of outlaws sought
refuge across the border in Florida made the penetration of Spanish
territory"indispensable. "
Adams's explanation of the causes of the Seminole War was made
plausible by the generally correct (if overstated) nature of the facts
cited. Yet more significant are the facts omitted: that the struggle
betw·een the tribes of the Southeast predated the arrival of the British
in the Floridas, that the Treaty of Fort Jackson had not been signed by
the chiefs who led the resistance in the Floridas; and that the United
States government in 1816 had attempted to restore to the Creeks the
lands takell under the Treaty of Fort Jackson, giving up its efforts only
after Jackson's defiance and western opposition made them futile.47
To castigate Arbuthnot and the other Britons for encouraging the
Indians to assert a claim that even the United States government at
one point had acknowledged is dubious to say the least.
The characterization of the seventy-year-old Arbuthnot, widely
.known as a kindly and genial old man, as the instigator of the
Seminole War is an extraordinary example of scapegoating.48 To
blame him for the Seminole War was to deny that the Indians had
either the justification or the inclination to resist the encroachment
of Americans on their lands. Adams no doubt had taken his· cue from
Jackson in placing responsibility for the war on Arbuthnot, yet
~A.dams himself seems to have believed the myth that hostilities
betw"een the United States and native Americans invariably had their
roots in the agitation of evil white men. He wrote to Onis in July 1818
that "for many years" the United States had not fought "with any
Indian tribes unless stimulated by the influence of foreign incendi-
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aries." 49 It was a self-justifying rationale typical of the era of Mani-
fest Destiny:
Adams's letter includes grisly descriptions of the murder of Amer-
icans by Indians during the course of the frontier skirmishing.50 But
his references to Indian atrocities against American settlers are not
balanced by any recognition of American attacks on Indians, a ten-
dency reflected in the press as well. The impression created is one of a
steady series of unprovoked assaults on peaceful settlers. Yet much of
the border violence was part of an ongoing cycle of mutual retaliation
between whites and Indians in which both sides kept close tally of
the "score."51 Governor D.B. Mitchell of Georgia later testified to
Congress that "truth compels me to sa~ that before the attack on
Fowltown, aggressions ... were as frequent on the part of whites as
on the part of Indians." 52
Perhaps most significant in Adams's exposition of the causes of the
Seminole War is his omission of the act that historians acknowledge
as the immediate cause of the conflict-the attack on Fowltown.53
Adams, well aware of the incident, no doubt left it out because it did
not contribute to his argument. Its omission confirms that his expla-
nation of the Seminole War is a conscious exercise in selective truth
where "facts" are included only insofar as they provide evidence for a
prior conclusion.
Adams's letter to Erving differs significantly from his initial re-
sponse to Spain of 23 July. That note had defended Jackson on the
grounds that Spain had violated its treaty obligations by failing to
control the Seminoles. The 28 November letter, in contrast, creates a
cosmology in which Jackson's invasion is the only possible result of
the actions of the British in the Floridas during the War of 1812, the
"Negro Fort" episode, the use of Amelia Island by South American
privateers, and the depredations of the Seminoles. Spain's failure to
restrain the Seminoles according to the terms of Pinckneys' Treaty of
1795 is mentioned only in passing.
This selective, anecdotal approach to the "facts" of the Seminole
War bears some similarity to the methods the Puritan historians used
in retelling the story of the founding of New England.54 Adams's text,
like the historical works of Cotton Mather and Edward Johnson, is a
sacred history designed to inspire and persuade rather than dispas-
sionately recount. Sacred histories of America by their nature omit
events uncongenial to the theme of the nation's providential and just
development.55 For Adams to refer to the dubious legitimacy of the
Treaty of Fort Jackson and the attack on Fowltown would have cast
doubt on the essential justice of the American case. It would also have
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made understandable the Seminole and Creek border attacks and
would have demonstrated the moral ambiguity of the American
position. Adams was seeking not the philosopher's truth but rather
the truth of the prophet who overcomes contradiction by the cer-
tainty with which he reveals the divine plan.56 Indeed, the self-
righteous, uncompromising tone of his letter resonated with the
nation's mood and heritage in a way that a fair-minded explanation of
the Seminole War would not have done.
Reflecting the Puritan historians too is Adams's designation of
opponents of American destiny in unflattering and inaccurate terms:
"banditti," "savages," "outlaws," "malefactors" were all used to
describe the inhabitants of Spanish Florida. Though obviously ques-
tionable as fair-minded descriptions of the blacks and Indians, they
were very effective in setting the emotional tone of the letter and the
desired context of good versus evil.5 ? As Francis Jennings has noted,
II to call a man a savage is to warrant his death." 58
Having "justified" the invasion of Florida, Adams next addressed
the issue of the seizure of the Spanish forts. The taking of St. Mark's
was necessar)', he said, because there was a threat of the fort's im-
rninent capture by "hostile Indians." The "laws of neutrality and of
'war, as well as prudence and humanit)'," dictated Jackson's seizing
the fort. Adams claimed no need for "citations from the printed
treatises on international law to prove the correctness of the princi-
ple. It is engraved," he said, "in the common sense of mankind." In
similar terms he defended the capture of Pensacola. The"enmity" of
t.he Spanish governor in refusing passage of an American supply
vessel up the Escambia River without payments of "excessive du-
ties," the sheltering of tIle "savage enemies" of the United States
'within the garrison at Pensacola, and the threatening letter from the
Spanish governor demanding that Jackson leave Florida all made the
town's capture "indispensably necessar~"59 Adams claimed that
both St. Mark's and Pensacola had been seized "not in the spirit of
h.ostility to Spain, but as necessary measures of self-defence."
The record contradicts this version of the events leading to the
seizure of St. Mark's and Pensacola. Adams's claims to the contrary;
]1.0 evidence introduced at the trial of Ambrister and Arbuthnot
proved the contention that the fall of St. Mark's was imminent.6o
l\ioreover, no evidence was ever found to to show that the allegation
of several hundred warriors in Pensacola was anything but an excuse
lly Jackson to seize the town.61 The supply barge supposedly assessed
"excessive duties" was in fact given special permission to pass
t]lrough Spanish territory and paid the standard rate.62 This left only
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the Spanish governor's" threatening letter" to Jackson as justification
for the seizure of Pensacola.
Adams's most important task in his letter to Erving was to justify
the executions of Arbuthnot and Ambrister without further inflam-
ing those in England who had called for retaliation for their slain
countrymen. Adams resorted to international law and the law of the
jungle to do so. According to him, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, along
with Nicholls and Woodbine, were part of a conspiracy to goad the
Indians into waging"savage, servile, exterminating war against the
United States." Therefore, Jackson was authorized to use unusually
harsh methods in dealing with 11is two captives; in fact, he could
"have hung them both without the formality of a trial." Quoting
Emmerich de Vattel to support his position, Adams defended the
executions of the two Britons for its"salutary efficacy for terror and
example." H~ added "It is thus only that the barbarism of Indians can
be successfully encountered." 63
Adams's vigorous defense of Jackson's bloodthirsty tactics is ironic
in light of his initial horror at them. When informed by Crawford in
May of the court-martial of Ambrister and Arbuthnot, Adams had
expressed reservations: "They hung some Indian prisoners, as it
appears, without due regard for humanit~ A Scotchman by the name
of Arbuthnot was found among them, and Jackson appears half in-
clined to take his life. Crawford some time ago proposed to send
Jackson orders to give no quarter to any white man found with the
Indians. I objected to it then, and this day avowed that I was not
prepared for that mode of warfare," he had written.64 Now he em-
braced such methods. Adams's aggressive defense of the Seminole
War violated another deeply felt belief of the Adams family; that of
standing for the peaceful resolution of international disputes. Chang-
ing the warlike practices of European diplomacy had been a major
aspect of the revolutionary vision, and no one had adhered to that
ideal more than the Adamses. John Adams took great pride in having
kept the nation out of full-fledged hostilities with France during the
"Quasi-War" of 1798-1800, even though his stand probably cost him
reelection. John Quinc~ too, firmly believed that the republican
revolution must reject war as a tool of policy if it hoped to remake the
world. Yet at the helm of American foreign policy; Adams was now
resorting to the force, fraud, and hypocrisy characteristic of the Euro-
pean order that the republican revolution presumed to transcend.
This ne~ more aggressive republicanism was reflected in the Erving
letter: "The right of the United States can as little compound with
impotence as with perfid~"
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Accordingl~ Adams refused the Spanish demand that Jackson be
punished for his actions: "The President will neither inflict punish-
ment, nor pass censure upon General Jackson, for that conduct, the
motives for which were founded in the purest patriotism. 11 Indeed,
Adams placed a large share of the responsibility for the Seminole War
on Spain for failing "to restrain by force the Indians of Florida from
hostilities against the United States. 11 65 He suggested that the con-
duct of its colonial officials be investigated for assisting /I these hordes
of savages in the very hostilities against the United States which it is
their official duty to restrain,lI claiming that such an investigation
'was necessary to preserve the "honorll of Spain.66
Adams finished his letter to Erving with a demand as audacious as
it was astounding: that the Spanish government punish its colonial
officials for their "misconduct" and that Spain pay"a just and reason-
able indemnity to the United States for the heavy and necessary
experlses which they have been compelled to incur by the failure of
Spain to perform her engagements to restrain the Indians. 1I Adams
11lade explicit the penalty for further Spanish Ifmisconduct": "If the
Ilecessities of self-defence should again compel the United States to
take possession of the Spanish forts and places in Florida. . . another
llnconditional restoration of them must not be expected/'67
Thus did John Quincy Adams, using half-truths, falsehoods, and
powerful rhetoric, transform the officially unauthorized conquest of
foreign territory into a patriotic act of self-defense and the United
States from aggressor into aggrieved victim. Ironicall~ this Ifgreatest
state paperll (as Samuel Flagg Bemis termed it) of Adams's career is
almost completely contradicted by the historical record. In this light,
t:he letter to Erving must be characterized as propaganda, designed to
create a perception of reality wholly in conflict with fact. Yet its tone
and seemingly irrefutable logic make it convincing reading evenno~
It was an impressive linguistic feat, one accomplished in large meas-
u.re by the self-righteous, uncompromising tone in which Adams
lt~ctured the Spanish government. In demanding that Spain pay for
t]le costs of the American invasion, he was perhaps heeding the words
of Tacitus, his favorite historian, who observed that "crime once
exposed had no refuge but in audacit~"68
The Erving letter is a prime example of John Quincy Adams serving
his country in the way he knew best. He had never defended his
n~ationas a soldier in the field, nor had he contributed to its strength
tllrough financial contributions. Like Cicero, Adams was an orator, a
IIJLan who knew how to use language to maximum political effect. All
hils life he had honed that ability-by his endless study of the classics,
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tedious translations of ancient authors, and voluminous composition
of correspondence both public and private. No~ at a moment of
national crisis, his skill was called to the fore. The Erving letter
demonstrated that even if the pen is not necessarily mightier than the
sword, it can be a powerful and essentiallegitimator of the sword's
use.
Even as John Quincy Adams composed his letter to Erving, he suf-
fered another severe personal crisis. "Ominous words" arrived from
Quincy on 30 October that Abigail had fallen seriously ill. Only a
month earlier, he had left his mother in good health. Now her death
appeared imminent. Despite the bad news, Adams was "compelled
reluctantly" to carryon his duties during this crucial phase of the
negotiations, uncertain whether his beloved mother was dead or
alive. On 2 November he received the dreaded news: Abigail had died
on the morning of 28 October, a victim of typhus. Ironically; the sense
of duty to country that Abigail had instilled in John Quincy kept
them apart at her death. As he confronted Onis with an ultimatum
designed for the greater glory of the United States, his mother went to
her final resting place without the presence of her prized son.69
Her loss provoked unusually heartfelt reflections in Adams's diary:
"My mother was an angel upon earth. She was a minister of blessing
to all human beings within her sphere of action. Her heart was the
abode of heavenly purity. She had no feelings but of kindness and
beneficence; yet her mind was as firm as her temper was mild and
gentle. She had known sorrow but her sorrow was silent. She was
acquainted with grief, but it was deposited in her own bosom. She was
the real personification of female virtue, of piety; of charity; of ever
active and never intermitting benevolence. Oh God! could she have
been spared a little longer! My lot in life has been almost always cast
at a distance from her. I have enjoyed but for short seasons, and at
long, distant intervals, the happiness of her society; yet she has been
to me more than a mother. She has been a spirit from above watching
over me for good, and contributing by my mere consciousness of her
existence to the comfort of my life. That consciousness is gone, and
without it the world feels to me like solitude." 70
In this dejected state, Adams strove to honor his mother's memory
by concluding a treaty with Spain.
SEVEN
The Origins of Empire
John Quincy Adams began his diary for 1819 by paraphrasing from
the golden verses attributed to Pythagoras:
Let not thine eyelids close at parting day
Till, with thyself communing, thou shalt sa~
What deed of good or evil have I done
Since the last radiance of the morning sun?
In strict review the day before thee pass,
And see thyself in truth's unerring glass.
If, scorning self-delusion's fraudful ways,
Her solemn voice of reproving Conscience raise,
With keen contrition, aid divine implore
Each error to redeem, and wrong no more.
Or, should that faithful guardian witness bear
That all thy action should have been just and fair
Rejoice, and Heaven invoke with soul sincere
In spotless virtue's path to persevere.
With these lines as a guide, Adams endeavored finally to bring Onis
to terms.
'rhe Erving letter had international repercussions. That the United
States publicly held Great Britain partly responsible for the Florida
affair astounded the European diplomatic community: Even more
astounding was Castlereagh's acquiescence, in the face of fierce crit-
icism by the British press, to the American actions. He defended his
position by stating that the "unauthorized practices" of Ambrister
and Arbuthnot "deprived them of any claim" to protection by their
government. The foreign secretary instructed Bagot to make no fur-
ther protest of the incident. 1
That Castlereagh chose to ignore the execution of two Britons (one
~l Royal Marine) by an American general is an interesting study in the
Ilature of international diplomacy: Had Castlereagh so desired, he
could have used the incident as an excuse to take strong action
against the United States. Nations have gone to war over less; the
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British public certainly favored some sort of retaliatory measure.2 Yet
Castlereagh would not jeopardize his policy of reconciliation with
the United States merely to avenge the murders of two British adven-
turers. Indeed, he had done nothing in response to the unilateral
reoccupation of Astoria by the United States, a more tangible threat
to British interests. Adams knew that Castlereagh valued reconcilia-
tion with the United States more than he did the lives of two wayward
Britons; his understanding of Castlereagh's priorities explains why
Adams, unlike Monroe, saw no danger in implicating Great Britain in
his letter to Erving.
The Erving letter had an even greater effect in the United States,
where. debate over the legality of the Florida invasion neared a
crescendo. Once again, members of Congress led by Henry Clay
prepared to challenge the administration, this time over the constitu-
tionality of Jackson's campaign. Adams viewed the"agitation, misap-
prehension, and conflict" in partisan terms. He saw the debate as a
way for Crawford supporters in the Congress to discredit Jackson and
thus eliminate a potential rival for the presidency:3 The Erving letter
was intended to counter criticism of Jackson and the administration.
Its publication in the 28 December issue of the National Intelligencer
neatly coincided with the release of yet another mass of documents,
this time intended to support Adams's interpretation of the Seminole
War.
The letter helped to shape the terms of the debate over Jackson's
conduct. Adams's vitriolic, uncompromising defense of the general
gave administration supporters the language they needed to respond
to the opposition's charges of unconstitutionality and Bonapartism.
Adams had couched the issue in terms of patriotism and self-defense,
fixing most of the blame on Spain. This left critics in the uncomforta-
ble position of appearing to defend Spain at a critical time in the
negotiations. For the moment, they delayed formally raising the issue
in the Congress, as House and Senate committees prepared their own
reports on the matter.
Ironicall~ the Erving letter had little effect on the Spanish govern-
ment, the party for whom it was ostensibly intended. By the time it
arrived in Madrid in early 1819, a major shakeup had already occurred
in the Consejo de Estado. In mid-September Foreign Secretary Pizarro
and Finance Minister Garay were relieved of their duties by the king
and ordered to leave Madrid, victims of the machinations of the
camarilla. 4 The Marquis de Casa Yrujo, who had been minister to the
United States during the Jefferson administration, replaced Pizarro.
Erving did not welcome the change of ministers. Though he had
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rnade little progress in his discussions with Pizarro, he had come to
respect the integrity and intellect of the Spaniard. Conversely; he was
suspicious of Yrujo, from whom he expected "no good." Erving wrote
to Adams that he would be "very happy indeed" if he could "only
:keep [Yrujo] from undoing" what progress had been made in the
talks.5
Despite Erving's fears, Yrujo moved quickly to give Onis greater
l1egotiating powers. Instructions dated 10 October authorized Onis to
a.gree to a transcontinental boundary extending along the Missouri to
its source and then directly to the Pacific. The instructions suggested
{he Sabine as the Texas boundary but allowed Onis to retreat to the
C:olorado River of Texas if necessary to forestall invasion by the
lJnited States. Instructions dated 23 October gave him even greater
latitude. They not only permitted the minister to agree to a north-
vrestern boundary as far south as the Columbia River but also au-
tJhorized him to "construct, discuss, and conclude the agreement
according to the circumstances, without necessity of further con-
s'ultation" with Madrid.6 In other words, Onis now had full powers to
nlake the best deal he could without consulting the home office.
1'hese new instructions signaled that the Spanish government was
finally ready to make the necessary concessions in order to reach
agreement with the United States.
Significantly; this major change in direction had occurred two
nlonth before the arrival of Adams's letter to Erving. The cold realities
of international politics, not the bluster of John Quincy Adams, had
dictated to the Spanish government this new willingness to compro-
nlise. At the conference at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, Spanish hopes for direct
allied support in suppressing the South American revolutions had
been crushed once and for all. In what has been termed his"greatest
diplomatic triumph," Castlereagh had secured, among other things,
allied agreement that there be no armed mediation of the South
American struggles.7 Tsar Alexande~ in contrast, had been unable
even to get Ferdinand invited to the conference; in its aftermath the
tsar instructed Dmitri Pavlovitch Tatistscheff to inform the Spanish
government that it should give up all hopes for armed intervention by
tIle allies.8
The outcome at Aix made undeniable to the Spanish government
w·hat had been clear to Onis (and Pizarro) for some time-that Spain
could not expect allied help in resolving its disputes with either the
South Americans or the United States. Spain must go it alone in
dealing with its problems in the Western Hemisphere: hence the
willingness of the Consejo de Estado (and the camarilla) to give Onis
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greater flexibility in negotiating with Adams. The illusion enter-
tained by members of the camarilla that the United States could be
contained at or near the Mississippi River had been replaced by a
strategy calling for Onis to erect a secure barrier between the United
States and the Spanish borderlands of the Southwest, even if it meant
extending a boundary to the Pacific. Ironicall~ Pizarro, who had long
advocated such a strate~ was not around to see it finally adopted.
In Washington, Onis received more bad news in mid-December 1818
when word arrived of a treaty concluded by Gallatin and Rush with
Great Britain. The agreement, known as the "Convention of 1818,"
resolved many (though not all) of the outstanding disputes between
the two nations. Its most significant aspect concerned the Canadian-
American boundar~The negotiators agreed that from the Lake of the
Woods to the Rockies the boundary should be the 49th parallel. The
vaguely defined Oregon territory west of the mountains they de-
clared "free and open" to both American and British citizens for a
period of ten years. Thus did the United States establish partial
control of the Pacific Coast in a treaty that A.L. Burt called "one of
the major agreements in the history of Canadian-American rela-
tions." 9
Onis recognized that the terms of the Convention of 1818 made
substantial Spanish concessions in the Northwest inevitable. The
United States had not acquired a stake in the region from Great
Britain only to give it away to Spain. When word arrived of the new
treaty with Great Britain, however, Onis had not yet received his
enlarged powers, and he fretted that the United States might attempt
to force Spain's hand by recognizing one of the South American
states.
This now seemed a distinct possibility. In a conversation with
Hyde de Neuville on 12 December, Adams had expressed his hope
that France might act in concert with the United States in recogniz-
ing the government of Buenos Aires. He explained the abrupt reversal
of American policy to the startled Frenchmen by noting that"the fact
of the independence of Buenos Aires appears established, [and] we
think it necessary to be recognized."lO This talk of recognition
panicked Hyde de Neuville. One of his prime objectives was to fore-
stall recognition in order to prevent a rupture in the Adams-Onis
talks which might lead to war, for a Spanish-American war could
involve the other powers of Europe, sweeping France away in the
maelstrom. On 28 December, Hyde de Neuville, in a state of "great
agitation," again met with Adams to discuss South American affairs.
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If Onis would agree "within three of four months" to a treaty on
Adams's terms, he inquired, would the administration refrain from
recognizing Buenos Aires? Adams coyly replied that the administra-
tion "would give no such pledge," adding that"events were placing
the affairs of South America quite out of our control." He tantalized
Hyde de Neuville (and, indirectly; Onis) by commenting that had
Spain "taken the pains" earlier to settle the negotiations, "there
'would probably be much less ardor in the country against Spain and
consequently less in favor of the South Americans. Spain might have
trusted to the operation of these effects. Now it might be too late."ll
Hyde de Neuville's obvious distress pleased Adams; it signaled
that his strategy of using recognition as a means of putting pressure
on O]lis was working. The August dispatches to the American minis-
ters requesting them to feel out the reactions of the European govern-
ments to plans for recognition had been the first step in this polic~
'"rhe reports of the South American commission had heightened
speculation about recognition. Moreover, Adams had been meeting
~Nith the new Buenos Airean envoy David Curtis DeForest, (a native
of Connecticut) intimating that the United States would soon ac-
lcnowledge him as consul general. Now Adams told Hyde de Neuville
directly what the administration contemplated. Nor was the elabo-
rate diplomatic dance yet over. Adams kn.ew that Spain might not
yield, that a war neither side wanted might erupt. Accordingl~ the
{Jnited States had to be ready actually to extend recognition. To
prepare for this possibilit~he drafted another letter to Richard Rush
in London.
Adams told Rush that "the period is fast approaching" when the
independence of Buenos Aires "will be so firmly established as to be
beyond the reach of any reasonable pretensions of supremacy on the
part of Spain." He instructed Rush to explain to Castlereagh and the
rest of the diplomatic corps "how important it is to them, as well as to
u.s, that the newly found states should be ... recognized." Adams
jl1stified recognition on the basis of "the ordinary rules of the laws of
n.ations in their intercourse with the civilized world." He ended by
directing Rush to inform Castlereagh "in a most friendly manner"
th.at the United States "has it in contemplation" to extend some form
of recognition to Buenos Aires"at no remote period." 12
Monroe suggested that Adams's draft note to Rush be reviewed by
the whole cabinet. Astonishingl~ the other members of the adminis-
tl'ation had no knowledge of the "intention" to recognize Buenos
A.ires. Adams described their reaction to his draft note as "startled,"
yet he defended his actions by claiming that Monroe had instructed
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him to say as much to DeForest. 13 Crawford, Calhoun, and Wirt were
astounded that they had not been informed of this change in policy.
Adams, formerly the main opponent to recognition, explained why it
was now desirable. He alluded to "great changes" since the previous
spring which provided"additional proof of the stability of the govern-
ment of Buenos Aires." He argued that the reports of the South
American commission provided further cause for recognition-in
sharp contrast to his condemnation of the commission's findings in
November. When Calhoun expressed reservations about acting with-
out the support of Great Britain, Adams claimed that "deference to
the British government should not be carried too far; that we should
not have the appearance of pinning ourselves too closely upon her
sleeve; that we should carefully preserve the advantage of taking the
lead in advancing the recognition of the South American govern-
ments, and, while using persuasion with England to move in concert
with us, take care to let her know that we shall ultimately act
independently for ourselves." 14
Of course, Adams was embracing recognition not because of any
"great changes" in the state of South American affairs but because
the hopeless state of the negotiations with Spain dictated that the
time had arrived to play the recognition "card." Despairing of a
peaceful settlement of the dispute, Adams pushed for legislation by
Congress authorizing the president under certain contingencies to
seize and retain Spanish Florida. This would add legitimacy to the
threat in the Erving letter that further failure by Spain to "restrain"
the Seminoles would result in the reoccupation of the province.
Adams characterized as "hopeless" any prospects for a settlement
unless such a law should pass: "That might bring Spain to it. Nothing
else would." IS
Adams gloomily contemplated the point to which his strategy of
force and diplomacy had brought him-the brink of war. Spain had
not knuckled under to American pressure; now the administration
either had to follow through with its threats or face the humiliation
of having its bluff called before the entire world. Neither outcome
would reflect well on Adams's statesmanship. The landscape on other
fronts appeared to him equally bleak: "This Government is, indeed,
assuming daily more and more a character of cabal, and preparation,
not for the next Presidential election but the one after-that is,
working and counterworking, with many of the worst features of
elective monarchies." 16
Adams's personal relationship with the president had been strained
when Monroe had confronted him with the rumor that Adams had
THE ORIGINS OF EMPIRE 153
.agreed to represent the Prince Regent at the christening of the child of
JBritish minister Bagot. Adams vehemently denied the potentially
politically embarrassing charge, made, according to Monroe, by a
"'friend" of John Quinc~ He had no doubt as to the motive of the
charge: "There had been a spirit at work ever since I came to Wash-
ington very anxious to to find or make occasion of censure upon me."
'That Monroe placed any credence at all in the rumor offended him:
"'It gives me, therefore, the measure of the president's feelings and
opinions in reference to me; and they are not flattering." By this
point, Adams doubted the extent of his influence over Monroe, per-
eeiving "an undertow always working upon and about the presi-
dent---what used in England to be called a backstairs influence-of
"N"hich he never says anything to me, and which I discover only by its
effects." 17
Amid his political and diplomatic difficulties, Adams suffered
from a profound sense of personal loss engendered by his mother's
death. Abigail's passing ("one of the severest afflictions to which
lluman existence is liable") marked a major passage in his life. He
wrote of her death in revealing terms: "The silver cord is broken, the
tenderest of natural ties is dissolved. Life is no longer to me what it
was; :my home is no longer the abode of my mother. While she lived,
\ivhenever I returned to the paternal roof I felt as if the joys and charms
of childhood returned to make me happy. All was kindness and
aJfection, at once silent aIld active as the movement of the orbs of
11eaven. One of the links that connected me with former ages is no
TInore." 18
Th.ree days after writing these lines, on 3 January 1819, Adams
went for a long walk through the snowy streets of Washington. On
Pennsylvania Avenue he was met by Hyde de Neuville, who had news
of great importance. The two men went immediately to Adams's
office, where the nervous Frenchman reported that Onis had received
"fresh instructions" from his government, for the first time authoriz-
bIg a transcontinental boundar~The new Spanish minister of foreign
affairs, the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, was "very peacefully disposed"
and wanted a treat~ Hyde de Neuville said. Yet the French minister
stressed that the South American recognition question still posed an
obstacle. If Spain would corne to terms, would the United States agree
to forgo "premature recognition" of the South Americans?
Adams again flatly rejected any explicit guarantee. Recognition
and the Spanish-American negotiations were separate issues, he said:
"We could not make our conduct in respect to one of these objects
conditional upon the result of the other." Nonetheless, he held out a
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glimmer of hope to Hyde de Neuville: "If the French government
should suggest to us just and reasonable motives for postponing
further a recognition of the South American revolutionary govern-
ments, all due consideration would be given to their advice, and if it
was accompanied by a satisfactory adjustment of our differences with
Spain, it would have great additional weight." 19 Rejecting explicit
guarantees of nonrecognition, Adams made it clear that progress in
the talks could lead to a de facto moratorium on recognition. In such
indirect phrases are found the makings of diplomatic agreements.
Hyde de Neuville's "good offices" had, for the moment, saved the
day. Yet despite his enlarged powers, Onis was not confident that an
agreement could be reached. His instructions still did not comply
with Adams's "ultimatum" of 31 October. Indeed, Adams responded
unfavorably to Onis's 16 January proposal calling for a northwest
boundary running from the source of the Missouri westward to the
Columbia and along the middle of that river to the sea. The secretary
of state's one-paragraph answer (dated 29 January) merely repeated
the ultimatum of 31 October.20 It was not until 24 January that Onis
received from Yrujo the instructions granting him full powers. Jubi-
lant, he was able to respond to Adams's 29 January note: "I am
prepared to take upon myself the definitive settlement of the points
in controversy:" The time for haggling over historical claims and
rights was past: "We should confine ourselves to the settlement of
those points which may be for the mutual interest and convenience
of both."21 Onis was ready to make the necessary concessions to
come to terms; an agreement was now plainly in sight.
Adams's bold diplomatic gambit had worked. The threat of immi-
nent recognition of South American independence, combined with
the news of the verdict at Aix-Ia-Chapelle, made capitulation by
Onis inescapable. The recognition "card" might need to be played
again, should Onis's conciliatory attitude turn out to be more appar-
ent than real. Meanwhile, however, Adams had to dampen the flames
of enthusiasm rekindled by his moves toward recognition. In par-
ticular, he had to rebuff the advances of DeForest, who had thought
his acknowledgment as consul general from Buenos Aires was as-
sured. Adams's public flirtation witll the expatriate DeForest had
been a useful tool in convincing Hyde de Neuville and Onis of the
administration's intent to extend recognition to Buenos Aires, but
now DeForest's presence was a menace to the success of the negotia-
tion. To make matters worse, Adams found out that DeForest had
been secretly working with Clay to pressure the administration into
acting. On 14 Januar)', in an attempt to embarrass the administra-
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tion, Clay had steered through the House a resolution requesting
that the Adams-DeForest correspondence be submitted to Con-
,gress.22
This sort of duplicity enraged Adams. Now that a settlement was
'within his grasp he was in no mood to contend with another round of
the "great South American witchery;" as he termed the latest con-
gressional action. "In this affair everything is invidious and factious,"
he wrote. "The call [for the Adams-DeForest correspondence] is made
for the purpose of baiting the administration and especially of fasten-
ing upon the secretary of state the odium of refusing to receive the
South American ministers and consul generals. I am walking on a
rope, with a precipice on each side of me, and without human aid
upon which to rely." Blind to his own duplicity in handling the South
i\me.rican question, Adams characterized DeForest's notes to him as
U cunning and deceptive," and moved to intimidate the Buenos Airean
envoy:23
On 22 January; DeForest discovered the perils of crossing the path
of so formidable an antagonist as Adams. The secretary of state
informed DeForest that as a United States citizen he was liable to
prosecution for violating the neutrality laws by his activities as an
envoy for Buenos Aires. DeForest, startled by this information, asked
~,vhetherhis seventeen-year stay in Buenos Aires had not altered his
status as an American citizen. Adams then made plain the situation:
"It is unnecessary for me to give you an opinion on that point. You
llad better consult a lawyer upon it." Adams added that it was not
llis intention to make any mention of his conversations with De-
I~orest "unless it should be necessary in the discharge of my public
duties." Then he drove his main point home: "It is in candor due to
you to let you know that the recognition of yourself as consul
general of Buenos Aires, should it hereafter be granted, will in no
wise divest you of your character as a citizen of the United States."
In other words, to continue to press for acknowledgment as consul
general could lead to DeForest's prosecution for violation of the
neutrality laws.24 '
Thoroughly chastised, DeForest beat a quick retreat. He was no
doubt irked that Adams would threaten him with violation of the
neutrality laws when so many American citizens were actively sup-
porting the South American cause without fear of prosecution. None-
theless, he repudiated his dealings with Clay and assured Adams that
h.e was"entirely satisfied" with the administration's South American
policy: With that, DeForest retired to his home in New Haven, never
again to bother John Quincy Adams.
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Having again quelled agitation for South American recognition,
Adams turned his attention to the unfolding congressional investiga-
tion of Jackson. He hoped that his strong justification of Jackson in
the Erving letter, combined with the generalIs enormous popularity;
would suffice to repulse the constitutional, moral, political, and
personal objections being raised regarding his conduct. Commentary
both pro and con filled the pages of the nation/s newspapers.
The persuasiveness of Adams/s letter was bolstered by some sev-
enty documents purporting to support its claims. A careful reading of
the documents, however, reveals that they either "prove" facts that
were common knowledge (such as Nicholls/s presence in Florida
during the War of 1812) or do not prove what Adams says they do. For
example, Adams asserted that Arbuthnot/s "principal object" was to
"stimulate" the Indians to hostility; yet the documents that Adams
makes reference to in this context give no support to his allegation.25
Indeed, Monroe and Adams themselves recognized the inadequacy
of the documentary evidence to support their case. In his "friendly
letter" to Jackso-n of 20 July; Monroe had alluded to circumstances in
which a commanding general might exceed his orders. If the officers
of a neutral nation (in this case Spain) should "forgetJl the obligations
of neutrality and "stimulate the enemy to make war" by furnishing
them arms and asylum, then an attack on the garrisons (in this case,
St. Mark/s and Pensacola) of a neutral nation, in the pursuit of the
"enemy" (the Seminoles), would be justifiable. This is the scenario on
which Adams based his defense, but Jackson/s correspondence did not
support this version of events. Monroe wrote to Jackson "By charging
the offense to the officers of Spain, we take the ground which you
have presented and look to you to support it. You must aid in procur-
ing the documents necessary to this purpose. Those you sent ...
were prepared in too much haste, and do not, I am satisfied, do justice
to the cause. This must be attended to without dela~JI
Monroe then described to Jackson what needed to be done to
resolve the discrepancy between the administrationIS defense of the
generalIs campaign and the correspondence regarding it: "The pas-
sage to which I particularly allude ... is that [in] which. you speak of
the incompetency of an imaginary boundary to protect us against the
enemy-the ground on which you bottom all your measures. This is
liable to the imputation that you took the Spanish posts for that
reason, as a measure of expediency; and not on the account of the
misconduct of the Spanish officers. The effect of this and such pas-
sages . . . would be to invalidate the ground on which you stand and
furnish weapons to your adversaries.... If you think proper to au-
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thorize the Secretary or myself to correct those passages, it will be
done with care, though, should you have copies, as I presume you
have, you had better do it yourself. II 26
Unfortunately for Monroe, Jackson refused to participate in this
crude attempt to alter his correspondence. He denied that he had
exceeded his orders and would not agree to amend his dispatches,
justifying his conduct by reference to the letter authorizing him to
"adopt the necessary measures to tenninate ll the conflict. Jackson
ignored Monroe's subsequent request that he write a letter acknowl-
edging "that a difference of opinion existed between you and the
Executive, relative to the extent of your powers. II 27 Hence, Monroe
and Adams were forced to confront the public and Congress using
documents that even they recognized were inadequate to support
their case.
The inconsistencies in Adams's letter and the documents accom-
panying them were publicly addressed in two letters to the Richmond
.Enquirer from Benjamin Watkins Leigh under the pseudonym"Alger-
:oon Sydney:" 28 Leigh, a venerable Virginia Republican, disputed the
premises upon which Adams had defended Jackson. He characterized
.Adams's letter as one "designed more to doubts and discontents at
home, than to answer the complaints of the Spanish government." 29
lie accused Adams of prodding Monroe into upholding Jackson's
actions and called the argu.ments in the Erving letter"as dangerous as
they are cruel and abhorrent from the national character for modera-
1ion, clemenc~ and justice. II He demonstrated that Adams's refer-
ences to Vattel in defending the execution of the two Britons were
taken out of context and did not support what Adams claimed they
did.3D In addition, Leigh's review of the documentary evidence led
him to charge that it did not support the claims Adams had made on
its behalf. He pointed out that the documents that had been released
proved that Jackson had exceeded his orders-thus publicizing the
discrepancy Monroe had attempted to cover up by altering his corre-
spondence with Jackson. Leigh called for the invasion of Florida to be
U disavowed, disapproved, and reprehended by our government." The
allthoritative nature of the /IAlgernon Sydney" letters made Le~gh's
charges hard to refute. Ironic too, is the pseudonym under which he
cllose to write-that of one of the English "real whigll classical
republicans of the early eighteenth century:
Adams's legalistic defense of an illegal act was thus revealed to be a
fraudulent legalism. The president and the secretary of state knew
t:his (as evidenced by their efforts to change Jackson's correspon-
dence), and the Sydney letters made that fact and the discrepancies in
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the documentary evidence part of the public record. However, the
letters appeared two weeks after the late December publication of
Adams's letter, which then had already decisively effected public
opinion. The Erving letter gave the rhetorical high ground to those
who defended Jackson and the administration, labeling them as
champions of intemationalla~ the rights of American settlers, and
"patriotism" against those who were in the uncomfortable position
of demanding what the Spanish government demanded-the punish-
ment of Jackson. The charges that Jackson had acted unconstitu-
tionall~ raised amid fears of the rise of an American Bonaparte, rang
hollow compared with Adams's sacred history of Americans strug-
gling against foreign intriguers and native "savages" to fulfill the
nation's manifest destin~Given the American public's disposition to
accept its myths as truths, Adams's letter needed only to be plausible
to be believed. Moreover, it was read by a public that revered Jackson
and wished to see his actions defended, particularly since those
actions augmented the power of a nation in which many people had a
stake.
That the documentary evidence did not "prove" Adams's conten-
tions was no doubt unknown to most people and probably meant
little to those who did know. It was far more important that his
explanation of the Seminole War harmonize with the national myths
of virtue, mission, and destiny than that it correspond to a set of
documents. The sheer bulk and official-looking nature of the mate-
rial Adams submitted allowed it to function symbolically as "evi-
dence," quite apart from any relation those documents had to the
events in question.
Matters worsened for the administration on 12 January when the
House Committee on Military Affairs released its report condemning
the executions of Ambrister and Arbuthnot. Shortly thereafter, Con-
gressman Thomas W. Cobb of Georgia introduced resolutions calling
for legislation prohibiting the execution of prisoners of war without
the consent of the president, legislation prohibiting the invasion of
foreign territory without congressional approval, and disapproval of
the capture of St. Mark's and Pensacola as "contrary to orders and in
violation of the constitution." 31 The House attack was orchestrated
in part by Treasury Secretary Crawford, who had a long-standing feud
with Jackson and who welcomed the chance to tarnish the image of a
future presidential rival. Cla~ also jealous of the public's magnetic
attraction to Old Hickor~ led the anti-Jackson forces.32
The House took up the question of the Seminole War on 16 Januar~
It proved the longest, most celebrated, most controversial congres-
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sional debate to that time. Packed galleries greeted the procession of
speakers, each of whom welcomed the opportunity to hold forth on a
topic of such intense public interest. Clay made the most notable
speech. In an alternately rambling, passionate, and eloquent address,
the Kentuckian decried the subjugation of the Seminoles by the
sword of Jackson and raised the specter of military leaders subverting
.American constitutional government. His fierce attack signaled the
beginning of a feud with Jackson that lasted for decades.33
Cynics found Clay's lamentations on behalf of the Seminoles hard
to swallow. Clearly; the constitutional and humanitarian impulses of
the anti-Jackson forces were reinforced by their dislike and fear of
both the general and the administration. Rufus King captured the
ambiguity of the debate when he wrote that although many of Jack-
son's supporters (himself included) were "promoting measures which
they would not approve," the credibility of the opposition left much
to doubt. "I cannot join in the hue and cry with them, who with
altogether different motives, are zealously; and for the first time in
their lives, the champions of humanity; the teachers of the milder
virtues, the accusers 9f the vindictive white warrior, and the protec-
tors of the red men." 34
Beyond the skepticism of those who saw the anti-Jackson forces as
motivated by political considerations, the efforts of Jackson's oppo-
Ilents were doomed by the dynamics of American political discourse.
<:oncerns over possible violations of the Constitution seemed vague
and abstract compared with the tangible gains derived from Jackson's
exploits, particularly now that those exploits had been given a pa-
triotic luster by Adams. Indeed, the only way to rebut Adams's letter
was to challenge its implicit assumption regarding the "destiny" of
the U:nited States to control the Southeast, as well as its assumption
of the inherent evil of the blacks, Indians, Spanish, and British who
stood in the way of that destiny: Yet to question such assumptions
"\ivould automatically place the politician who did so beyond the realm
of mainstream American political discourse, within which a belief in
A,merica's destiny and in the depravity of those who oppose it has
generally been a prerequisite for election. Similarly; to criticize Jack-
son's invasion of Florida while not questioning America's "right" to
t:he peninsula was to raise a procedural objection of the sort that
carried little weight in the pragmatic mind of the American public.35
Chances that the resolutions disapproving Jackson's conduct
would pass were greatly diminished by the appearance in Washington
of Old Hickory himself on 23 January. He arrived from Nashville on
horseback, determined to stymie the "hellish machinations" (as he
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termed them) of Clay and Crawford. Few dared directly to challenge
Jackson, whose reputation for fits of uncontrolled anger and a propen-
sity for dueling preceded him. The general monitored the remainder
of the debate from his hotel suite, casting a formidable shadow over
events.36
On 8 Februar~ the House reached a verdict. It rejected the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs resolutions condemning the execution of
Arbuthnot and Ambrister by votes of 62 to 108 and 63 to 107. The
Cobb resolutions intended to prevent a repetition of the Seminole War
were voted down 70 to 100. Jackson (and the administration) stood
completely vindicated. Far from discrediting Jackson, the failed con-
gressional attack increased his popularity with the American people.
To man~ the large margins by which he had been cleared confirmed
the suspicion that the attack on their hero had been politically
motivated. In the wake of the House vote, Jackson departed on a
triumphant tour of the Northeast in which he was mobbed by an
adoring public that for the most part knew little and cared less about
his flouting of the Constitution. Then, as no~ the American public
loved bold figures on horseback who refused to be constrained by
constitutional niceties. In a vivid display of caudillismo North Amer-
ican style, Jackson was feted with parades, banquets, bands, and
portraiture.37
Adams's bold, ingenious handling of the Seminole War crisis re-
sulted from his recognition of two basic truths. First, he remembered
Madison's dictum that"all government rests on opinion"-a point
particularly true in a democracy.3s Second, Adams realized that pub-
lic opinion could best be influenced by a defense of the Seminole War
that powerfully articulated the basic American myths of virtue,
mission, and destiny: Such a defense would make irrelevant any facts
to the contrary in the minds of most people. In this sense, Adams's
"great gun" helped define the art of rhetorical leadership in an impe-
rial democracy that would be repeatedly faced with the need to find
moral justification for what were essentially acts of self-aggrandize-
ment. In the tradition of Cicero, Adams's powerful oratory had
swayed the course of a nation.
John Quincy Adams anxiously watched the proceedings against Jack-
son unfold. He interpreted criticism of the general as an indirect
assault upon himself. "There is a common object of decrying me, " he
wrote. "There is not in either house of congress an individual mem-
ber who would open his lips to defend me. . . and as I am not there to
defend myself, Clay has a free swing to assault me, which he does,
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both in his public speeches and by secret machinations, without
scruple or delicacy:" 39
As the marathon debate on Jackson's conduct neared a climax in
early Februar~ the cabinet gathered to consider a new proposal by
Onis, the first since he had signaled his intention to assume full
negotiating power. Communicated to Adams by Hyde de Neuville,
the proposal called for a western boundary following the Red River to
the 95th degree longitude, then a line north to the Arkansas River,
extending to its source. From there, Onis proposed that a line be
drawn due west to the "Multnomah" (Willamette) River and follow
its course to the Columbia and then to the Pacific. This line conceded
much more to the United States than any of Onis's previous offers,
and Monroe, weary of the negotiations, inclined toward accepting it.
Adams, however, was not yet satisfied. The offer, he said, "would not
be acceptable to the nation" i he added that if Onis really intended to
come to terms, "we can obtain better." 40
"Better" to Adams meant a northwestern boundary extending
lalong the 41st parallel. He cajoled the president and other cabinet
Jmembers not to be overanxious for a settlement now that Onis was
on the verge of total capitulation. Adams reasoned that Onis, having
conceded the principle of a transcontinental boundar~could be made
to yield even more (see Map 6). He had judged Onis's mood correctly:
Having secured the Texas boundary at the Sabine, the Spaniard was
ready to make concessions along the northwest coast in order to
ensure a treaty: He still feared that should a treaty not be signed before
the end of the current se"ssion of Congress, the United States or its
proxies would invade Florida and possibly Texas. The vindication of
Jackson by Congress proved to Onis that the administration could act
as it pleased without fear of censure. Moreover, he continued to
distrust Hyde de Neuville, whose primary goal Onis suspected to be
the improvement of Franco-American relations.41
Hence, on 9 February Onis delivered to Adams an eighteen-point
projet outlining the elements of a treaty: Its major points were these:
1. Cession of East and West Florida (that is, as they were ceded by
Great Britain to Spain in 1783) to the United States.
2. A western boundary beginning at the Sabine, running to the 32nd
parallel, then due north to the Red River and along its course to to
the 100th meridian, then north to the Arkansas and along the
course of that river to the 42nd parallel, then directly west to the
Multnomah River, following its course north to the 43rd parallel,
and then to the Pacific.
- - - Onis 's offer of the Arkansas-
San Clemente line, 1 February 1819
- Adams's counteroffer of
6 February 1819
Map 6. The Proposals of 1 and 6 February 1819 (projected on the Melish
map of 1818)
3. The guaranty of all land grants in Florida made by the king of Spain
until 24 January 1818, the date Onis first proposed the cession of
the Floridas.
4. A reciprocal renunciation of all claims, either public or private,
against the other government.
5. The renewal of the treaty of limits and navigation of 1795 between
Spain and the United States (Pinckney's Treaty), excepting those
parts superseded by the current settlement.42
The projet seemed promising, but before submitting it to the
cabinet for evaluation, Adams prepared a counterprojet so that the
two might be considered side by side. On 11 February a long cabinet
discussion found Adams once again battling the inclinations of the
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other members of the administration (including Monroe) to accept
Onis's offer. Adams still insisted on 41 degrees as the northwestern
boundary; moreove~ he lobbied for the line to be drawn along the
southern and western banks of the rivers (thereby excluding Spain
from their navigation) rather than down the center, as is customary
diplomatic practice.43 In spite of all the concessions Onis had made,
Adams still fought for more, as if every inch he could wrest from the
Spaniard would add luster to his country's (and his own) greatness. He
had Florida; he had a transcontinental boundar~ Now he strove to
make the American corridor to the Pacific as wide as possible.
Monroe instructed Adams to prepare a formal counteroffer in
response to Onis's comprehensive proposal. On 13 February; Adams
presented this new projet to Hyde de Neuville, terming the offer "the
last we could make" (see Map 7). It varied from Onis's projet in both
foml and substance. First, it dispensed with the effusive expressions
of good will that Onis had included, which Adams characterized as
"'sentimental professions of friendship and affection between the
'United States and the king of Spain" and "entirely superfluous."
Second, Adams refused to allow Onis's presupposition that West
Florida had not been part of the Louisiana Purchase. That issue had
been a point of honor between the negotiators of the two sides since
the beginning of the controversy; and even with victory within his
grasp, Adams would not yield this symbolic triumph to Onis. He
thought it "unnecessary" to say"anything directly contrary" to the
past pretensions of either side.
A compromise appeared in the making on the crucial western
boundary question. Adams's offer of a line from the Arkansas River to
the 41st parallel and then directly to the Pacific had been countered
by Onis's proposal of a line to the Pacific along the 42nd. But Hyde de
Neuville stressed that on two points Onis could not yield "without
humiliation": that the boundary be drawn down the center of the
rivers rather than along their southern and western banks, and that
Spain be allowed navigation of the rivers constituting part of the
boundary. Adams rejected both demands on the grounds of practical
considerations. Difficulties in charting the shifting centers of the
:rivers could lead to disputes over ownership of islands; and control of
the waterways "was of no importance to Spain, who would never have
~any settlements II there, whereas "the United States would have
lextensive settlements upon them in a very few years, II making navi-
gation rights a moot point.44
Beyond these questions pertaining to the western boundary; only
lminor points separated the two sides. Onis objected to the $S million
--- Onis's offer of the Multnomah line,
9 February 1819
- Adams's counteroffer of
13 February 1819
Map 7. The Proposals of 9 and 13 February 1819 (projected on the Melish
map of 1818)
limit of claims by Americans against the Spanish government, to be
assumed by the United States, on the grounds that Spain would
appear to have sold the Floridas for that amount. He feared that the
king's advisers would convince the volatile monarch that his "honor"
could not be bought for so small a sum. Adams insisted on the figure
to protect the government from incurring an open-ended liability for
the claims of American citizens. Onis soon capitulated on this
point.
On 16 February Hyde de Neuville presented to Adams a written
statement summarizing the positions of two sides.45 An agreement
was tantalizingly close. The French minister reported to Adams that
Onis "had agreed to all the essential points" of the latest American
offer, with the exception of where to draw the river boundaries. Onis
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still insisted, perhaps as much for reasons of personal honor as for
substantive considerations, that the boundary follow the centerline
of the rivers.
At a White House reception on 18 February the mood was festive.
Rumors of the impending treaty were circulating throughout the
capital; conciliation filled the air; and in that spirit Monroe offered to
concede the river boundary question to Onis. "I will do anything you
want," said Monroe. "I have had a personal esteem for you ever since
the first day I dealt with you. Have a glass of wine with me." 46 The
next day; when Onis informed Adams of his conversation with
Monroe, the secretary was incensed that his negotiating authority
had been usurped by good feelings and good wine, even if the usurper
was his boss. He went directly to the White House to lobby Monroe to
retract his bit of negotiation. The president feared disrupting the
prospects for a settlement over what seemed to him a minor point,
but Adams persisted in his pleas-as much for the sake of his pride as
for the good of his country-and finally Monroe yielded to his pug-
.nacious secretary of state.
Adams then had to convince Hyde de Neuville that the president
of the United States had not really meant what he had said to Onis at
the reception. He explained to the French minister that he "was
lconfident that Onis had not correctly understood" Monroe, and he
'went on to dispute the propriety of the whole exchange: "What right
had Mr. Onis to speak upon the matter to the president in the drawing
room at all? 11 Adams disingenuously declared that he would be will-
ing to ignore such impertinence this time, "but the president himself
-'would be much and justly displeased if he had reason to think that a
eomplimentary expression of politeness, used by him in answer to a
rema.rk made to him by a foreign minister at a drawing room, was to
be construed into an abandonment of an important principle in a
pending negotiation." 47
On.is, no doubt in disgust, yielded to Adams's view of events and
agreed to take the boundaries along the southern and western banks
of the rivers. On 20 February the two negotiators reached final agree-
rnent on the long-awaited treaty: Adams suggested that a formal
signing ceremony be delayed for two days to coincide with birthday of
Washington. At 11:00 A.M. on 22 February 1819, Adams' and Onis
signed in triplicate their hard-won agreement. That same day the
secretary of state personally delivered the treaty to the Senate for
ratification.
Adams marked the signing of the treaty with a effusive entry in his
diary:
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It was near one in the morning when I closed the day with ejaculations of
fervent gratitude to the giver of all good. It was, perhaps, the most impor-
tant day of my life. What the consequences may be of the compact this day
signed with Spain is known only to the all-wise and all-beneficent dis-
poser of events, who has brought it about in a manner utterly unexpected
and by means the most extraordinary and unforeseen.... Let no idle and
unfounded exultation take possession of my mind, as if I could ascribe to
my own foresight or exertions any portion of the event. It is the work of an
intelligent and all-embracing Cause. May it speed as it has begun!
The acknowledgement of a definite boundary line to the South Sea
forms a great epocha in our history. The first proposal of it in this negotia-
tion was my own, and I trust it is now secured beyond the reach of
revocation. It was not even among our claims by the Treaty of Indepen-
dence with Great Britain. It was not among our pretensions under the
purchase of Louisiana-for that gave us only the range of the Mississippi
and its waters. I first introduced it in a written proposal of 31st October
last, after having discussed it verbally both with Onis and De Neuville. It
is the only peculiar and appropriate right acquired by this treaty in the
event of its ratification. I record the first assertion of this claim for the
United States as my own, because it is known to be mine perhaps only to
the members of the present administration, and may perhaps never be
known to the public-and, if ever known, will be soon and easily forgot-
ten.48
Thus within two paragraphs did an exultant John Quincy Adams
credit both God and himself for the making of the Transcontinental
Treaty.
The American people enthusiastically greeted the news of the treaty
with Spain. Most newspaper reports stressed the acquisition of Flor-
ida as the most important aspect of the agreement, particularly in the
South, where the II threat" posed by Spanish ownership of Florida had
long been a subject of concern. Few southerners as yet perceived
cession of the Texas claim as cause for alarm.49
It is certain that Monroe and Adams feared a negative backlash as a
result of the concession of the Texas claim. In early February 1819,
just weeks before reaching an agreement with Onis, Adams wrote in
his diary that "There are various symptoms that if we do not come to
an arrangement there will be a large party in the country dissatisfied
with our concess~ons from the Rio del Norte to the Sabine." 50
According to Adams, Monroe shared this concern but believed that
the acquisition of the Floridas, the extension of a claim to the Pacific,
and the resolution of the claims question "would be such advantages
to this countr)T, that any ... opposition founded upon our consent to
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take the Sabine for the western boundary would have little weight
with the people." 51 Jackson, too, in conversation with Adams, repu-
tedly argued that while "there were many many individuals who
would take exception" to the retreat from the Rio del Norte, "the vast
majority of the nation would be satisfied with the western boundary
we propose, if we obtain the Floridas." 52
But the point to be emphasized is that conceding the claim to
Texas was not necessary to obtain the Floridas. Acquisition of the
Floridas was assured as of Onis's offer of 24 January 1818. The con-
cession of Texas was first proposed in July 1818 in exchange for a
transcontinental boundary; and even so, more was conceded than was
absolutely necessar~Onis's instructions of 10 October 1818 author-
ized him to yield as far as the Colorado River of Texas in order to make
a dea.l. While Adams probably did.not know this, it is worth compar-
ing the secretary of state's tenacious struggle for every square illCh
and every watercourse in the Northwest with his passive acquies-
cence in the cession of the Texas claim.53
Samuel Flagg Bemis writes that "under Monroe's direction no
determined effort was made to get Texas. 11 54 Indeed, Adams and
Monroe saw cession of the Texas claim as a positive good. In March
1820, Adams candidly admitted to Senator Ninian Edwards of Illinois
that IIas an Eastern man, I should be disinclined to have either Texas
or Florida without a restriction excluding slavery from them." 55 By
May 1820, Monroe was even more explicit; he wrote to Jefferson that
the uncertainty created by the expulsion of Spain from the continent
and the formation of a new government in Mexico meant that "it
would be easy to arrange the boundary in the wilderness, so as to
include as much territory on our side as we might desire. No Euro-
pean power could prevent it.... But the difficulty does not proceed
from these sources. It is altogether internal, and of the most distress-
ing and dangerous tendency": that is, the issue of slavery; which
.Monroe traced as a point of controversy from the birth of the republic.
In 1820 he perceived that the Missouri question was only the latest
chapter in this controversy; the compromise by which Maine had
been admitted as a free state to balance the new slave state of
~Missouri, he said, had gained time for "passions to subside, &. for
calm discussion and reflection, which have never failed to produce
fheir proper effect in our countr~"To Monroe, the implications of the
slavery question were clear: "From this vie~ it is evident, that the
1rurther acquisition of territory; to the West and South, involves diffi-
culties of an internal nature which menace the Union itself." He
counseled no more acquisitions of territory in the West or South
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"which is not approved, by all the members, or at least a majority of
those who accomplished our revolution." 56
Shortly thereafter, Monroe wrote to Jackson in a similar vein.
"Having long known the repugnance with which the eastern portion
of our Union ... have seen its aggrandizement to the west and south,
I have been decidedly of [the] opinion that we ought to be content
with Florida for the present, and until the public opinion in that
quarter shall be reconciled to any future change." 57 Together, the two
letters unarguably demonstrate that Monroe's willingness to concede
the claim to Texas stemmed from his fears of adding more potential
slave territory to the Union, not as a prerequisite for securing the
Floridas from Spain. It is understandable that Monroe and Adams
chose not to correct the popular (and subsequent scholarly) miscon-
ception that Texas was ceded in exchange for Florida. Their relatively
unchallenged cession of the Texas claim must go down as one of the
greatest examples of sleight of hand in the history of American
diplomacy:
Most Americans at the time did not appreciate the significance of
the transcontinental boundary: In an age when it took a week to travel
from New York to Washington, few recognized the importance of
extending the nation's grasp to the Pacific. Rufus King's reaction was
typical: "We gain the Floridas, which we want; and an immense
region of territory in the west that we do not want." 58 The agreement
with Spain in 1819 became known as the"Adams-Onis Treaty" or the
"Florida Treaty;" names that obscure its most significant aspect.
The Senate, mirroring the public's enthusiasm for the Trans-
continental Treaty; ratified it unanimously on 24 February; acting so
quickly that there was no time for opposition to coalesce. On that
same day Senator Abner Lacock of Pennsylvania, chairman of the
committee in charge of investigating the Seminole War, submitted
his long-awaited report on the affair. In calm, measured terms, the
report concluded that in the course of conquering Florida, Jackson
had disregarded his orders, usurped the authority of Congress and the
executive, and inflicted"a wound on the national character." 59 For a
while it seemed that the report would reopen the controversy over
Jackson's conduct. But Adams ridiculed the document by observing
that Jackson's military operations in Florida were"among the most
immediate and prominent causes that produced the treaty."60 In-
deed. He recognized the decisive importance of military force in the
making of his diplomatic victory. Moreover, the new treaty with
Spain, combined with Britain's unconcern about the execution of its
subjects, made moot any criticisms of the general's methods. Neither
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the public nor the Senate was ready to engage in another examination
of Jackson's campaign now that its benefits were obvious to all. The
Senate tabled Senator Lacock's report, allowing it to expire quietly at
the end of the congressional session on 4 March. Ironically; even the
.authors of the report voted to ratify the treaty:61
While Americans rejoiced at the extension of their republic, Euro-
peans feared the birth of another New World empire. The treaty made
itt clear that the United States had rebounded from the War of 1812 to
become a formidable actor in world affairs and nearly unassailable in
the Western Hemisphere. The British press saw the agreement as
powerful evidence of the ambitious, aggressive, and expansionist
tendencies of the United States.62
John Quincy Adams brushed off all criticism of his handiwork.
Why should the United States not expand its domain? The Europeans
llad been empire-building for three centuries. The United States
eould expect criticism from them, if only because of envy: "If the
world do not hold us for Romans," Adams said, "they will take us for
Jews, and of the two vices I would rather be charged with that which
has greatness mingled in its composition." 63 To him, U.S. expansion
to the, Pacific meant the partial fulfillment of a divine plan. Europe,
lle wrote, must become IIfamiliarized with the idea of considering our
proper dominion to be the continent of North America." That the
{Jnited States would expand across the continent was /Ias much the
law of nature ... as that the Mississippi should flow to the sea. Until
I~urope shall find it a settled geographical element that the United
States and North America are identical, any effort on our part to
reason the world out of the belief that we are ambitious will have no
other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition
:hypocrisy:"64 A more ringing endorsement of Manifest Destiny has
IJLeVer been uttered.
Adams's jubilant mood was soon shattered. On 8 March, Henry
Clay informed Monroe of three large grants of land in Florida made to
Spanish nobles by the king just prior to 24 January 1818, the date
before which all grants were acknowledged as valid. Adams rushed to
reread his dispatches from Madrid and discovered the bitter truth: in
several letters the previous spring, Erving had warned of recent grants
ill which the king had ceded away all his remaining holdings in
Florida; the minister had even included copies of the grants in one of
his dispatches.65 Inexplicably; Adams had overlooked Erving's warn-
il1g that "this is, perhaps, [the king's] mode of preparing for a cheap
clession of the territory to the United States."
Onis too was sl.:lrprised at the tum of events. Having believed that
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the grants in question had been voided, he did not welcome this new
obstacle to ratification of the treaty he had worked so hard to con-
clude. Onis had nothing to gain by obstructing the treaty. He had,
after all, been the member of the Spanish government who had
pushed hardest for a settlement. Historians generally have absolved
him of any knowledge of the grants, ascribing them to the backstage
machinations of the camarilla.66 Still, Onis must have taken satisfac-
tion at the frustration the situation engendered in his antagonist
Adams.
Adams, on the other hand, took it for granted that Onis had inten-
tionally tricked him. Nonetheless, the secretary of state took full
responsibility for the error. The news of the land grants, made all the
more bitter in that it was conveyed by Cla~ fulfilled his "vague,
general, and superstitious impression" that the treaty had been too
good to be true. Amid the myriad dispatches, letters, state papers, and
other correspondence that crowded upon him, Adams had overlooked
messages of crucial importance. "This is at least enough to dampen
all vanity and self-conceit that I could derive from it. Never will the
treaty recur to my memory but associated with the remembrance of
my own heedlessness." 67
Perhaps the voice of conscience spoke to Adams as he flagellated
himself for his carelessness. From the outset, he had resorted to
ethically dubious tactics to bring Onis to terms. He had submitted
spurious document collections to Congress. He had misrepresented
the South American revolutions to the public in his "Phocion" let-
ters. He had cynically used the threatened recognition of the South
American revolutions as a wedge to gain concessions from Onis. He
had exaggerated and distorted the conflict with the Seminoles in such
a way as to make runaway slaves and Indians resisting dispossession
of their land the aggressors. He had defended the (officially) un-
authorized invasion of Florida and the execution of two British sub-
jects. Though European (and American) practice had long divorced
the morality of the statesman from that of the private citizen, John
Quincy Adams had refused to believe that success in the public realm
required compromising one's personal integrity or moralit~yet in his
diary ruminations and in his correspondence Adams fretted that his
success as a statesman and national leader was being attained at the
cost of his personal integrit~Now at the moment of triumph, he was
deprived of victory by his own inexplicable oversight. He saw it as an
act of divine retribution.
Adams's dejection worsened when it became clear that the Spanish
government would not ratify the treat~Although the King and Yrujo
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llad received the agreement favorabl~ certain members of the Con-
sejo de Estado objected on the grounds that it ceded away too much
territor~ that it did not protect Spanish territories from expeditions
organized in the United States, and, most important, that it did not
include a U.S. pledge of non-recognition of the South American
governments.68 In a weird twist, the anxiety of the king's ministers
over the recognition question had been heightened by Adams's diplo-
rnatic bluff of that spring, a bluff that had pushed Onis and Yrujo
toward a settlement but now led members of the Consejo de Estado to
balk at its ratification.69
Efforts to obtain ratification by Spain were not aided by the
eonduct of the new minister to Madrid, John Forsyth. The Georgia
eongressman, had been rewarded for his loyalty to the adminis-
tration with the job of replacing Erving but proved ill suited to the
task. Gruff and tactless, Forsyth soon verified Adams's description
of him as lacking in "experience, prudence, and sincerit~" Upon
a.rriving in Madrid he became embroiled in a dispute with Spanish
officials over the handling of his baggage. He compounded his diffi-
culties by demanding that the land grants in Florida .be annulled
and by sending diplomatic messages deemed too insulting to be
received. Inexperienced as a diplomat and unable to speak Spanish,
F'orsyth extinguished the flickering hope that the treaty might soon
be ratified. 70
In July 1819, Ferdinand, swayed by his confidants, decided to
withhold ratification indefinitel~ using the land grant dispute as a
pretext. Again, the Spanish government tried to secure British sup-
port. A new Spanish minister, General Dionisio Vives, was sent to
Washington to negotiate a more favorable settlement. The whole
ghastly procedure appeared ready to begin anew. Vives arrived in
Washington in April 1820, demanding as preconditions for ratifica-
tion t:hat the United States strengthen its neutrality laws, guarantee
th.e integrity of Spain's territorial possessions in the Western Hemi-
sphere, and promise not to recognize any rebel governments. 71
Adams had no intention of yielding to Vives's demands, but Spain's
uIlwillingness to ratify the treaty created confusion in the minds of
l\1.onroe and Adams as to what to do next. In August 1819, Adams
recorded that the cabinet was "unanimously agreed" on the necessity
0.£ asking Congress for authority to take possession of Florida with or
",rithout Spain's ratification of the treat~ In a rationale that echoed
his defense of Jackson, Adams argued that the occupation of Florida
by United States troops would not be "an act of hostility to Spain, but
... an assertion of our OWIl right, rendered necessary by a breach of
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faith on the part of Spain." He repeated this argument in early
November as the cabinet deliberated the contents of the president's
third annual message to Congress. 72
Monroe, however, after initially agreeing with the plan to take
strong action, had second thoughts. Intelligence reports from Europe
indicated that France and Russia would strongly oppose a u.S. move
into Florida; such a move might provoke them into active support of
Spain. Monroe also worried that domestic opinion as well might
oppose another military foray into Florida. Adams, too, as a result of a
conversation with the Russian minister, Pierre de Poletica, who
stressed the tsar's desire for the "maintenance and preservation of a
general peace," began to harbor doubts as to the wisdom of taking
precipitate action in Florida.73 Monroe convened his cabinet on 26
November in an attempt to reach a consensus on a course of action.
That meeting again revealed the strange interpersonal dynamic of the
Monroe administration. Adams entered it still committed to pushing
for strong action. To his surprise (and suspicion), he found Crawford
pushing for implementing the treaty unilaterall~ after formerly op-
posing such a course. Adams now realized that to occupy Florida
involved a very real danger of war; moreover, he sensed that Monroe
resented being pushed in that direction: "Latel~ and particularly
yesterda~ I saw that my advice had become irksome to the presi-
dent-that he was verging on the suspicion that I was spurring him to
rash and violent measures." As usual, Adams attributed this mistrust
to the machinations of his rivals: "The enemies of Mr. Monroe's
administration, and my enemies, have been continually laboring
with the industry and venom of spiders to excite in his mind a
jealousy of me. They have so far succeeded that whatever I earnestly
recommend, he distrusts." Consequentl~Adams abruptly reversed
course and dropped his recommendation of the occupation of Flor-
ida. 74 The following day he met agaill with the president, who now
was again leaning in favor of strong action. Adams, admitting that his
reversal of the previous day had been done solely in the hope of
pleasing the president, this time offered his support to whatever
course Monroe chose. For once, the masterful secretary of state was
reduced to the role of the fawning courtier, at a loss as to what move to
recommend next. 75
The arguments of Hyde de Neuville made clear to Adams the path
to follow. The French minister pleaded with Adams to await the
arrival of the new Spanish minister before taking any action to
implement the treat~ Hyde de Neuville argued that forbearance by
the United States in the matter would curry great favor with the
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European allies, who desperately wished to avoid any conflict that
Jmight lead to a general war. Using force to implement the treaty
'would have the effect of making Spain the aggrieved party and per-
lb.aps compel the other European sovereigns to support its cause. Hyde
de Neuville contended that ratification could be gained without the
llse of force if the United States would be patient.76
Ultimately; Monroe chose a conciliatory approach. In his message
to Congress of 7 December 1819 the president requested authoriza-
tion to implement the treaty; yet announced that he would make no
lnove to do so before meeting with the new Spanish minister. Monroe
contended that to refrain temporarily from asserting its claims would
demonstrate the "candor, magnanimity; and honor" of the United
States. He added that a short delay would cost the nation nothing. 77
In May 1820 the president again formally delayed plans to implement
the treaty; this time because he wanted to assess the position of the
Ilew Spanish republican government recently established in the wake
of a military revolt in Madrid.78
Monroe's altruistic rhetoric aside, it was European diplomatic
opinion that influenced him not to take Florida by force. While
rnilitary action had done much to wrest a treaty from Onis, it now
promised to provoke an international backlash against the United
States. Accordingly; Monroe and Adams recognized that "forbear-
allce" was the proper diplomatic card to pla~By acting with restraint,
the U"nited States stood to reinforce its role as a "responsible" actor in
international affairs, secure in the knowledge that the Europeans
"V~7'ere favorable to the treaty's eventual ratification. 79 It was the cap-
stone of three years of astute diplomacy by Adams and Monroe.
Only on 5 October 1820, after the establishment of a new Spanish
government following the military revolt, did Madrid ratify the
t:reat~ In the end, the land grants were declared null and void. In the
lJnited States, Monroe resubmitted the treaty to the Senate for
ratification. It passed, though this time there were four dissenting
votes from western senators. On 22 February 1821, the"Adams-Onis
lreaty" took effect.
For Adams, the two years between the treaty's initial signing and
its eventual ratification were a time of self-imposed purgator~ He
correctly believed that his political opponents were using his role in
th.e land grant dispute to humiliate him.8o He suspected that
C:rawford secretly wished the treaty to fail. And he perceived a rising
tide of opposition to the treaty; both by westerners (led by Clay) who
objected to the cession of Texas ·and by northerners who were spurred
by the Missouri debates into opposing the entry of Florida into the
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Union.81 In January 1820, Adams wrote that "the treaty is gone
forever ... all the benefit which was hoped from it for the administra-
tion is lost." 82
The treaty's eventual ratification provoked another revealing diary
entry: "I considered the signature of the treaty as the most important
event of my life. It is an event of magnitude in the history of this
Union. The apparent conclusion of the negotiation had been greatly
and unexpectedly advantageous to the country: It had at once discon-
certed and stimulated my personal antagonists and rivals. It promised
well for my reputation in the public opinion. Under the petals of this
garland of roses the Scapin, Onis, had hidden a viper.... Clay and his
admirers here were snickering at the simplicity with which I had
been bamboozled by the crafty Spaniard. . . . By the goodness of that
inscrutable Providence which entraps dishonest artifice in its own
snares, Onis divulged his trick too soon for its success." 83 Adams (in
spite of his earlier self-recriminations) could not acknowledge that
the land grant dispute had been the result of his own carelessness. He
preferred to believe that Onis had been out to trick him.
On the same day that the Transcontinental Treaty was ratified,
John Quincy Adams submitted to Congress his Report on Weights and
Measures, advocating the adoption of the metric system in the United
States and abroad. Adams wrote of it in heroic terms: "I have no
reason to expect that I shall ever be able to accomplish any literary
labor more important to the best ends of human exertion, public
utilit}j or upon which the remembrance of my children may dwell
with more satisfaction." He bracketed the Report with the Transcon-
tinental Treaty as "two of the most memorable transactions of my
life." 84
The painstakingly and laboriously compiled Report reflected a
lifetime of learning. It attempted to synthesize histor}j philosoph}j
and physics into a coherent whole that illuminated the nature of
human relations. The treatise had made great demands on Adams's
already over-busy schedule, leaving him even less time to spend with
his wife and children and preventing him from visiting his father in
Quincy in the summer following his mother's death. Writing it had
become almost an obsession for him, a chance to escape to the world
of his imagination. On the assumption that "the associated pursuit of
great objects of common interest is among the most powerful expedi-
ents for the improvement of modem man," the Report called for "a
concert of civilized nations" to establish a uniform. system of weights
and measures to facilitate international commerce. Adams acknowl-
edged that any legislated change in weights and measures would face
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much popular resistance, yet such a system would have more than
just economic benefits. Adams envisioned its leading to "the im-
provement of the physical, moral, and intellectual condition of man
upon earth" by strengthening the IIlinks of sympathy between the
inhabitants of the most distant regions." In a revealing parallel, he
pointed to the suppression of the African slave trade as a precedent to
the sort of international effort that would be required for such a
project. He left no doubt as to its importance: "Uniformity of weights
and measures ... would be a blessing of such transcendent magni-
tude, that, if there existed upon earth a combination of power and will
adequate to accomplish the result by the energy of a single act, the
being who should exercise it would be among the greatest of benefac-
tors of the human race." In essence, the Report on Weights and
.Measures was Adams's philosophical counterpart to the treaty that
:had been ratified that same day:85
William Appleman Williams describes the Report as "the classic
document of the Age of Mercantilism.... [It is] a magnificent tri-
umph of the Weltanschauung of mercantilism that transcends time
and place. II 86 Yet Adams's vision was not appreciated at the time. So
great was the erudition of the piece that no one in Congress bothered
to read it. Indeed, except for a member of the Royal Engineers, no one
seems to have read it at all during Adams's lifetime. Even his father,
perhaps in retribution for John Quincy's absence during his time of
emotional need, admitted to his son that "I cannot sa~ and perhaps
s:hall never be able to sa~ that I have read it. 1I8? And 170 years· after
the publication of the Report on Weights and Measures, the American
people-almost alone among the nations of the world-still have not
seen the wisdom in Adams's recommendation to adopt the metric
system.
EPILOGUE
The American Cicero
Truth, virtue, honor, the dignity of human nature ... are
the touchstones by which the conduct of nations as well as
individuals is to be tested.
John Quincy Adams to William Peterkin, 20 July 1821
Final ratification of the Transcontinental Treaty signaled the end of
the first phase of American continental expansionism in the nine-
teenth centur}T. By establishing the previously undefined limits of the
Louisiana Purchase and adding Florida, the treaty resolved long-
standing uncertainties about the nation's borders. Moreover, the
treaty determined the course of American expansionism until the
Civil War by its claim to Oregon and the northwest coast in exchange
for an equally strong (if not stronger) claim to Texas.
The cession of the Texas in return for a transcontinental boundary
proved critically important. In effect, the "Louisiana Purchase" had
been the basis of a u.s. claim to virtually all of North America. The
Transcontinental Treaty; by defining "Louisiana" to exclude Texas,
set the stage for one of the most divisive issues in antebellum pol-
itics-Texas annexation. Proslavery leaders saw Texas as essential to
the preservation of slavery and the Union. British attempts (real or
imagined) to acquire Texas were viewed as a direct assault on south-
ern interests. The Jacksonian pro-slavery advocate Duff Green at-
tributed British pretensions to abolishing slavery in Texas to "the
monomaniacal ravings of John Quincy Adams" and "the fanatical
representations of the abolitionists." 1
When seen in the context of the open-ended nature of America's
Louisiana Purchase claims, Democratic calls for the "re-annexation"
of Texas were entirely justified. Southern leaders were correct in
perceiving that the cession of the Texas claim in 1819 was an attempt
to contain slavery: Yet they were wrong to attribute the decision to
yield Texas to Adams. Historic responsibility for that decision must
be placed on Monroe.
As for the Northwest, ratification of the treaty was soon followed
by the tsar's famous ukase of September 1821 claiming exclusive
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control of territory on the notthwest coast as far south as 51 degrees
and excluding Americans from waters within one hundred Italian
miles of the shore.2 Led by John Quincy Adams, the United States
vigorously opposed this assertion of Russian imperial rights. Only
after several toughly worded messages from Adams (and the financial
collapse of the Russian-American Company) did the tsar repeal his
edict. This led in April 1824 to an agreement between the United
States and Russia allowing nearly unrestricted access for American
citizens to the northwest coast and its adjoining waters.3
By defeating the tsar's attempt to take control of the northwest
coast, Adams and Monroe legitimized the concept of noncolonization
articulated in the Monroe Doctrine. Although the president's famous
:message to Congress of December 1823 is often characterized as a
:hollow threat, it must be remembered that in July 1823 Adams had
stated explicitly to the Russians that the United States would contest
.any new colonial establishments on the northwest coast.4 Lacking a
strong naval presence in the region, the Russians chose not to chal-
1enge the United States over the issue. The agreement of April 1824
represented a Russian capitulation to American demands. Seen from
this perspective, the Monroe Doctrine was less a hollow threat to the
European powers than a fonnal announcement to Congress of a
policy already in place.
Despite the establishment of an American presence on the north-
west coast, the dream of a neomercantile empire centered at Astoria
Ilever materialized. The dream did not fail for lack of attention.
jrhroughout the 1820s and 1830s a variety of entrepreneurs and
interests pushed to explore the region and tap its economic potential.
lrhe most notable figure in this regard was congressman John Floyd of
"irgil1ia, who lobbied for American military occupation of the Co-
lumbia River as a first step to expanded trade with China.s But
treacherous shoals at the mouth of the Columbia prevented Astoria
from becoming a major port.6 In addition, overzealous hunting
r,apidly depleted the sea otter population in the 1820s, thus eliminat-
ing a primary fur export to Canton. Finall~ the expanding operations
of the Hudson's Bay Company in the Oregon country limited the
freedom of Americans to exploit the region during the era of "free and
open occupation." 7 Only in the wake of the mass migrations of
settlers in the 1840s did the United States challenge Great Britain for
control of the Oregon countr~ It must be remembered, however, that
iIlitial u.s. interest in the region was mercantile, not agricultural. As
~rorm.anGraebner writes: "In Oregon the American territorial objec-
tive had been clear from the beginning of the boundary controversy in
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I818-access to the magnificent harbor of Puget Sound through the
Strait of Juan de Fuca. What had dictated the perennial American
insistence on the extension of the forty-ninth parallel to the Pacific
had been the realization that such a settlement would convey the
necessary waterways to the United States. So clear was the national
interest in the distant Northwest that Fuca Strait and Puget Sound
together guided official American policy from John Quincy Adams to
James K. Polk." 8 Graebner's observation on the commercial origins of
u.S. interests in Oregon is sound, yet it should be said that American
interest in the region dates at least from the time of the Lewis and
Clark expeditiol1 or, more properl~ from the 1787 voyage of Robert
Gray and his ship Columbia.
Even though the northwest coast never proved the axis of a global
trading empire, as Adams had anticipated, the United States had
taken a determined first step toward acquiring a share of the wealth of
the Orient. It is in this sense that the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819
may be considered to be the origin of global empire. The policy of
Adams and Monroe built upon the trail learned of by Astor, blazed by
Lewis and Clark, and championed by Jefferson. At the end of the trail
lay a foothold on the Pacific and access to the transpacific trade. By
acquiring a claim to the Oregon countr~ Adams and Monroe made
the United States a force to be reckoned with in the imperial struggle
between Russia, Spain, and Great Britain for control of the eastern
Pacific Rim. Within fifty years the United States would secure clear
title to Oregon, annex California, and purchase Alaska. By the turn of
the twentieth centur~Hawaii and the Philippines would be acquired
and the principle of the"open door" firmly established with regard to
China. In the twentieth century the American drive for preeminence
in Asia (itself a part of the SOD-year European thrust eastward) would
result in a "tNar with Japan for supremacy in Asia and the establish-
ment of a truly global American empire. The unparalleled extent of
this empire is suggested in the vision of omnipotence implicit in the
U.S. role as the world's first (and, so far, only) "superpower." Novus
ordo seclorum.
The Jeffersonian origins of the Transcontinental Treaty should not
obscure Adams's critical role in making the transcontinental claim a
reality. It was Adams who best perceived the nation's long-term
imperial interest amid the tangled skein of diplomatic controversies
confronting the United States. Adams's observation that that a trans-
continental claim formed no part of either the Treaty of Paris ending
the War of Independence or the Louisiana Purchase makes clear why
he saw it as his great contribution to the American nation. In pursuit
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of this end he walked a diplomatic tightrope. He outmaneuvered
opponents both at home and abroad, responded shrewdly to con-
tingency; and tempered his diplomacy with the strategic use of
force-a bravura performance in the tradition of classic European
diplomac}T. From the perilous circumstances facing the country when
Adams took the helm of American foreign policy; the United States
emerged poised to conquer a continent. It was this dramatic improve-
ment in the nation's relative position internationally that made
Adams the most successful statesman in American history-indeed,
the most successful statesman of his time, a period known as the
"golden age" of European diplomacy. The legacy of this statecraft
would be seen in the policies of Adams proteges William Seward and
grandson Henry Adams's confidant John Ha}T.9
T:he acquisition of Florida achieved by the Transcontinental Treaty
fulfilled the long-held dream of security for the southern frontier. The
famous "pistol pointed at New Orleans" finally belonged to the
United States. By the early 1820s many Americans (including John
Quincy Adams) saw Spanish ownership of Cuba as "the next "threat"
to the nation's borders and rekindled efforts to gain control of that
island. Io The slavery question and the nation's preoccupation with
continental settlement, however, prevented the realization of this
expansionist dream until 1898.
For the Seminoles, it must have been a sad day when they learned
that their homeland now belonged to the United States and that
.Andrew Jackson would be the province's first American governor.
'Their persecution in 1818 at Jackson's hands proved but a prelude to a
second war of extermination against them (1835-42) in which the
:remaining members of the tribe either moved west or were killed or
forced to take refuge in the dense swamps of Florida. Today; the
Seminoles survive in the national consciousness as the mascot of
Florida State Universit}T.II
Final ratification of the Transcontinental Treaty in 1821 also paved
the way for recognition of South American independence. Through-
out the period between the initial signing of the treaty and its final
ratification, recognition of Latin American independence remained
h.ostage to U.S. relations to the European powers. Between February
1819 and February 1821, Adams continued to work to maintain a
scrupulous neutrality regarding South American affairs. To Russian
l\1inister Poletica, Adams reiterated the intention of the United
States to pursue a policy "entirely in harmony" with that of the
]~uropeanpowers. 12 The secretary of state, in a manner foreshadow-
ing his handling of the Greek question in 1823, vigorously opposed
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including favorable references to the South American struggles in the
president's annual messages of 1819 and 1820 on the grounds that to
do so would needlessly antagonize the Europeans. 13 Although Adams
always refused formally to guarantee to Spain that the United States
would not recognize the South American revolutionary govern-
ments, he did hint to ~panishMinister Vives that that if the treaty
were ratified, the United States "probably would not precipitately
recognize the independence of the South Americans." 14 Adams kept
his word, waiting a decent interval before taking the step Spain had so
feared. The recognition of South American independence, forecast as
imminent by John Quincy Adams in January 1819, finally began in
mid-1822. 1s
Throughout the period, U.S. policy toward South America paral-
leled that of Great Britain. Indeed, the concept of nonintervention
in the Western Hemisphere, the other important principle of the
Monroe Doctrine, was made viable by Great Britain's unambiguous
opposition to European efforts to restore Spanish sovereignty in
South America. The "Polignac Memorandum" of October 1823, in
which British Foreign Secretary George Canning explicitly stated to
the French minister his objections to any efforts by the European
powers to intervene in South America, merely restated a policy that
had been clear since the conference of Aix-Ia-Chapelle. Adams's
genius as a diplomat is again revealed by his adamant opposition to
Canning's famous offer of Anglo-American cooperation in South
American affairs. Although Jefferson and Madison both advised
Monroe to accept the offer as a means of ensuring British good will,
Adams alone recognized that the United States had nothing to gain by
allying with Great Britain and nothing to fear if it did not. Adams
knew that Great Britain would continue its policy of de facto recogni-
tion of South American independence with or without the formal
support of the United States. 16
The Monroe Doctrine can be viewed as the culmination of six
years (and in a larger sense, nearly fifty years) of astute American
diplomac~Adams's far-sighted, pragmatic approach to Anglo-Amer-
ican relations, South American affairs, continental and commercial
expansionism, and the place of the United States in the world made
possible the bold articulation in December 1823 of what was in effect
a statement of hemispheric supremacy: It must also be said that the
Transcontinental Treaty is of greater historical significance than the
far more thoroughly investigated circumstances immediately sur-
rounding Monroe's celebrated 1823 message. The success of Mon-
roe's foreign policy (and hence the Monroe Doctrine) hinged on the
treat~ Insofar as the treaty finalized the boundaries of the Louisiana
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Purchase, it should be bracketed with that more heralded piece of
American diplomacy as the diplomatic cornerstones of the Monroe
Doctrine. Questions of authorship aside, it is undeniable that with-
out Adams's adroit statesmanship during the preceding years,
Monroe would have been in no position to pronounce his famous
doctrine.
This is not to diminish the scope of Monroe's foreign policy
achievements. As the nation's chief executive, Monroe deserves cred-
it for making the Jeffersonian foreign policy a success in spite of the
near-catastrophes of the Embargo and the War of 1812. In this respect,
Mon.roe's foreign policy was more successful than that of either
Jefferson or Madison. It might rightfully be claimed that the shrewd-
.ness of Adams made possible much of Monroe's succeSSj nonetheless,
.Monroe deserves credit for being wise enough to know sound advice
'when he heard it-one of the most valuable traits for a president to
:have.
Recentl)', scholars of early American diplomacy have noted a con-
tinuity of ideas and aims in the nation's foreign policy from 1776 to
the present. l 7 The record of Adams and Monroe's foreign policy (and
:more generally the Jeffersonian foreign policy as a whole) lends
support to this observation. During Monroe's presidency a number of
critical precedents regarding the conduct and control of American
:foreign policy were established or reinforced. Most important, the
lexecutive branch of the government emerged from the Monroe presi-
dency with substantially greater power than was envisioned by the
framers of the Constitution. The expansion of presidential power
represented by Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase was augmented consid-
erably during Monroe's two terms. In several key respects it can be
said that Monroe's administration marked the birth of the "Imperial
:Presidenc~II
Specifically; Congress's unsuccessful challenge to the Amelia Is-
land occupation, failed p'ush for South American recognition, and
abortive attempt to censure Jackson's invasion of Florida demon-
strated that the legislative branch would allow the executive wide
latitude to conduct foreign polic~ Congressional votes on these is-
s'ues indicated unambiguously a reluctance to interfere with the
presidential conduct of foreign affairs even if that conduct bordered
on the unconstitutional. Adams, an outspoken champion of a strong
executive branch, knew that an imperial foreign policy demanded a
president with far more power than was prescribed by the Founding
JPathers. His success in expanding the power of the executive branch
over foreign affairs is one his most enduring legacies.
The power of the executive to make war was enormously strength-
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ened during the Monroe presidenc~The de facto military conquest of
Florida definitively established that undeclared war would be a for-
eign policy tool available to the president. Unlike Jefferson, who had
refrained from using force to implement the Mobile Act of 1804, or
Madison, who in 1812 had disavowed the actions of Mathews in
Florida, Monroe (as a result of Adams's influence) defended Jackson's
seizure of Florida. In a recent work on Jeffersonian polic~ Robert
Tucker and David Hendrickson observe that "no chapter in American
diplomacy would appear to lend itself less to the category of a moral-
ity play than the diplomacy of the Floridas./I 18 Yet the military
means by which the province was finally acquired does make the
diplomacy of the Floridas a morality play-a drama of territory won
and constitutional scruples lost. Jackson's invasion of Florida estab-
lished a precedent of unilateral executive military action that would
be repeated approximately two hundred times in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The precedent was made all the stronger insofar
as Monroe lacked Jefferson's charismatic hold over Congress and the
citizenr~ Because of this unarguable difference between the two
men, it might be said that the enlarged presidential power to conduct
foreign policy acquired during Monroe's administration went pri-
marily to the office, not to an individual.
The First Seminole War debate was the moment in which the
power to make war shifted decisively in the direction of the ex-
ecutive. Historians have long emphasized the significance of the
Louisiana Purchase in expanding the implied powers of the presi-
dency; Adams himself noted in 1820 that it represented "an assump-
tion.of implied powers greater in itself and more comprehensive in its
consequences than all the assumptions of implied powers in the
twelve years of the Washington and Adams administrations put to-
gether./I Then, in the aftermath of the First Seminole War debate, the
executive emerged with the de facto power to make war. Hence,
the Jeffersonian era marks the establishment of a presidency with the
power to acquire territory and the power to make war. Although
presidents have usually felt it necessary to secure support from
Congress before committing troops to combat, the success of all five
presidential war messages and the reluctance of legislators to cut off
funds to troops already in the field indicate that congressional control
of the war power has long been more symbolic than real. The power to
commit troops to combat without congressional approval has proved
critically important to the extension, consolidation, and protection
of the constantly growing, ever farther-flung American empire. Not
all presidents have chosen to use the de facto war-making power of
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the office, but it has been available to determined and ambitious chief
executives. The inability of Congress in recent years to rein in the
Imperial Presidency is seen in the impotence of the 1973 War Powers
Act, which successive presidential administrations have unilaterally
declared unconstitutional. 19
Monroe's presidency also marked the definitive end of Jefferson's
emphasis on "peaceable coercion" as a major tool of American for-
eign policy: Certainly; peaceful means would be employed whenever
possible to settle foreign policy disputes, but the actions of subse-
quent American presidents indicate none who seriously believed that
the international state system could be based on any foundation other
than force and violence. In the councils of state, belief in the possibil-
ity of a world without war would be perceived as naive, sentimental,
.and above all, "unrealistic." Warfare, rather than becoming a relic of
the past, would become a central part of the national mythology and
Ian indispensable cultural bonding agent.20
Another element responsible for the steady enlargement of presi-
dential powers in the realm of foreign affairs has been the executive's
lcontrol of the amount and kinds of information available to the
public and the Congress on foreign policy matters. A skillful ex-
ecutive is in a position to define the terms of a foreign policy debate by
t:he release to Congress of "facts" (in the form of documents and other
bits of intelligence) of his own choosing. Here again the actions of the
Monroe administration were precedent-setting. The record of Secre-
tary of State Adams's congressional dealings demonstrates that mem-
bers of the executive branch have not been above selectively editing,
distorting, or otherwise misrepresenting information designed for
congressional scrutiny:
Related to the executive branch's ongoing informational advantage
over the Congress in foreign policy matters has been the evolution of
(1 presidential "rhetoric of empire" designed to marshal public (as
well as congressional) support for its policies. It is a mode of discourse
funda.mentally rooted in the nation's Puritan and Revolutionary past
but which first reached fruition in the rhetoric of Adams, most
particularly in his 28 November 1818 dispatch to Erving. This dis-
course has become a durable and essential aspect of American diplo-
Inacy inherited and elaborated by successive generations of American
statesmen but fundamentally unchanged over time.
The rhetoric of American empire comprises three main aspects:
the assumption of the unique moral virtue of the United States, the
ClLssertion of its mission to redeem the world by the spread of republi-
ean government and more generally the IIAmerican way of life," and
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the faith in the nation's divinely ordained destiny to succeed in this
mission. The rhetorical triad of virtue, mission, and destiny suggests
the messianic dimension of the American experience in which for-
eign policy issues are not subject to reasoned debate but rather
reduced to a choice between Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, pro-
and anti-American, "us" and "them." In this rhetorical context,
opponents to the advance of the American empire have been consid-
ered to be misguided, if not depraved and traitorous.
Mastery of the rhetoric of empire has given American presidents a
powerful tool with which to gain congressional and public support
for an imperial foreign policy. Indeed, the ability to tie specific policy
goals to the universalistic myths of American nationality has been
essential to presidential foreign policy leadership. Invoking the
myths of virtue, mission, and destiny by appeals to blood, soil, and
the flag (as Adams did in the Erving letter and as Polk would do in his
war message) has proved a nearly irresistible method of gaining sup-
port for imperial ventures. Stirring narratives of long-aggrieved Amer-
icans, evil enemies, and righteous retaliation have proved persuasive
to the minds of most citizens, appealing as they do to the nation's self-
image. The theological aspect of these narratives has meant that facts
that contradict the narrative are either explained away or ignored, as
they were in the wake of Adams's Erving letter. Opponents have found
themselves (as critics of Jackson did in 1819) in the position of
seeming to be aiding the "enemy."
Beneath this rhetoric of empire there has consistently been an elite
reluctance to trust the nation's foreign policy to the uncertainties and
vacillations inherent in democracy. Indeed, it may be said that Amer-
ican foreign policy has been inherently undemocratic insofar as polit-
ical elites have perceived (in the tradition of European Realpolitik)
only one safe course through which to navigate the hazards of inter-
national affairs. In this vie~ "pluralism" may be acceptable in do-
mestic matters but is a prescription for catastrophe in foreign affairs,
where there is a far slimmer margin of error. With the nation's
survival all too often at stake, the architects of American empire have
generally assumed that foreign policy is too important to be left to the
people's unmediated judgment. Whatever views they may have held
as candidates, once in office American leaders have generally been of
the conviction that the public must be shielded from a candid knowl-
edge of the nation's foreign relations. Abstractions such as "strict
construction" of the Constitution must not be allowed to interfere
with the survival and success of the American global revolution. The
conduct of Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Wilson, Frank-
lin Roosevelt and others suggests that stretching the limits of consti-
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tutional authority is a prerequisite to presidential greatness. In this
respect, "strict construction" is revealed to be a rhetorical device
designed to rein in the presumed excesses of the political opposition,
not to prevent the execution of policies deemed by the ruling clique to
be vital to the nation's interest.21 In general, it seems fair to say that
America's IIgreatest" presidents have put more faith in their own
judgment regarding how best to serve the national interest (in tacit
violation of the presidential oath of office) than in adhering to the
:narrowly administrative role outlined for the executive in the Consti-
tution.
In a similar way; "morality" has played a paradoxical role in the
history of American foreign policy: Foreign policy goals have tradi-
tionally needed a moral rationale in order to be viable. Yet from the
time of the Jefferson and Hamilton debates over foreign policy in the
1790s, American statesmen and scholars have generally believed that
allowing abstract moral considerations to take precedence over tangi-
ble national interests would be the height of folly: The foreign policies
of even the most lIidealistic" presidents (Wilson, for example) cannot
be said to have contradicted what were perceived to be the nation's
eoncrete interests. The sheer fact of American wealth and power
suggests that a disinterested altruism has not been a major factor in
determining American foreign policy: Empirically; the tendency has
been to equate u.s. foreign policy goals with that which is moral, and
vice versa. While the universalistic rhetoric of American foreign
policy has frequently masked realities distinctly less honorable than
advertised, American statesmen have been of the conviction (as
.i~dams was during the Jackson affair) that serving what they perceive
to be the national interest is the greatest good.
The public's tacit acquiescence in this duplicity is explained by the
fact that its desire to believe is stronger than its desire to kno~ and
by its perception that beneath the patriotic fictions its concrete
interests are being served. This being so, statesmen have been able to
define morality as that which serves the American nation and, more
generally; the global republican revolution. Rather than following a
"'double standard" as is sometimes charged, they have actually ad-
llered to one standard throughout the nation's history: the standard of
American national self-interest. The potential ethical pitfalls of this
formulation are obviated by the assumption of congruity between the
progress of humanity at large and the survival and success of the
{]nited States. God blesses America. Or so the thinking goes.22
C;iven John Quincy Adams's vast accomplishments as secretary of
state, which dwarfed those of his predecessors Jefferson, Madison,
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and Monroe, it is one of the cruel ironies of American history that he
was not the consensus choice for president in 1824. By the old rules,
Adams deserved the chance to lead his country. Unfortunately for
him, the era of selecting American presidents by consensus was over.
Throughout his term as secretary of state, Adams continued to
evince a lack of interest in the presidency and an unwillingness to
cultivate support for his candidacy: In 1818, he wrote to Paul EC.
Degrand: "If my country wants my services [as president], she must
ask for them." 23 He spurned the backing of Pennsylvania represen-
tative Joel Hopkinson: "I will not take one step to advance or promote
pretensions to 'the presidency:" 24 And in a letter to Louisa in late
1822, Adams rejected the efforts on his behalf of newspaper editor
Robert Walsh, instructing his wife to "tell him, that in his editorial
capacit~ I wish him to set aside all his feelings of personal regard for
me, as completely as if there were no such person in existence." 25
Beyond discouraging potential political supporters, Adams's corre-
spondence reveals a strange ambivalence towards the presidenc~
similar to the ambivalence he expressed upon becoming secretary of
state. In October 1822 he wrote to Louisa: "There will be candidates
enough for the Presidency without me, and if my delicacy is not
suited to the times, there are candidates enough who have no such
delicacy. It suits my temper to be thus delicate.... If my friends will
neither say nor write to me a single word about the Presidenc~from
this time forward until the election is over, I believe it would be better
for me and perhaps better for them. . . . They think I am panting to be
President, when I am much more inclined to envy Castlereagh [who
had committed suicide] the relief he had found from a situation too
much like mine.... If I should tell you that I dread infinitely more
than I wish to be President, you would not believe me.... It is my
situation that makes me a candidate and you at least know that
my present situation was neither of my own seeking, nor of my
choice." 26 The letter's open expression of a death wish is revealing, as
is Adams's perception of self as a reluctant agent of destiny.
Adams's coy diffidence toward the office he believed destiny in-
tended him to occupy is most vividly displayed in an extraordinary
essay known as the"Macbeth Policy:" Meant to serve as a response to
Hopkinson's continued exertions on his behalf, it reveals the con-
fused state of Adams's mind in the months prior to the election of
1824. He muses that Macbeth's remark "If chance will have me king,
why chance may crown me without my stir" reveals"a remnant of
virtue yet struggling in the breast of that victim of unhallowed
ambition against the horrible imaginings of that policy by which he
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finally wins the crown and loses his life and his soul." The parallels to
Adams's own life are obvious: high office is to go to those /lthe most
able and the most worthy;" not to those with the most friends in the
Congress and in the press. A president is made only by the merit of his
previous accomplishments, not by offers of aid to those who lend
their support. Adams deemed as /I essentially and vitally corrupt" an
office won as the result of promises made to political backers. Hence,
.he felt compelled to dissuade those who would assist his candidacy
because of their expectations of favors in return. Adams spurned aid
in spite of the /lgreat exertions" that he believed had been made to
discredit his candidacy: /lIn no part of the Union, not even in my
:native New England, has there been an unequivo.cal manifestation of
,a public sentiment disposed to hold me up as a candidate. If that
feeling does not exist, and in a force which no effort of intrigue can
suppress or restrain, it would be a useless, and perhaps worse than
luseless, thing for a few personal friends of mine to produce it.... If
Jmy countrymen prefer others to me, I must not repine at their
choice.... Merit and just right in this country will be heard. And in
Jmy case if they are not heard without my stir I shall·acquiesce in the
conclusion that it is because they do not exist."27
Adams's reluctance to take steps to promote his candidacy must be
juxtaposed against his management of foreign affairs and domestic
opinion as secretary of state. As the helmsman of American foreign
policy; Adams maximized the interests of the nation-state he served
by a policy in which the ends controlled, rather than justified, the
nleans. Whether by linguistic persuasion, intimidation, or obfusca-
tion, he did what was necessary (including defending the arguably
lJ.nconstitutional use of military force) to advance what he perceived
to be the nation's interest. Yet in the realm of presidential politics,
Adams maintained a scrupulous above-the-fray attitude that neither
reflected his true feelings about the office nor confronted the realities
(even though he was keenly aware of them) of the political culture in
'N'hich he lived. It is another of the many contradictions that com-
posed the man John Quincy Adams.
His own words notwithstanding, when the people gave a plurality
of their votes to Jackson, Adams could not /lacquiesce in the con-
clusion." His unequivocal statement of principle in the /lMacbeth
l>olicy" makes even more astounding his shameless politicking in the
rnonths preceding the deciding vote for president in the House of
R,epresentatives. Official Washington was treated to the spectacle of
the imperious John Quincy Adams visiting congressional boarding-
llouses and engaging in the classic art of political horsetrading. The
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infamous "corrupt bargain" where by he received Clay's electoral
support in exchange for an appointment to head the department of
state is only part of the story. Adams also schemed to swing the states
of Louisiana, Illinois, and Maryland out of the Jackson camp and into
his own.28 Perhaps the greatest irony is that had Adams taken even a
moderately active role in the campaign, he probably would have won
the election outright; it was generally acknowledged the he was the
most competent, if not the most popular, of the candidates. His rigid
adherence to the Adams family myth had proved his undoing.
Samuel Flagg Bemis describes Adams's machinations to win the
House presidential vote as "nothing corrupt, nothing unconstitu-
tional. "29 George Dangerfield observes that "if corruption existed,
it was a corruption that is inseparable from all political arrange-
ments."30 Yet even if the means by which Adams became president
violated no legal statute, they made a mockery of the creed by which
Adams had presumed to live. The union with the archduke of person-
al ambition, Henry Clay; whatever policy views the two men shared,
was a sellout of all Adams purported to believe regarding the proper
path to political office. In the final analysis, Adams was as ambitious
and as willing to mortgage his personal integrity to feed that ambition
as any of his rivals. In light of his actions, his repeated denials of
ambition appear a grotesque parody of the classical republican ideal
of the virtuous, unselfish, public servant. His protestations of un-
selfishness only add hypocrisy to his undeniable ambition.
In another sense, his actions reveal that the "classical republi-
canism" of revolutionary America was anachronistic in the age of
Jackson. John Quincy Adams's failure to be spontaneously chosen the
leader of his nation, given his capabilities, his achievements, and his
character, demonstrated conclusively the irrelevance of the classical
ideal that virtue and service are spontaneously rewarded. It was
Adams's peculiarly bad luck to be the individual destined to drama-
tize this lesson. He was, it is fair to say; in a very difficult situation. To
have made the major sacrifices that he did in service to his nation, to
achieve the triumphs that he did, and then to concede graciously
to an individual whose career he had once saved and whom Jefferson
had described as "a dangerous man" was in the end too much to ask of
Adams, symbolically the most principled individual in the history of
American politics. In his mind, he faced an agonizing choice between
preserving his personal integrity and preserving the nation to which
he had dedicated his life. Perhaps he felt that having sacrificed so
much else for his country; he really had no choice.
Louisa was disgusted at her husband's electoral schemings. His
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open display of a grasping ambition that she had always known
existed surprised her nonetheless.31 Henry Adams, too, would later
bitterly criticize his grandfather's actions. The family historian de-
scribed John Quincy as "a tool of the slave oligarchy (especially about
Florida)," who "never rebelled until the slave oligarchy contemp-
tuously cut his throat." Henry lamented that his grandfather was
"abominably selfish or absorbed in self, and incapable of feeling his
duty· to others"j his career before 1830 had been "a sentimental
folly-a bitter absurdity: "32
Perhaps the ultimate rebuke was a line that appeared in a Jackson-
ian :newspaper: "Expired at Washington on the ninth of Februar~ of
poison administered by the assassin hands of John Quincy Adams. . .
the virtue, libert~ and independence of the United States."33
Having achieved the office as a result of his own machinations,
Adams became one of the least successful presidents in American
history: His farsighted pla.ns for national unity and development were
almost completely stymied by the opposition of both houses of Con-
gress. His visionary program of national development, requiring as it
did a strong central authority; would have been difficult for any
political leader to implement. Moreover, his claim to moral lead-
ership had been tarnished, to say the least, by the manner in which he
was elected. These facts, combined with the bitterness of Jackson
supporters over the "stolen" election of 1824, doomed the Adams
administration from the start and spurred the formation of the Demo-
cratic party: Ironically; John Quincy Adams, whose whole public life
llad been devoted to preventing factionalism in American politics,
contributed as much as any single individual to the rise of the second
American party system by his dogged desire to become president. His
defeat at the hands of Jackson in 1828 signaled the beginning of a new
era in American politics.
Defeat in 1828 meant that for the second time in two generations,
the American people had rejected the program, the leadership, and
the values of the Adams family: Like his father before him, John
(2uin.cy found himself and his views out of step with the mainstream
of American development.34 He now knew that the destiny of his
family was not to lead the nation but to serve as a symbol for all that
Jacksonian America meant to change.
In the wake of his rejection by the American public and the suicide
of his son George in May 1829, Adams underwent a severe personal
crisis.3s A life founded on the proposition that God's purposes on
earth could be determined and acted upon by an educated, moral
]mind had been shattered. :He experienced agonizing doubts about the
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existence of God and the meaning of life. All his suffering and sacri-
fices had led only to his defeat by a man whom Brooks Adams
describes as representing to John Quincy Adams "the materialization
of the principle of evil"; Adams found "to his horror that he, who had
worshipped education and science, had unwittingly ministered to the
demon." 36
Adams's disillusionment was not short-lived. The triumph of Jack-
son and of the values of greed and avarice characteristic of Jacksonian
America symbolized to him the destruction of the American experi-
ment in liberty and republican government. The dominance of the
slaveholders and the spirit of plunder that drove federal land policy
sickened him. In a letter to the Reverend Charles Upham in 1837,
Adams expressed his bitterness that the national patrimony of public
lands was being squandered rather than used to finance the system of
roads, railroads, and canals necessary for national development. Yet
the "Sable Genius of the South," fearful of northern prosperity and
federal authorit~ "fell to cursing the tariff and internal improvement,
and raised the standard of free trade, nullification, and states
rights.... The great object of my life therefore ... has failed." 37
It is against this backdrop of despair and doubt that Adams's return
to politics via the House of Representatives seems all the more
quixotic. The sane course would seem to have been retirement to the
life of books and agriculture that he had always yearned for. Perhaps a
lifetime of public service made politics a hard habit to break; at any
rate, in spite of the opposition of Louisa and the boys, Adams took his
House seat in 1831.
Perhaps he was merely fulfilling what he perceived to be his new
destiny. He crafted his return to politics in Ciceronian terms, quoting
the Roman statesman: "I will not desert in myoid age the republic I
defended in my youth." 38 In his moment of crisis Adams closely
identified with Cicero. He had translated Cicero's writings as a boy
and now reread them in the original Latin.39 The Roman's stead-
fastness in the face of immense tribulation inspired Adams, as did
Cicero's historic role as a spokesman for the past in times of political
and social turbulence. He wrote to his son Charles: "Everyone of the
letters of Cicero is a picture of the state of the writer's mind when it
was written. It is like an evocation of shades to read them. I see him
approach me like the image of the Fantasmagoria-he seems opening
his lips to speak to me and passes off, but his words as if they had
fallen upon my ears are left deeply stamped upon my memory." 40
Adams's career in the House is notable for the contrast it bears to
his career as a national leader. Occupying a secure seat, the "man of
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the whole nation" became the man of his section and of his con-
science, unconcerned with the divisiveness created by his antislavery
stand. Indeed, he missed no opportunity to oppose the slave interests
he so despised. He led the struggle to repeal the"gag rule" prohibiting
congressional reception of antislavery petitions and defended before
the Supreme Court a group of blacks who had mutinied on the slave
ship Amistad.41 Although he never publicly allied himself with the
abolitionist movement, Bemis describes him as "an abolitionist at
heart." It is a fair judgment. Adams's repeated attacks on the "slave-
scourging republicans" made him a pariah among southerners and
the target of numerous death threats.42
Adams's antislavery views predated his career in the House.43 His
diary for the period of the Missouri debates, while the Transcontinen-
tal rfreaty remained unratified, contains an extraordinary profusion
of opinion concerning the dire seriousness of the slavery question and
his own uncompromising opposition to slavery and slavemasters.
Believing that the problem was systemic, Adams traced the roots of
the Missouri controversy to the "dishonorable compromise with
slavery" sanctioned by the Constitution. He was convinced that "the
bargain between freedom and slavery contained in the Constitution
is morally vicious, inconsistent with the principles upon which alone
our revolution can be justified." 44 He viewed Jefferson's Declaration
of Independence with its promise of equality as "the precipice into
which the slave-holding planters of his country sooner or later must
fall. n 45
Adams described the Missouri question as "a flaming sword" that
threatened the continuation of the union: "I did take it for granted
that the present question [Missouri] is a mere preamble-a title page
to a great tragic volume." 46 It was not his only premonition of the
Civil War. In December 1819 Adams wrote that "the seeds of the
Declaration of Independence are yet maturing. The harvest will be
what West, the painter, calls the terrible sublime." 47 In November
1820 he eerily predicted: "If slavery be the destined sword in the hand
of the destroying angel which is to sever the ties of this union, the
same sword will cut in sunder the bonds of slavery itself. A dissolu-
tion of the union for the cause of slavery would be followed by a
servile war in the slave-holding states, combined with a war between
the two severed portions of the union. It seems to me that its result
:must be the extirpation of slavery from this whole continenti and,
calanlitous and desolating as this course of events in its progress must
be, so glorious would be its final issue, that, as God shall judge me, I
dare not say that it is not to be desired." 48 Adams kept this fire-eating
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sentiment confined (for the time being) to the privacy of his dair~ but
it was the sort of apocalyptic rhetoric that would later prove unnerv-
ing in the extreme for slaveholders.
Adams's concern over the slave question had led him to doubt the
wisdom of territorial expansion even as he presided over his great
territorial acquisition. In April 1820 he commented to Congressman
David Trimble of Kentucky: "I thought the greatest danger of this
union was in the overgrown extent of its territor~ combining with
the slavery question." 49 Adams observed that the Missouri crisis had
"operated to indispose" all sections against the Transcontinental
Treat~ "the North and East because they do not wish even to have
Florida as another slave statej and the South and West, because they
wish to have all the territory to the Rio del Norte for more slave
states." 50 Adams's comment that he "had very little attachment to
the treaty" because of the acquisition of lands destined to be slave
states demonstrates how keenly aware he was of the hazards of
expansion to the continuation of the Union. As early as 1820, he
recognized that expansion through space might not forestall the
development of political conflict over time. Indeed, he sensed that
territorial expansion might accelerate the disintegrative tendencies.
During the Missouri" debates, Adams's diary reveals a man ready to
take strong measures to prevent the spread of slavery: He lamented
the failure of a provision in the Missouri Bill excluding the introduc-
tion of slaves into Missouri, a measure that foreshadowed the Wilmot
Proviso of 1846.51 He commented in March 1820 that "perhaps it
would have been a wiser as well as a bolder course to have persisted in
the restriction upon the Missouri, till it should have terminated in a
convention of the states to revise and amend the Constitution.... If
the union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon
which it ought to break.// 52 No abolitionist could have said it better.
Adams speculated that Missouri's attempt to deny rights to free
people of color visiting from other states required that Massachusetts
refuse to recognize the rights of white Missourians visiting the Bay
Statej moreover, he argued that Missouri's refusal to recognize the
rights of free people of color from Massachusetts meant that his
home state would be justified in refusing to return fugitive slaves to
Missouri slaveowners. Adams's motives are clear: "All of which I
would do, not to violate, but to redeem from violation, the Constitu-
tion of the United States." 53 It is a powerful statement of the consti-
tutional basis of antislavery:
During his tenure as secretary of state, as a candidate fQr president,
and as president-despite his diary's passionate antislavery senti-
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ments-Adams made no public pronouncements on the slave ques-
tion.54 His moral outrage remained unspoken, a victim of his
understanding that a frank statement on the issue would spell the
end of his hopes for national leadership. The slave issue most clearly
reveals the contradictions Adams faced in trying to be both the "man
of the whole nation" and a man true to his own conscience.
Noteworthy too, are Adams's observations regarding the dynamic
of the Missouri debates. He perceived that the most energetic and
impassioned orators in the slavery debates tended to be those who
argued in defense of slavery: If there were "but one man" who "could
arise with the genius capable of comprehending, a heart capable of
supporting, and an utterance capable of communicating those eternal
truths that belong to this question, to lay bare in all its nakedness that
outrage upon the goodness of God, human slavery; now is the time,
and this is the occasion, upon which such a man would perform the
duties of an angel upon earth!" 55 Here Adams was envisioning the
messianic, redemptive role which his conscience wanted him to play
but which political expediency prohibited. Adams yearned for a time
in which he would be no longer the statesman but rather the prophet,
free to speak whatever his conscience suggested was right. Even-
tually; he did play the role of antislavery critic with such virtuosity as
to earn the nickname "Old Man Eloquent."
Congressman Adams's defense of the rights of slaves was paralleled
by his increasing sympathy for the cause of the Indians of the South-
east. He described American Indian policy as "among the heinous
sins of this nation, for which I believe God will one day bring [it] to
judgement." 56 The prominence of the slaveholder and speculator in
the opening of new lands in the Southeast led Adams to be one of the
:most outspoken opponents of the Indian removal policy: He con-
demned the Second Seminole War as a violation of both the rights of
Indians a~d the nation's honor.57 This erstwhile defender of the rights
of southern frontiersmen now believed that it would be better to
allow the Southeast to remain in the hands of the Indians than to
expand a civilization whose organizing principle was slave labor.
JA.dams hoped that his stand might somehow aid "that hapless race of
ltl.ative Americans, which we are exterminating with such merciless
cmd perfidious cruelty:" 58 The language echoes that of the Erving
lettet:. but now Adams saw justice to be on the side of the Indians, not
the white frontiersmen. It hardly seems necessary to note that it was
1~dams who had changed between the 1810s and 1830s, not the
situation on the southern frontier. Ultimately; Adams recognized the
tragic hopelessness of the Indian question. In 1841 he turned down
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the chairmanship of the House Committee on Indian Affairs.
Powerless to stop the extermination of native Americans, he wrote
that the position would be nothing but "a perpetual harrow upon my
feelings. 11
Adams's defense of the rights of slaves and of Indians led him to
reject what he perceived to be the racially based foundations of
Manifest Destiny. By modem standards, Adams was a racist-he
firmly believed in the cultural and moral superiority of the white
race-yet he differed with the dominant temper of his times (and
with former associates such as Calhoun) in his conviction of the
natural rights of all people, regardless of skin color. He refused to
accept the proposition that black people had no rights that any white
man was obliged to recognize. To Adams, slavery was a moral cancer
on the body politic which forfeited America's pretensions to lead-
ership of the cause of human freedom. He viewed the virulent,
pseudoscientific racism that swept both North and South during the
decades preceding the Civil War as a monstrous distortion of the
promise of the republican revolution. In a landmark speech on 25
May 1836, Representative Adams denied that the Constitution pro-
hibited Congress from interfering with slavery in the South. Antic-
ipating Lincoln's doctrine of emancipation under martial law; he
stated: "From the instant that your slaveholding states become the
theater of war, civil, servile, or foreign, from that instant the war
powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of
slavery in every way which it can be interfered with." 59
Adams's stirring advocacy of human freedom won him wide re-
buke; one gentleman from Alabama promised "to cut your throat
from ear to ear." Undaunted by this and other threats, Adams endured
congressional trial for censure in what was yet another effort to "stop
the music of John Quincy Adams." He knew that the nation was not
yet ready to take the great moral leap of the imagination required to
end slavery: "To open the way for others is all that I can do. The cause
is good and great." His pro-freedom convictions are perhaps best
expressed in the last two lines of a poem he wrote in 1827 on the first
anniversary of his father's death:
Roll, years of promise, rapidly roll round
Till not a slave on this Earth be found
Adams wanted to inscribe the lines on his father's tomb; he refrained
from doing so at the prompting of friends who feared the inflamma-
tory symbolism of such an act.60
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Closely linked to Adams's antislavery stand was his uncompromis-
ing opposition as a congressman to the acquisition of Texas. This too
was a reversal from the position he had taken as secretary of state and
as president. Then he had fought hard to acquire Texas; he repeatedly
claimed to have been the last cabinet member to acquiesce in the
retreat to the Sabine River during the negotiations with Spain, and as
president he had pushed for annexation of the province.61 Now he
resisted such efforts with every weapon at his disposal. Adams knew
what many historians since his time have obscured, that American
politics in the 1830s and 1840s was fundamentally a struggle between
those who viewed slavery as wrong and those who saw it as right. It
was less a "conspiracy" of the "slaveocracy" than it was a moral,
philosophical, and political debate between incommensurable world
views. Adams, like Lincoln to follo~ knew that the Union could not
long endure half slave and half free, that it must become all one thing
or the other. He characterized the Texas revolution of 1836 as a
criminal revolt by slaveholders and speculators. He feared that annex-
,ation of Texas would be followed by the absorption of Cuba and the
increasing dominance of the slave interests in the halls of Congress.
:In 1843 he proposed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that
the free states would be under no obligation to acquiesce in any Texas
annexation treaty-a stand that verged on John Calhoun-style nul-
lification.62 The classical lens through which he viewed events
prompted Adams to compare Tyler's defeated Texas annexation treaty
of 1844 to the Catiline conspiracy; thwarted by Cicero, in 63 B.C.
.Annexation of Texas, he said, would be "robbery of Mexico." 63
Adams's resistance to Texas annexation naturally led him to op-
pose the Mexican War vehemently. Despite his age and physical
frailty; he was the spiritual leader of the antiwar faction in the House,
being one of only fourteen members to vote against a declaration of
'war. He urged American officers to resign their commissions rather
fhan fight in what he considered to be an "unrighteous war." He
called for the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Mexico
and peace without territorial indemnit~ Predictably; this stand gen-
erated charges of treason and disloyalt~Adams's intense opposition
to the spirit and tactics of Manifest Destiny during this period makes
all the more ironic his earlier role in generating and advancing the
expansionist fever. As secret"ary of state, Bemis writes, Adams "had
elll but coined the magic making phrase 'Manifest Destin~'''64
Adams (along with Calhoun) was convinced that Polk had pro-
voked a confrontation on the Texas border and then presented the
issue to Congress and the public as an act of aggression by Mexico. It
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is not surprising that Adams recognized Polk's duplicitous diplo-
macy; it was similar to his own defense of the First Seminole War.
Both he and Calhoun knew well how easy it was to stampede the
Congress into supporting executive actions of dubious legitimac~
Adams, who had disdained the constitutional objections to Jackson's
foray into Florida, now found himself the one futilely opposing the
shibboleths of patriotism and self-defense with abstract constitu-
tional principles.
Adams also led the fight to obtain the release of all the documents
in the president's possession relating to the conduct of the war. Polk,
citing concern for the national interest, had released only a portion of
the relevant material. Adams knew better than anyone that a sani-
tized documentary version of reality created the illusion without the
substance of executive consultation with the Congress. His appeal for
all the documents reveals how far he had come since his term as
secretary of state: "I think the House ought to sustain, in the strong-
est manner, their right to call for information upon questions in
which war and peace are concerned. They ought to maintain their
right, and maintain it in a very distinct manner, against this assertion
on the part of the President of the United States." 65
Adams's apostasy reached its apex in a letter he wrote on 26
December 1847 to -another old republican and antiwar spokesman,
Albert Gallatin. The letter, one of the last Adams ever composed,
decried Polk's war message as a "direct and notorious violation of the
truth." He lamented that the congressional power to make war had
been usurped by the executive branch: "It is now established as an
irreversible precedent that the President of the United States has but
to declare that war exists . . . and the war is essentially declared." 66
The former archdefender of an enlarged exetutive warmaking power
now perceived-too late-the danger to liberty and republicanism
that such power implied. He seems not to have acknowledged his part
in establishing the precedent, however.
Adams's opposition to slavery and the Mexican War did not prevent
him from continuing to champion the expansion of commercial
relations with Asia and the acquisition of Oregon. Bemis writes that
"nobody was interested in events in China more than Adams." He
maintained close ties with those New Englanders involved in the
China trade such as LH. Perkins, Bryant and Sturgis, and the Cush-
ings. He steadfastly supported Great Britain during the Opium War
and welcomed the Treaty of Wanghia of 1844.67 Having committed
the United States to an East Asia policy in 1819, he was happy to see
the growth of American commerce in that part of the world.
THE AMERICAN CICERO 197 .
Concerning the Oregon question, Adams was an unyielding 54-40
man. His plea for no territorial indemnity from Mexico did not
prevent his lobbying for all of the Oregon countr~ Adams posited a
natural American right to the Northwest; he defended his stand in
Congress by alluding to the biblical passage commanding humanity
to "be fruitful and multiply ... and have dominion over the fish of the
sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth on earth." 68 In contrast to his critique of the Mexican War, he
heartily approved Polk's confrontational approach to Britain in the
Northwest. Adams feared that Great Britain wished to maintain
Oregon as "a wilderness for the savage hunter" and to "stunt our
natural growth." He even advocated war should Great Britain prove
utterly resistant to American pleadings.69 Hence, he understood
Polk's meaning when, referring to Oregon, he said, "The American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have
assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject
for future colonization by any European power." Adams's own "Mon-
roe Doctrine" had come to fruition.
His support of Polk's Oregon policy points out the contradictions
in Adams's opposition to expansion in the Southwest. The president's
expansionism merely reassembled the alliance of northeastern mer-
cantile and southern slaveholding interests that had been served by
the Transcontinental Treat~ "Polk's aggressive diplomacy" was es-
sentially the continuation, both in tactics. and aims, of Adams's
aggressive diplomacy of a quarter-century earlier. The charges of
11ypocrisy leveled against Adams for his congressional record on the
Indians, slaver~ and expansion into the Southwest were entirely
justified. His "principled" stands on these issues enraged his oppo-
11ents, who were unwilling to let him walk away from such a well-
defined past.
The most significant aspect of John Quincy Adams's "second ca-
reerU as a congressman is the degree to which it was a repudiation of
the achievements of his first career as "the man of the whole nation."
()n Indian removal, on slaver~on expansionism in the Southwest, on
the warmaking powers of the executive he had flipflopped. Only on
those issues that had always been in the interests of his home state-
the acquisition of Oregon and the extension of the China trade-did
he demonstrate the steadfastness characteristic of the true "man of
principle" he presumed to be.
Adams's second career was as much marked by divisiveness as his
first career had been marked by appeals to unity: His conduct as a
congressman was confrontational and provocative. The man who had
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written to his father in 1811 that "union is to me what balance is to
you" came to welcome the prospect of civil war.70 To Adams, the evil
of slavery had so tainted the noble experiment in republican liberty
that he believed disunion desirable. To an audience in 1842 he specu-
lated: "Was all this a Utopian daydream? Is the one talent, entrusted
by the Lord of the harvest, for the improvement of the condition of
man, to be hidden under a bushel? Is the lamp, destined to light the
world, to be extinguished by the blasting breath of slavery?"7! He
described the Constitution as "a menstruous rag, and the Union is
sinking into a military monarchy; to be rent asunder like the empire
of Alexander or the kingdoms of Ephraim and Judah." 72 He wrote to
Richard Rush in 1845 that "the polar star of our foreign relations at
that time [1817-25] was justice it is now conquest. Their vital spirit
was then liberty it is now slaver~ ... Liberty has yet her greatest
warfare to wage in this Hemisphere. May your posterity and mine be
armed in celestial panoply for the conflict." 73 The reference to his
term as secretary of state being characterized by "justice" is telling:
he could not consciously acknowledge his former complicity with
the evil he now decried.
In the end, John Quincy Adams's destiny was fulfilled. Yet destiny
proved a cruel trickster, placing Adams in a role that he had not
anticipated; the ways of God had not been revealed to a man. As he
neared death, Adams knew that the nation he had devoted his life to
was coming apart, falling victim to the factionalism that history had
predicted was fatal to republics. In October 1846 he made this entry
in his diary: "If my intellectual powers had been such as have been
sometimes committed by the Creator of man to single individuals of
the species my diary would have been, next to the Holy Scriptures,
the most precious and valuable book ever written by human hands,
and I should have been one of the greatest benefactors of my country
and of mankind. I would, by the irresistible power of genius and the
irrepressible power of will and the favor of almighty God, have ban-
ished war and slavery from the face of the earth forever. But the
conceptive power of mind was not conferred upon me by my Maker,
and I have not improved the scanty portion of His gifts as I might and
ought to have done." 74 His diar~ intended to be a daily record of the
evolution of God's chosen people, was instead a narrative of the birth,
rise, and immi~entcollapse of their union.
The experiment in republican government consisting of a volun-
tary union of states was to fail, to be reconstructed as an imperial
democracy consecrated in blood. The American republic was, as the
lessons of history predicted, ending in tragedy. That most Americans
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have not perceived the life of John Quincy Adams or the history of the
republic in such terms is not surprising, given the popular obsession
with happy endings. As Henry Adams later wrote, "Americans have
always taken their tragedy lightl~11 7S
Despite a debilitating stroke in November 1846, Adams kept his
House seat, a silent sentinel of the antiwar movement. On 21 Febru-
ary 1848, while voting against a measure recommending the decora-
tion of Mexican War veterans, John Quincy Adams collapsed at his
desk. Lapsing into a coma, he died two days later. He died without
knowing that on his last full day of life, 22 February-birthday of
Washington and anniversary of both the signing of the Transcontinen-
tal Treaty and its ratification-Polk sent to the Senate for ratification
the Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican War,
expanded the territory of the United States, and further inflamed the
sectional controvers~A life that had begun at the birth of indepen-
dence had ended in the shadow of civil war.
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